A14096:41
The doctrine of the synod of Dort and Arles, reduced to the practise With…
The doctrine of the synod of Dort and Arles, reduced to the practise With a consideration thereof, and representation with what sobriety it proceeds.
Amsterdam : Successors to G. Thorp, 1631?
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
And what may that be? not the knowledge of God: for that rather presupposeth things future, and so knowable […] in the kind of things future, then makes them future. Therefore it remains, that the mere decree & will of God is that which makes them future. If, to shift off this, it be said, that the essence of God is the cause hereof, I further demand, whether the essence of God be the cause hereof, as working necessarily, or as working freely. If as working necessarily, then the most contingent things became future by necessity of the divine nature, and consequently he produceth whatsoever he produceth by necessity of nature, which is Atheistical: Therefore it remains, that the essence of God hath made them future, by working freely, and consequently the mere will and decree of God, is the cause of the futurition of all things.1 And why should we doubt hereof, when the most foul sins that have been committed in the World, are in scripture phrase professed to have been predetermined by God himself? Upon supposition of which will and decree divine, we confess it necessary, that things determined by him shall come to pass, but how? not necessarily, ⟨p. 20⟩but, either necessarily, or contingently and freely; to wit, necessary things necessarily, contingent things, and free things, contingently and freely. So that contingent things, upon supposition of the will divine, have a necessitie secundum quid, but simply a contingency; and that the same thing may come to pass, both necessarily secundum quid, and simply in a contingent manner, ought to be nothing strange to men of understanding, considering that the very foreknowledge of God is sufficient to denominate the most contingent things, as coming to passe necessarily secundum quid.
And what may that be? not the knowledge of God: for that rather presupposeth things future, and so knowable 〈…〉 in the kinde of things future, then makes them future. Therefore it remaines, that the meere decree & will of God is that which makes them future. If, to shift off this, it be said, that the essence of God is the cause hereof, I further demaunde, whether the essence of God be the cause hereof, as working necessarily, or as working freely. If as working necessarily, then the most contingent thinges became future by necessitie of the divine nature, and consequently he produceth whatsoever he produceth by necessitie of nature, which is Atheisticall: Therefore it remaines, that the essence of God hath made them future, by working freely, and consequently the meere will and decree of God, is the cause of the futurition of all things.