A14095:856
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
As touching the perfection of Gods knowledge uncapable of addition, therein we argue with you. Your next position is worthy of consideration; As Gods knowledge doth not make things to be, so neither doth the immutable or absolute certainty of his knowledge make things so known by him to be immutable, or absolutely necessary either in themselves, or in respect of his eternal knowledge. To this I answer, first to the first member of your sentence, that great Divines from Augustine's days to these days have maintained that the knowledge of God is the cause of things. And the reason they give is th•s; because the knowledge of God is scientia artificis, the knowledge of a craftsmaster. Now the case is clear, that craftsmasters by their ⟨p. 347⟩knowledge do work and cause things. Yet I am content to help you with a distinction, if you will be pleased to accept of it. That the knowledge of God which is the knowledge of an artificer, is the scientia simplicis intelligentiae, whereby he knows all things possible, and how to order all things most conveniently to their ends. But the knowledge you speak of here proceeds of scientia visionis, whereby God ever knew what should come to pass: and this knowledge indeed is not the cause of things. But as for the later member of this your sentence, it might have been• so carried as to give your self satisfaction (if I be not deceived) and us also: as thus, So the certainty of Gods knowledge doth not make things certain; or if you would add the word necessary we could have bo• with it, though it marreth the proportion; which precisely is this, As knowledge doth not make things to be, so certain knowledge doth not make things certainly to be. But you leaving out the word certainly, take away all evidence of proportion. Belike you would acknowledge that certain knowledge doth make things certainly to be. But I do not like the proposition, and the genius of your argument drawn from proportion, if it hath any force any way, hath force against it.
As touching the perfection of Gods knowledge uncapable of addition, therein we argue with you. Your next position is worthy of consideration; As Gods knowledge doth not make things to be, so neither doth the immutable or absolute certainty of his knowledge make things so knowne by him to be immutable, or absolutely necessarie either in themselves, or in respect of his eternall knowledge. To this I answer, first to the first member of your sentence, that great Divines from Austines daies to these daies have maintained that the knowledge of God is the cause of things. And the reason they give is ths; because the knowledge of God is scientia artificis, the knowledge of a craftsmaster. Now the case is cleare, that craftsmasters by their