A14095:836
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
In the next place you give some reason for your assertion. As when you say, We are able by Gods permission to lay a necessity upon contingents and so to foreknow them, yet our knowledge still is but finite. Hence you seem willing to infer that therefore God seeing his knowledge is infinite is able to know future contingents without laying any necessity upon them, by the determination of his will. I am very glad to hear you reason, because it is so rare with you herein like to Hector Naevianus, Qui Philosophari volebat sed paucis.
In the next place you give some reason for your assertion. As when you say, We are able by Gods permission to lay a necessitie upon contingents and so to foreknowe them, yet our knowledge still is but finite. Hence you seeme willing to inferre that therefore God seeing his knowledge is infinite is able to know future contingents without laying any necessitie upon them, by the determination of his will. I am very glad to heare you reason, because it is so rare with you herein like to Hector Naevianus, Qui Philosophari volebat sed paucis.
Henry the seventh of England was wont to say he desired ⟨p. 338⟩to look his dangers in the face: so I desire to know what my opposite hath to say against the truth I defend. I have been so long exercised in these points, and encountered such champions, that I have no cause to fear your colours, nor powder and shot neither: wherefore in the first place I answer, that the difference between knowledge finite and infinite doth not require that infinite knowledge should extend so far as to know things unknowable, for that were to extend beyond his object. But rather herein they differ, of things knowable, finite knowledge takes notice only of some; infinite knowledge comprehends all. Now things contingent till they are determined to come to pass, or not to come to pass, are not knowable that they shall come to pass, nor are knowable that they shall not come to pass; and consequently cannot be known that they shall come to pass, or known that they shall not come to pass.