A14095:946
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
The subject many times may be wiser then the Prince; yet hath he not therefore any authority over his Prince, to make laws to bind him, but rather the Prince though inferior in wisdom, hath power over him. But the wiser men are, the fitter they are to govern, and the more willingly and joyfully should others submit unto them, supposing the wisdom of the governor to be bound to aim at the good of the subject. But no such obligation is found in God, who as he is the Creator of all, so he made all things for himself. And good reason that seeing all things are from him, therefore all things should be for him. Qui dedit esse, quo sine essent habuit potestatem. 1When you say that too strict obligement unto laws positive ⟨p. 390⟩or decrees unalterable, deprives both law-givers and others of their native liberty and opportunity of doing good, I find nothing sound in all this. For you confound the liberty of nature, which is equally common to all, with liberty of condition, which is greater by far in one then in another. Secondly, you range God the supreme Law-giver, with other law-givers which have only power deputed unto them; no obligement unto laws doth deprive any man of liberty natural. For whatsoever is forbidden any man, yet is he never a whit the less naturally free to the doing of it then before, though in case he transgress, he is subject to censure and punishment. And of this natural liberty you speak of hitherunto, as being most proper for the nature of decrees, that is, liberty from coaction and natural necessitation, though now you divert from this unto civill liberty, which is only liberty from subjection.
The subject many times may be wiser then the Prince; yet hath he not therefore any authority over his Prince, to make lawes to binde him, but rather the Prince though inferiour in wisedome, hath power over him. But the wiser men are, the fitter they are to governe, and the more willingly and joyfully should others submit unto them, supposing the wisedome of the governour to be bound to aime at the good of the subject. But no such obligation is found in God, who as he is the Creator of all, so he made all things for himselfe. And good reason that seeing all things are from him, therefore all things should be for him. Qui dedit esse, quo sine essent habuit potestatem. 1