A14095:833
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
But I would know of him or you, how comes it to be true that such a contingent shall exist, whereas in his own nature it is only possible to exist, and indifferent as well not to exist as to exist. As for example, how is it true that to morrow ⟨p. 336⟩it shall rain, rather then that to morrow it shall not rain, seeing in it self it is no more inclinable to the one then to the other. If the one were true and the other false, then there were no question, but God should know the one to be true and the other to be false. But seeing there is no reason given by Suarez, why the one should be true rather then the other; there is no reason why one should be known of God to be true more then the other. And therefore Suarez layeth for a ground that future contingents have from all eternity a determinate truth, but shows not how they come to have their truth; nor how things merely possible in themselves come to be future, which as it is apparent, could not possibly be without a cause. But had he gone about this work, which indeed was most necessary, the truth would soon have appeared in his colours. For it will soon be found that nothing could be the cause hereof but the will of God. Which was the opinion as he professeth both of Ricardus, and of Scotus, and in effect of Cajetan and of many of the Thomist; and that Alexander of Hales favoureth it.
But I would know of him or you, how comes it to bee true that such a contingent shall exist, whereas in his owne nature it is onely possible to exist, and indifferent as well not to exist as to exist. As for example, how is it true that to morrow ⟨p. 336⟩it shall rayne, rather then that to morrowe it shall not rayne, seeing in it selfe it is no more inclinable to the one then to the other. If the one were true and the other false, then there were no question, but God should knowe the one to be true and the other to be false. But seeing there is no reason given by Suarez, why the one should be true rather then the other; there is no reason why one should be knowne of God to be true more then the other. And therefore Suarez layeth for a ground that future contingents have from all eternitie a determinate truth, but shewes not how they come to have their truthe; nor how thinges merely possible in themselvs come to be future, which as it is apparēt, could not possibly be without a cause. But had he gone about this worke, which indeede was most necessary, the truth would soone have appeared in his colours. For it will soone be found that nothing could be the cause hereof but the will of God. Which was the opinion as he professeth both of Ricardus, and of Scotus, and in effect of Cajetan and of many of the Thomist; and that Alexander of Hales favoureth it.