A14095:976
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of…A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of…
A discovery of D. Jacksons vanity. Or A perspective glass, whereby the admirers of D. Jacksons profound discourses, may see the vanity and weakness of them, in sundry passages, and especially so far as they tend to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twice, Doctor of Divinity, as they say, from whom the copy came to the pressA discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1631
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Neither did you tell us that Gods ubiquitary presence was as a centre whereupon all things did revolve; though here you tell us thus much of Gods decree in respect of contingent acts. The profitable nature of this admirable conceit is (you say) to free us from suspicion that his necessary foreknowledge should lay a necessity upon our actions, or take away all possibility of doing, ⟨p. 406⟩otherwise. Now to prevent this suspicion, we have no need of these quaint fictions of yours, as in conceiving Gods decree (or fore-knowledge rather) as an axis whereon every contingent act revolves. We say that by virtue and efficacy of Gods decree, not only some things come to pass necessarily, as the works of natural agents: but other things also come to pass contingently, that is, with all possibility of being otherwise, as the free actions of men, only upon supposition of Gods decree, we say it necessarily followeth that such things how contingent soever, shall come to pass: but how? not necessarily, but contingently.
Neither did you tell us that Gods ubiquitary presence was as a center wherupon all things did revolve; though here you tell us thus much of Gods decree in respect of contingent acts. The profitable nature of this admirable conceyte is (you say) to free us from suspicion that his necessary foreknowledge should lay a necessity upon our actions, or take away all possibility of doing, ⟨p. 406⟩otherwise. Now to prevent this suspition, we have no need of these quaint fictions of yours, as in conceiving Gods decree (or fore-knowledge rather) as an axis whereon every contingent act revolves. We say that by vertue and efficacy of Gods decree, not onely some things come to passe necessarily, as the workes of naturall agents: but other things also come to passe contingently, that is, with all possibility of being otherwise, as the free actions of men, onely upon supposition of Gods decree, we say it necessarily followeth that such things how contingent soever, shall come to passe: but how? not necessarily, but contingently.