A14095:899
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Again, the liberty of God is not like unto the liberty of his creatures, whether Angels or men, which yet notwithstanding you very confidently confound, manifesting no sense of so uncouth an assertion. Liberty in the creature is unto different acts of will, as either to will this, or to will that; but no such liberty is to be found in God. It was and is impossible there should be any other act in God then there is, because God is a simple act, and that act is his very essence, and as his essence cannot, nor could not be otherwise then it is, so neither could any other act of will be in him then there is. Gods liberty is only to different objects, not to different acts, though you pass over this without any distinction.
Againe, the libertie of God is not like unto the liberty of his creatures, whether Angels or men, which yet notwithstanding you very confidently confound, manifesting no sense of so uncouth an assertion. Liberty in the creature is unto different acts of will, as either to will this, or to will that; but no such libertie is to be found in God. It was and is impossible there should bee any other act in God then there is, because God is a simple act, and that act is his very essence, and as his essence cannot, nor could not bee otherwise then it is, so neither could any other act of will be in him then there is. Gods liberty is only to different objects, not to different acts, though you passe over this without any distinction.
Again, in the sentence going before you told us, God was free to exercise his power, and to communicate his goodness; which is most true: but when in the next place you tell us he is free to decree, this is nothing answerable to the former. For to decree is no exercise of his power, nor communication of his goodness. For if it were, then seeing his decrees have been free from everlasting, from everlasting there should be an exercise of his power, and communication of his goodness. Which is as much as to say that the world was everlasting.
Againe, in the sentence going before you told us, God was free to exercise his power, and to communicate his goodnesse; which is most true: but when in the next place you tell us he is free to decree, this is nothing answerable to the former. For to decree is no exercse of his power, nor communication of his goodnesse. For if it were, then seeing his decrees have beene free from everlasting, from everlasting there should be an exercise of his power, and communication of his goodnesse. Which is as much as to say that the world was everlasting.