A14095:905
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
And indeed, it were very absurd to say so: For the mutability of a thing supposeth the being of a thing. Now hath God ordained that the salvation of Gods elect, after they have obtained it, or the damnation of the reprobates after they suffer it, shall be mutable? Hath he not rather ordained the contrary both as touching his elect, that they shall ever be with the Lord, 1and as touching the reprobate that their Worm shall never dye, and their fire never be extinguished? Yet I confess either is simply mutable, in respect that God hath power to alter it. But this kind of mutability is not the object of Gods decree. For God doth not decree to take unto himself power to do this or that. Yet it is true, that by virtue of Gods decree some things come to pass contingently, and some things necessarily. But this is only in respect of the agency of second causes, some of them being made by God, agents natural working necessarily, some agents rational and free, working contingently and freely: Not in respect of Gods own agency, for whatsoever God doth work outwardly, that must needs come to pass contingently or freely: for it is not in the power of God to work necessarily; it is the perfection of God unalterable, to be necessarily, to work freely. Now the doom of any man is the work of God, and so is the condemnation ⟨p. 372⟩both of men and Angels, and not the work of second causes: and therefore the contingent being thereof is not the object of Gods decree. God doth not decree, that to fall out contingently, much less doth he decree that after it is, it shall be mutable: speak your mind plainly, and tell us whether the damnation of Judas, or of the Angels that fell, or of any reprobate that is departed this life is mutable. I presume you dare not affirm this: and what is the reason? not because God wants power to alter, but because his will is that it shall not be otherwise, and his will can neither be changed from within, nor resisted from without, because it is omnipotent. In this case therefore this consequence is good: God hath decreed the damnation of Judas, and his decree is immutable, and omnipotent, therefore the damnation of Judas is immutable, to wit, supposing the foresaid decree of God.
And indeed, it were very absurd to say so: For the mutability of a thing supposeth the being of a thing. Now hath God ordained that the salvation of Gods elect, after they have obtayned it, or the damnation of the reprobates after they suffer it, shall be mutable? Hath he not rather ordained the contrary both as touchng his elect, that they shall ever be with the Lord,