A14095:949
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Of the coherence of that which followeth with that which ⟨p. 392⟩went before, I will not enquire, for what do I know whether you purpose to write quodlibets. But in my judgement you do not give a right reason why it is fitter to be grounded by laws then by the wills of men. For the corruption of man disables him as well from the making of good laws, as from governing well by will and pleasure. But if men are to choose, the reason in my opinion why they will choose to be governed by laws, is because by laws they may aforehand know what shall be the execution of justice, and accordingly judge thereof, and if they like and approve it, they may the better submit unto it. But if executions proceed according to the will of a Prince absolute, they cannot judge of executions before they come, because they know them not, they being left to the pleasure of men, and after they are brought forth it is too late to remedy them, if they prove evil. And the incorruptest and wisest man that ever was is fitter to give laws and to execute justice thereby, then to be trusted with execution of justice according unto pleasure; because such men come indifferent to the making of laws, which may be particularly interested in the manner of execution. For executions are only in particular cases, which particular cases may in special concern them that have the execution of justice. As for example, the malefactor may be a friend to the Magistrate himself, or a brother, or near of k•nne, which is a shrewd tentation to provoke him (though otherwise uncorrupt and fit enough to make: general laws) in this particular case to strain a good conscience, and by partiality to corrupt the course of justice.
Of the coherence of that which followeth with that which ⟨p. 392⟩went before, I will not enquire, for what doe I know whether you purpose to write quodlibets. But in my judgement you doe not give a right reason why it is fitter to be grounded by lawes then by the wils of men. For the corruption of man disables him as well from the making of good lawes, as from governing well by will and pleasure. But if men are to chuse, the reason in my opinion why they will chuse to be governed by lawes, is because by lawes they may aforehand know what shall be the execution of justice, and accordingly judge thereof, and if they like and approve it, they may the better submit unto it. But if executions proceed according to the will of a Prince absolute, they cannot judge of executions before they come, because they know them not, they being left to the pleasure of men, and after they are brought forth it is too late to remedy them, if they prove evill. And the incorruptest and wisest man that ever was is fitter to give lawes and to execute justce thereby, then to bee trusted with execution of justice according unto pleasure; because such men come indifferent to the making of lawes, which may bee particularly interested in the manner of execution. For executions are only in particular cases, which particular cases may in speciall cencerne them that have the execution of justice. As for example, the malefactor may be a friend to the Magistrate himselfe, or a brother, or neare of knne, which is a shrewd tentation to provoke him (though otherwise vncorrupt and fit enough to mak: generall lawes) in this particular case to strain a good conscience, and by partialitie to corrupt the course of justice.