A14095:964
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
From the first I looked for this, and at length the partridge is sprung. But you will say, otherwise his liberty is restrained. I answer, this is a vain fiction, proceeding from the vain consideration of mans infirmities, and attributing them unto God. For man after he hath promised a thing, afterwards would fain break his promise, either because he made it improvidently, or because he is of a fickle disposition; and therefore in performing his promise he doth it in a sort against his will. But no such improvidence is found in God, no such fickle disposition is incident to him. And therefore his will being the same still and that for good cause, his liberty is the same still. For liberty extends no farther then to do what we can or will.
From the first I looked for this, and at length the partridge is sprunge. But you will say, otherwise his liberty is restrayned. I answere, this is a vayne fiction, proceeding from the vayne consideration of mans infirmities, and attributing them unto God. For man after he hath promised a thing, afterwards would fayne break his promise, either because he made it improvidently, or because he is of a fickle disposition; and therfore in performing his promise he doth it in a sort against his will. But no such improvidence is found in God, no such fickle disposition is incident to him. And therefore his will being the same still and that for good cause, his liberty is the same still. For liberty extends no farther then to doe what we can or will.
Now though God can do otherwise absolutely, yet he will not do otherwise; and supposing that he hath decreed to do this it is impossible that he should do otherwise. For God cannot change his will, for as much as all change of will in the creature, proceeds from such imperfections as are not incident to the nature of God, as namely, improvidence, or forgetfulness, or sicklenes or the like, and yet do not we say that the deposition of Eli's race, or the death of his Sons were absolutely necessary.
Now though God can doe otherwise absolutely, yet he will not doe otherwise; and supposing that he hath decreed to doe this it is impossible that he should doe otherwise. For God cannot change his will, for as much as all change of will in the creature, proceeds from such imperfections as are not incident to the nature of God, as namely, improvidence, or forgetfullnes, or sicklenes or the like, and yet doe not we say that the deposition of Elies race, or the death of his Sonnes were absolutely necessary.