A14095:883
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
The reason is, no faculty extends beyond his object. Within the compass of his own object it may be extended to any kind or particular, but it reacheth not beyond his object; Now the object of the eye is only colour, and the object of the ear is only sound. And a man may look upon what colours he will of many, that are presented unto him, so by the ear take notice of any sounds that are, but neither the eye can behold that which is not coloured, nor the ear apprehend ought that is not of the nature of sound. In like so• the will within the compass of her own object, may settle upon what she will, but beyond her object she cannot extend.
The reason is, no facultie extends beyond his object. Within the compasse of his owne object it may be extended to any kind or particular, but it reacheth not beyond his object; Now the object of the eye is onely colour, and the object of the eare is onely sound. And a man may looke upon what colours he will of many, that are presented unto him, so by the eare take notice of any sounds that are, but neither the eye can behold that which is not coloured, nor the eare appr•hēd ought that is not of the nature of sound. In like so• the will within the compasse of her owne object, may settle upon what she will, but beyond her object she cannot extend.
Now the object of the will is good not evil, and therefore she is of free choice to settle upon what good she will, but not upon evil. But here some may say how then can any evil be committed? I answer two ways: First by error of judgment. For it is the nature of the will to follow the judgement of the understanding, therefore it is called a reasonable appetite. Secondly, by preferring a less good before a greater, as in making choice of doing something because it is profitable, or pleasurable, or some way or other advantageous for the present, notwithstanding that it is dishonest, and such as will bring a far greater damage unto us for the time to come. Or thus; because we make choice of something as before mentioned notwithstanding a superior authority hath forbidden it; both because an evil inclination makes us prefer things presently pleasing and profitable, and withal proud that we cannot endure to be in subjection to lawful authority, such as undoubtedly is the authority of God.