A14095:832
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
This objection Suarez foreseeth and proposeth: Sicut divina 1potentia non potest facere id quod de se non est factibile, ita nec scientia divina scire potest id quod ex se scibile non est, neque certum judicium ferre de eo quod in se omnino incertum est: Nam neque scientia potest ferri extra objectum suum, neque potest suo modo non commensurari illi in certitudine, & infallibilitate, quia requirit adaequationem. And to this purpose he allegeth Thomas, saying; Scientiam non posse esse necessariam, nisi objectum sub aliqua ratione qua attingitur, necessitatem habeat. Et hoc modo dici potest requiri ex parte objecti certitudinem objectivam, id est, talem modum veritatis, quae apta sit, ut certum & infallibile judicium feratur, quod sane habet omnis veritas hoc ipso quod determinata est. In which latter words he gives in brief a better and fairer answer, then in the whole distinction following, if he be able to make good what he saith. For indeed every truth determinate is a sufficient object of knowledge.
This objection Suarez foreseeth and proposeth: Sicut divina 1potentia non potest facere id quod de se non est factibile, ita nec scientia divina scire potest id quod ex se scibile non est, neque certum judicium ferre de eo quod in se omnino incertum est: Nam neque scientia potest ferri extra objectum suum, neque potest suo modo non commensurari illi in certitudine, & infallibilitate, quia requirit adaequationem. And to this purpose he alledgeth Thomas, saying; Scientiam non posse esse necessariam, nisi objectum sub aliqua ratione qua attingitur, necessitatem habeat. Et hoc modo dici potest requiri ex parte objecti certitudinem objectivam, id est, talem modum veritatis, quae apta sit, ut certum & infallibile judicium feratur, quod sane habet omnis veritas hoc ipso quod determinata est. In which latter words he gives in briefe a better and fairer answer, then in the whole distinction following, if he be able to make good what he saith. For indeed every truth determinate is a sufficient object of knowledge.
- 1Lib. de scien fut. conting.