A14095:884
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Now the object of the will is good not evil, and therefore she is of free choice to settle upon what good she will, but not upon evil. But here some may say how then can any evil be committed? I answer two ways: First by error of judgment. For it is the nature of the will to follow the judgement of the understanding, therefore it is called a reasonable appetite. Secondly, by preferring a less good before a greater, as in making choice of doing something because it is profitable, or pleasurable, or some way or other advantageous for the present, notwithstanding that it is dishonest, and such as will bring a far greater damage unto us for the time to come. Or thus; because we make choice of something as before mentioned notwithstanding a superior authority hath forbidden it; both because an evil inclination makes us prefer things presently pleasing and profitable, and withal proud that we cannot endure to be in subjection to lawful authority, such as undoubtedly is the authority of God.
Now the object of the will is good not evill, and therefore she is of free choyce to settle upon what good she will, but not upon evill. But here some may say how then can any evill be committed? I answere two wayes: First by errour of judgment. For it is the nature of the will to follow the judgement of the understanding, therefore it is called a reasonable appetite. Secondly, by preferring a lesse good before a greater, as in making choice of doing something because it is profitable, or pleasureable, or some way or other advantageous for the present, notwithstanding that it is dishonest, and such as will bring a farre greater dammage unto us for the time to come. Or thus; because we make choice of something as before mentioned notwithstanding a superiour authority hath forbidden it; both because an evill inclination maks us preferre things presently pleasing and profitable, and withall prowd that we cannot endure to be in subjection to lawfull authority, such as undoubtedlie is the authority of God.
Hence it comes to pass, that we are said also to be free to good or evil, which we may call a moral liberty in distinction ⟨p. 362⟩