A14216:1183
The Sum of Christian Religion
The sum of Christian religion: delivered by Zacharias Ursinus in his lectures upon the Catechism authorised by the noble Prince Frederick, throughout his dominions: wherein are debated and resolved the questions of whatsoever points of moment, which have been or are controversed in divinity. Translated into English by Henry Parry, out of the last & best Latin editions, together with some supply of wa[n]ts out of his discourses of divinity, and with correction of sundry faults & imperfections, which are [sic] as yet remaining in the best corrected Latin.The summe of Christian religion: deliuered by Zacharias Vrsinus in his lectures vpon the Catechism autorised by the noble Prince Frederick, throughout his dominions: wherein are debated and resolued the questions of whatsoeuer points of moment, which haue beene or are controuersed in diuinitie. Translated into English by Henrie Parrie, out of the last & best Latin editions, together with some supplie of wa[n]ts out of his discourses of diuinitie, and with correction of sundrie faults & imperfections, which ar [sic] as yet remaining in the best corrected Latine.
Oxford: printed by Joseph Barnes, 1587Oxford: printed by Ioseph Barnes, 1587
Part 2 › OF GODS PROVIDENCE. › Section 2: 2 WHAT THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD IS.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
1 That which is not done if God no way will it, must needs be done god some way willing it. This is true by the rule of contradiction, where one of the two contradictory propositions must always be true. But nothing can be done, god no way willing it, that is, god simply not willing it because he is omnipotent. And it is proper to omnipotency, for one to be able to do what he will, and to forbid, what he will not have done. Therefore all things are done, god some way willing them, to wit, either simply, as good things; or after a sort, as evil things. For if he would & could not, he should not be omnipotent. Now concerning those, which after a sort he will, after a sort he will not, he decreeeth of that part, whereof he hath weightier & better reasons, whether known or unknown unto us.
1 That which is not done if God no way will it, must needs be done god some way willing it. This is true by the rule of contradiction, where one of the two contradictory propositions must alwaies bee true. But nothing can bee done, god no way willing it, that is, god simplie not willing it because he is omnipotent. And it is proper to omnipotencie, for one to be able to doe what he will, and to forbid, what he wil not haue done. Therefore all things are done, god some way willing them, to wit, either simplie, as good things; or after a sort, as euil things. For if he would & could not, he should not be omnipotent. Now concerning those, which after a sort he wil, after a sort he wil not, he decreeeth of that part, whereof he hath waightier & better reasons, whether knowen or vnknowen vnto vs.
2 It is proper to him that is most wise, not to suffer any thing which is in his power, to be done without his will and counsel. And how much the wiser he is, so much the more largely doth his government extend it self. But god is a governor infinitely wise, and hath in his power ⟨p. 404⟩all things. Therefore he suffereth nothing to come to pass without his certain and determined counsel. And further, if the number of things were infinite, yet were god sufficient for the administering of them: seeing he is of an exceeding and infinite wisdom. And therefore he easily taketh care of all things that are created; which although they be many, yet in them-selves, and most of all in respect of Gods infinite wisdom, they are finite, and limited.