A14216:1223
The Sum of Christian Religion
The sum of Christian religion: delivered by Zacharias Ursinus in his lectures upon the Catechism authorised by the noble Prince Frederick, throughout his dominions: wherein are debated and resolved the questions of whatsoever points of moment, which have been or are controversed in divinity. Translated into English by Henry Parry, out of the last & best Latin editions, together with some supply of wa[n]ts out of his discourses of divinity, and with correction of sundry faults & imperfections, which are [sic] as yet remaining in the best corrected Latin.The summe of Christian religion: deliuered by Zacharias Vrsinus in his lectures vpon the Catechism autorised by the noble Prince Frederick, throughout his dominions: wherein are debated and resolued the questions of whatsoeuer points of moment, which haue beene or are controuersed in diuinitie. Translated into English by Henrie Parrie, out of the last & best Latin editions, together with some supplie of wa[n]ts out of his discourses of diuinitie, and with correction of sundrie faults & imperfections, which ar [sic] as yet remaining in the best corrected Latine.
Oxford: printed by Joseph Barnes, 1587Oxford: printed by Ioseph Barnes, 1587
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
The sixth Sophism, of the merit of good & evil.
The sixth Sophisme, of the merit of good & euill.
Whatsoever is necessary, doth not merit rewards or punishments. But all moral good and evil is done necessarily. Therefore neither the good meriteth reward, nor the evil punishment. Answer. This argument is handled by Aristotle in his Ethics, Lib. 3. Cap. 5. But the answer thereto is easy.1 First, the major is either particular, and so there is no consequence or sequel; or being generally taken, is false, and that even in moral or civil consideration, to wit, in respect of those things, which are necessary by supposition, and yet are done freely, as, the actions of men. Secondly, we grant the reason, in respect of the judgement of god, concerning good works. For the creature cannot merit any thing, no not by his best works, of God: Because both they are due; and are the effects of God in us. And therefore the more good things God worketh in us, so much the more he bindeth and endebteth us to him. Wherefore in the ⟨p. 425⟩godly,2 God crowneth and rewardeth of his free bountifulness not their merits, but his own gifts. But as touching evil works, we deny the reason: for they merit punishment, and that most justly. For although men forsaken of God cannot but sin: yet the necessity of sinning, both was purchased by their own fault, as who freely and willingly departed from God, and remaineth in them joined and accompanied with great desire & delight. Wherefore to this, that they should merit punishment, their own will sufficeth, whereas especially the punishment was before denounced. This solution or answer Aristotle himself in the same fifth Chapter giveth us, when as he showeth that men are deservedly reprehended and punished for vices, either of mind or body, though they can not avoid them or leave them: because themselves are the cause of their own vices, and have purchased them unto themselves of their own accord and voluntarily.