An answer to a challenge madeAn ansvver to a challenge made
An answer to a challenge made by a Jesuit in Ireland Wherein the judgement of antiquity in the points questioned is truly delivered, and the novelty of the now romish doctrine plainly discovered. By James Usher Bishop of Meath.An ansvver to a challenge made by a Iesuite in Ireland Wherein the iudgement of antiquity in the points questioned is truely delivered, and the noveltie of the now romish doctrine plainly discovered. By Iames Vssher Bishop of Meath.
James Ussher 1581–1656Dublin: printed by the Society of Stationers and Eliot's Court Press, 1624Dublin: printed by the Societie of Stationers and Eliot's Court Press, 1624
[24], 527, [9] p. · 153k words · STC 24542 · ESTC S118933
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
That man hath Free-will, is not by us gainsaid: though we dare not give him so large a freedom as the Jesuits presume to do. Freedom of will we know doth as essentially belong unto a man, as reason it self: and he that spoileth him of that power, doth in effect make him a very beast. For this is the difference betwixt reasonable and unreasonable creatures: as Damascene rightly noteth. 1The unreasonable are rather led by nature, then themselves leaders of it: and therefore do they never contradict their natural appetite, but as soon as they affect any thing, they rush to the prosecution of it. But man, being endued with reason, doth rather lead nature, then is led by it: and therefore being moved with appetite, if he will, he hath power to restrain his appetite, or to follow it. Hereby he is enabled to do the things which he doth, neither by a brute instinct of nature not ye• by any compulsion, but by advise and deliberation: the Mind first taking into consideration the grounds and circumstances of each action, & freely debating on either side what in this case were best to be done or not done; and then the Will inclining it self to put in execution the last and conclusive judgement of the practical Understanding. This liberty we acknowledge a man may exercise in all actions ⟨p. 465⟩that are within his power to do: whether they be lawful, unlawful, or indifferent; whether done by the strength of nature or of grace. for even in doing the works of grace, our free-will suspendeth not her action, but being moved and guided by grace, doeth that which is fit for her to do: grace not taking away the liberty, which cometh by Gods creation, but the pravity of the Will, which ariseth from Mans corruption. In a word, as we condemn b
Agapius and the rest of that mad sect of the Manichees, for bringing in such a kind of necessity of sinning, whereby men were made to offend against their wills: so likewise with Polychronius and other men of understanding we defend, that
we both believe and feel by experience that Grace is so powerful, that yet we conceive it no way to be violent.
THat man hath Free-will, is not by us gainesayd: though wee dare not give him so large a freedome as the Iesuites presume to doe. Freedome of will wee knowe doth as essentially belong unto a man, as reason it selfe: and he that spoyleth him of that power, doth in effect make him a verie beast. For this is the difference betwixt reasonable and unreasonable creatures: as Damascen rightly noteth. 1The unreasonable are rather ledd by nature, then themselves leaders of it: and therefore doe they never contradict their naturall appetite, but as soone as they affect any thing, they rush to the prosecution of it. But man, being indued with reason, doth rather lead nature, then is ledd by it: and therefore being moved with appetite, if he will, he hath power to restraine his appetite, or to follow it. Hereby he is inabled to doe the things which he doth, neither by a brute instinct of nature not ye• by any compulsion, but by advise and deliberation: the Minde first taking into consideration the grounds and circumstances of each action, & freely debating on eyther side what in this case were best to be done or not done; and then the Will inclining it selfe to put in execution the last and conclusive judgement of the practicall Vnderstanding. This libertie we acknowledge a man may exercise in all actions ⟨p. 465⟩that are within his power to doe: whether they be lawfull, unlawfull, or indifferent; whether done by the strength of nature or of grace. for even in doing the workes of grace, our free-will suspendeth not her action, but being moved and guided by grace, doeth that which is fit for her to doe: grace not taking away the libertie, which commeth by Gods creation, but the pravitie of the Will, which ariseth from Mans corruption. In a word, as we condemne bAgapius and the rest of that mad sect of the Manichees, for bringing in such a kinde of necessitie of sinning, whereby men were made to offend against their wils: so likewise with Polychronius and other men of understanding we defend, that cvertue is a voluntarie thing, and free from all necessitie; and with the author of the bookes De vocatione Gentium (attributed unto Prosper) dwe both beleeve and feele by experience that Grace is so powerfull, that yet we conceive it no way to be violent.
c[Greek or Hebrew]. Polychron. in Cantic. pag. 93. edit. Meursij.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Polychron. in Cantic. pag. 93. edit. Meursij.
dHanc quippe abundantiorem gratiam ita credimu• atque experimur potentem, ut nullo modo arbitremur esse violentam. Prosp. de vocat. Gent. li. 2. cap 26
But it is one thing to inquire of the nature, another to dispute of the strength and ability of Free-will. We say with Adamantius (in the Dialogues collected out of Maximus against the Marcionites) that eGod made Angels and Men [Greek or Hebrew], but not [Greek or Hebrew]: he endued them with freedom of Will, but not with ability to do all things. And now since the fall of Adam we say further, that freedom of Will remaineth still among men; but the ability which once it had, to perform spiritual duties and things pertaining to salvation, is quite lost and extinguished. For fwho is ⟨p. 466⟩there of us (saith S. Augustine) which would say, that by the sin of the first Man Free-will is utterly perished from mankind? Freedom indeed is perished by sin: but that freedom which was in Paradise, of having full righteousness with immortality. for which cause Mans nature standeth in need of Gods grace, according to the saying of our Lord; If the Son shall free you, then ye shall be free indeed: namely free to live well and righteously. For free-will is so far from having perished in the sinner; that by it they sin, all they especially who sin with delight, and for the love of sin, that pleaseth them which liketh them. When we deny therefore that a natural man hath any free-will unto good: by a natural man, we understand one that is without Christ, and destitute of his renewing grace; by free-will, that which the Philosophers call [Greek or Hebrew], a thing that is in our own power to do; and by good, a Theological not a Philosophical good, bonū veré spiritual & salutare, a spiritual good and tending to salvation. This then is the difference which Gods word teacheth us to put, betwixt a regenerate & an unregenerate man. The one is galive unto God, through Jesus Christ our Lord; and so enabled to hyield himself unto God, as one that is alive from the dead, and his members as instruments of righteousness unto God: ihaving his fruit unto holiness, and the end everlasting life. The other is a mere kstranger from the life of God, ldead in trespasses and sins; and so no more able to lead a holy life acceptable unto God, then a dead man is to perform the actions of him which is alive.
But it is one thing to inquire of the nature, another to dispute of the strength and abilitie of Free-will. We say with Adamantius (in the Dialogues collected out of Maximus against the Marcionites) that eGod made Angels and Men 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, but not 〈non-Latin alphabet〉: hee indued them with freedome of Will, but not with abilitie to doe all things. And now since the fall of Adam wee say further, that freedome of Will remayneth still among men; but the abilitie which once it had, to performe spirituall duties and things pertayning to salvation, is quite lost and extinguished. For fvvho is ⟨p. 466⟩there of us (saith S. Augustine) which would say, that by the sinne of the first Man Free-will is utterly perished from mankinde? Freedome indeed is perished by sinne: but that freedome which was in Paradise, of having full righteousnesse with immortalitie. for vvhich cause Mans nature standeth in neede of Gods grace, according to the saying of our Lord; If the Sonne shall free you, then yee shall be free indeed: namely free to live well and righteously. For free-will is so farre from having perished in the sinner; that by it they sinne, all they especially who sinne with delight, and for the love of sinne, that pleaseth them which liketh them. When we denie therefore that a naturall man hath any free-will unto good: by a naturall man, wee understand one that is without Christ, and destitute of his renewing grace; by free-will, that which the Philosophers call 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, a thing that is in our owne power to doe; and by good, a Theologicall not a Philosophicall good, bonū veré spirituale & salutare, a spirituall good and tending to salvation. This then is the difference which Gods word teacheth us to put, betwixt a regenerate & an unregenerate man. The one is galive unto God, through Iesus Christ our Lord; and so inabled to hyeelde himselfe unto God, as one that is alive from the dead, and his members as instruments of righteousnesse unto God: ihaving his fruite unto holinesse, and the end everlasting life. The other is a meere
fQuis autem nostrûm dicat, quòd primi hominis peccato perierit liberū arbitrium de humano genere? Libertas quidē perijt per peccatū; sed illa quae in Paradiso fuit, habendi plenā con immortalitate justitiam: propter quod natura humana divinâ indiget gratiâ, dicente Domino; Si vos Filius liberaverit, tunc veré liberi critis; utique liberi ad bene justeque vivendū Nam liberū a•b•triū usque adeò in peccatore non perijt; ut per illud peccent, maximé omnes qui cum delectatione peccant, & amore peccati, hoc eis placet quod eis libet. Aug. contr, duas exist. Pelagian. li. 1. cap. •.Quis autem nostrûm dicat, quòd primi hominis peccato perierit liberū arbitrium de humano genere? Libertas quidē perijt per peccatū; sed illa quae in Paradiso fuit, habēdi plenā cū immortalitate justitiam: propter quod natura humana divinâ indiget gratiâ, dicente Domino; Si vos Filius liberaverit, tunc veré liberi critis; utique liberi ad bene justeque vivendū Nam liberū a•b•triū usque adeò in peccatore non perijt; ut per illud peccēt, maximé omnes qui cum delectatione peccāt, & amore peccati, hoc eis placet quod eis libet. Aug. contr, duas e•ist. Pelagian. li. 1. cap. •.
He may live indeed the life of a natural and a moral man, and so exercise the freedom of his Will, not only in natural and civill, but also in moral actions, ⟨p. 467⟩so far as concerneth external conformity unto those notions of good and evil that remain in his mind: (in respect whereof the very mGentiles themselves which have not the Law, are said to do by nature the things contained in the Law:) he may have such fruit, as not only common honesty and civility, but common gifts of Gods spirit likewise will yield, and in regard thereof he may obtain of God temporal rewards appertaining to this transitory life, and a lesser measure of punishment in the world to come: yet until he be quickened with the life of grace, & nmarried to him who is raised from the dead, he cannot bring forth fruit unto God, nor be accepted for one of his servants. This is the doctrine of our Saviour himself, John. 15.4, 5. As the branch cannot bear fruit of it self, except it abide in the vine; no more can ye, except ye abide in me: I am the Vine, ye are the branches: He that abideth in me, and I in him, the same bringeth forth much fruit: for without me ye can do NOTHING, that is, nothing truly good and acceptable unto God. This is the lesson that S. Paul doth every where inculcate. oI know, that in me, that is in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing. pThe natural man perceiveth not the things of the spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him: neither can he understand them, because they are spiritually discerned. qWithout faith it is impossible to please God. rUnto them that are defiled and unbelieving is nothing pure: but even their mind & conscience is defiled. Now seeing sthe end of the commandment is charity, out of a pure heart, and of a good conscience, and of faith unfeigned; seeing the first beginning, from whence every good action should proceed, is a sanctified heart, the last end the seeking of Gods glory, and faith working by love ⟨p. 468⟩must intercurre betwixt both: the moral works of the unregenerate failing so foully both in the beginning, middle and end, are to be accounted breaches rather of the Commandment then observances, depravations of good works rather then performances. For howsoever these actions be in their own kind good and commanded of God, yet are they marred in the carriage, that which is bonum being not done been:
He may live indeed the life of a naturall and a morall man, and so exercise the freedome of his Will, not onely in naturall and civill, but also in morall actions, ⟨p. 467⟩so farre as concerneth externall conformitie unto those notions of good and evill that remaine in his minde: (in respect whereof the verie mGentiles themselves which have not the Law, are said to doe by nature the things contayned in the Law:) he may have such fruite, as not onely common honestie and civilitie, but common giftes of Gods spirit likewise will yeelde, and in regard thereof hee may obtaine of God temporall rewards appertayning to this transitorie life, and a lesser measure of punishment in the world to come: yet untill he be quickened with the life of grace, & nmarried to him who is raysed from the dead, he cannot bring forth fruite unto God, nor be accepted for one of his servants. This is the doctrine of our Saviour himselfe, Iohn. 15.4, 5. As the branch cannot beare fruite of it selfe, except it abide in the vine; no more can yee, except yee abide in me: I am the Vine, yee are the branches: He that abideth in me, and I in him, the same bringeth forth much fruite: for without me yee can doe NOTHING, that is, nothing truely good and acceptable unto God. This is the lesson that S. Paul doth everie where inculcate. oI know, that in me, that is in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing. pThe naturall man perceiveth not the things of the spirit of God, for they are foolishnesse unto him: neyther can he understand them, because they are spiritually discerned. qWithout faith it is impossible to please God. rVnto them that are defiled and unbeleeving is nothing pure: but even their minde & conscience is defiled. Now seeing sthe end of the commandement is charitie, out of a pure heart, and of a good conscience, and of faith unfained; seeing the first beginning, from whence every good action should proceed, is a sanctified heart, the last end the seeking of Gods glorie, and faith working by love
The Pelagian heretics were wont here to object unto our forefathers (as the Romanists do now a days unto us) both the examples of the Heathen, twho being strangers from the faith, did notwithstanding (as they said) abound with virtues: and S. Pauls testimony also concerning them, Rom. 2.14, 15. by which they laboured to prove, uthat even such as were strangers from the faith of Christ, might yet have true righteousness; because that these, as the Apostle witnessed, naturally did the things of the Law. But will you hear how S. Augustine took up Julian the Pelagian, for making this objection? xHerein hast thou expressed more evidently that doctrine of yours, wherein you are enemies unto the grace of God which is given by Jesus Christ our Lord, who taketh away the sin of the world: bringing in a kind of men, which may please God without the faith of Christ, by the law of nature. This is it, for which the Christian Church doth most of all detest you: & again. yBe ⟨p. 469⟩it far from us to think, that true virtue should be in any one, unless he were righteous. And as far, that one should be truly righteous, unless he did live by faith: for the just doth live by faith. Now which of them, that would have themselves accounted Christians, but the Pelagians alone, or even among them, perhaps thou thy self alone, would say that an infidel were righteous, would say that an ungodly man were righteous, would say that a man mancipated to the Devil were righteous? although he were Fabricius, although he were Fabius, although he were Scipio, although he were Regulus. And whereas Julian had further demanded: zIf a Heathen man do clothe the naked, because it is not of faith, is it therefore sin? Saint Augustine answereth absolutely, in as much as it is not of faith, it is sin: not because the fact considered in it self, which is to clothe the naked, is a sin; but of such a work not to glory in the Lord, none but an impious man will deny to be a sin. For howsoever, ain it self, this natural compassion be a good work; yet he useth this good work amiss, that useth it unbelievingly, and doth this good work amiss, that doth it unbelievingly: but who so doth any thing amiss, sinneth surely. From whence it is to be gathered, that even those good works which unbelievers do, are not theirs, but his who maketh good use of evil men:
The Pelagian heretickes were wont here to object unto our forefathers (as the Romanistes doe now a daies unto us) both the examples of the Heathen, tvvho being strangers from the faith, did notwithstanding (as they said) abound with vertues: and S. Pauls testimonie also concerning them, Rom. 2.14, 15. by which they laboured to prove, uthat even such as were strangers from the faith of Christ, might yet have true righteousnesse; because that these, as the Apostle witnessed, naturally did the things of the Law. But will you heare how S. Augustine tooke up Iulian the Pelagian, for making this ob•ection? xHerein hast thou expressed more evidently that doctrine of yours, wherein you are enemies unto the grace of God which is given by Iesus Christ our Lord, who taketh away the sinne of the world: bringing in a kinde of men, which may please God without the faith of Christ, by the law of nature. This is it, for which the Christiā Church doth most of all detest you: & again. yBe ⟨p. 469⟩it farre from us to thinke, that true vertue should be in any one, unlesse he were righteous. And as farre, that one should be truly righteous, unlesse he did live by faith: for the just doth live by faith. Now which of them, that would have themselves accounted Christians, but the Pelagians alone, or even among them, perhaps thou thy selfe alone, would say that an infidell were righteous, would say that an ungodly man were righteous, would say that a man mancipated to the Devill were righteous? although he were Fabricius, although hee were Fabius, although hee were Scipio, although he were Regulus. And whereas Iulian had further demanded: zIf a Heathen man doe cloath the naked, because it is not of faith, is it therefore sinne? Saint Augustine answereth absolutely, in as much as it is not of faith, it is sinne: not because the fact considered in it selfe, which is to cloath the naked, is a sinne; but of such a worke not to glory in the Lord, none but an impious man will deny to be a sinne. For howsoever, ain it selfe, this naturall compassion be a good worke; yet hee useth this good worke amisse, that useth it unbeleevingly, and doth this good work amisse, that doth it unbeleevingly: but who so doth any thing amisse, sinneth surely. From whence it is to be gathered, that even those good workes which unbeleevers doe, are not theirs, but his who maketh good use of evill men:
tSed acerbissimi gratiae hujus inimici, exempla nobis opponitis impiorum, quos dicitis alienos á fide abundare virtutibus. Aug. contr. Julian. lib. 4. cap. 3.Sed acerbissimi gratiae hujus inimici, exempla nobis opponitis impiorum, quos dicitis alienos á fide abundare virtutibus. Aug. contr. Iulian. lib. 4. cap. 3.
uPer hos enim probare conatus es, etiam alienos á fide Christi, veram posse habere justitiam; eo quòd isti, teste Apostolo, naturaliter quae legis sunt faciunt. Ibid.
xUbi quidem dogma vestrū quo estis inimici gratiae Dei, quae datur per Jesum Christum Dominum nostrū, qui tollit peccatum mundi, evidentiùs expressisti; intro ducens hominum genus, quod Deo placere possit sine Christi fide, lege naturae. Hoc est unde vos maximé Christiana detestatur Ecclesia. Ibid.Vbi quidem dogma vestrū quo estis inimici gratiae Dei, quae datur per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrū, qui tollit peccatum mundi, evidentiùs expressisti; intro ducens hominum genus, quod Deo placere possit sine Christi fide, lege naturae. Hoc est unde vos maximé Christiana detestatur Ecclesia. Ibid.
ySed absit, ut sit in aliquo vera virtus, nisi fuerit justus. Absit autē ut sit justus veré, nisi vivat ex fide: Justus enim ex fide vivit. Quis porrò eorū, qui se Christianos habe•i volunt, nisi soli Pelagiani, aut in ipsis etiā fortè tu solus, justū dixerit infidelē justū dixerit impiū, justū dixerit Diabolo mancipatū? sit licèt ille Fabricius, sit licèt Fabius, sit licèt Scipio, sit licèt Regulus. I•id.Sed absit, ut sit in aliquo vera virtus, nisi fuerit justus. Absit autē ut sit justus veré, nisi vivat ex fide: Iustus enim ex fide vivit. Quis porrò eorū, qui se Christianos habe•i volunt, nisi soli Pelagiani, aut in ipsis etiā fortè tu solus, justū dixerit infidelē justū dixerit impiū, justū dixerit Diabolo mancipatū? sit licèt ille Fabricius, sit licèt Fabius, sit licèt Scipio, sit licèt Regulus. I•id.
zSi gently (inquis) nudum operuerit, nunquid quia non est ex fide, peccatum est? Prorsus in quantum non est ex fide peccatum est: non quia per seipsum factum, quod est nudum operire, peccatum est; sed de tali opere non in •omino gloriari, solus impius negat esse peccatum. Ibid.
but that the sins are theirs, whereby they do good things amiss; because they do them not with a faithful, but with an unfaithful, that is, with a foolish and naughty will. Which kind of will no Christian doubteth to be an evil ⟨p. 470⟩tree, which cannot bring forth but evil fruits, that is to say, sins only. For all that is not of faith, whether thou wilt or no, is sin. This and much more to the same purpose, doth Saint Augustine urge against the Heretic Julian: prosecuting at large that conclusion which he layeth down in his book of the Acts of the Palestine Council against Pelagius. bHow much soever the works of unbelievers be magnified, we know the sentence of the Apostle to be true and invincible; Whatsoever is not of faith is sin. Which maketh him also in his Retractations to correct himself, for saying in one place, cThat the Philosophers shined with the light of virtue, who were not endued with true piety.
but that the sinnes are theirs, whereby they doe good things amisse; because they doe them not with a faithfull, but with an unfaithfull, that is, with a foolish and naughtie will. Which kinde of will no Christian doubteth to be an evill ⟨p. 470⟩tree, which cannot bring forth but evill fruits, that is to say, sinnes only. For all that is not of faith, whether thou wilt or no, is sinne. This and much more to the same purpose, doth Saint Augustine urge against the Heretike Iulian: prosecuting at large that conclusion which hee layeth downe in his booke of the Acts of the Palestine Councell against Pelagius. bHow much soever the works of unbeleevers be magnified, we know the sentence of the Apostle to be true and invincible; Whatsoever is not of faith is sinne. Which maketh him also in his Retractations to correct himselfe, for saying in one place, cThat the Philosophers shined with the light of vertue, who were not endued with true pietie.
bQuantumlibet opera infidelium praedicentur: Apostoli sententiam veram novimus & invictam; Omne quod non est ex fide, peccatum est. Id. de gestis c•ntra Pelag•um, cap. 14.
The like sentence doth Saint Hierome pronounce against those, dwho not believing in Christ, did yet think themselves to be valiant and wise, temperate or just: that they might know that no man doth live without Christ, without whom all virtue is accounted vice. And Prosper against Cassianus, a Patron of the free-will of the Semipelagians: eIt appeareth (saith he) most manifestly, that there dwelleth no virtue in the minds of the ungodly, but that all their works be unclean and polluted; who have wisdom not spiritual, but animal, not heavenly but earthly, not Christian, but Diabolical, not from the Father of light, but from the Prince of darkness; while by those very things which they should not have had but by Gods giving, they are made subject to him, who did first fall from ⟨p. 471⟩God. fNeither ought we therefore to imagine, that the beginnings of virtues be in the treasures of nature, because many commendable things are found in the minds of ungodly men, which do proceed indeed from nature; but because they have departed from him that made nature, can not be accounted virtues. For that which is illuminated with the true light, is light; and that which wanteth that light, is night: because the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God. And so that is vice, which is thought to be virtue: as that is foolishness, which is thought to be wisdom. Hitherto also pertaineth that sentence, produced by him out of S. Augustine's works: gThe whole life of unbelievers is sin; and there is nothing good without the chiefest good. For where there is wanting the acknowledgement of the eternal and unchangeable truth, there is false virtue even in the best manners. Which he elegantly expresseth in verse, as well in his 81. Epigram, as in his Poem against the Pelagians, wherein of natural wisdom he writeth thus:
hEt licèt eximias studeat pollere per arts,
Ingeniumque bonum generosis moribus ornet:
Coeca tamen finem ad mortis per devia currit,
Nec vitae aeternae veros acquirere fructus
De falsâ virtute potest; unamque decoris
Occidui speciem mortali perdit in aevo.
Omne etenim probitatis opus, nisi semine verae
Exoritur fidei, peccatum est, inque reatum
Vertitur, & sterilis cumulat sibi gloria poenam.
The like sentence doth Saint Hierome pronounce against those, dwho not beleeving in Christ, did yet thinke themselves to be valiant and wise, temperate or just: that they might know that no man doth live without Christ, without whom all vertue is accounted vice. And Prosper against Cassianus, a Patron of the free-will of the Semipelagians: eIt appeareth (saith he) most manifestly, that there dwelleth no vertue in the minds of the ungodly, but that all their workes be uncleane and polluted; who have wisdome not spirituall, but animall, not heavenly but earthly, not Christian, but Diabolicall, not from the Father of light, but from the Prince of darknesse; while by those very things which they should not have had but by Gods giving, they are made subject to him, who did first fall from ⟨p. 471⟩God. fNeither ought we therefore to imagine, that the beginnings of vertues be in the treasures of nature, because many commendable things are found in the mindes of ungodly men, which doe proceed indeed from nature; but because they haue departed from him that made nature, can not be accounted vertues. For that which is illuminated with the true light, is light; and that which wanteth that light, is night: because the wisdome of this world is foolishnesse with God. And so that is vice, which is thought to be vertue: as that is foolishnesse, which is thought to be wisdome. Hitherto also pertaineth that sentence, produced by him out of S. Augustines workes: gThe whole life of unbeleevers is sinne; and there is nothing good without the chiefest good. For where there is wanting the acknowledgement of the eternall and unchangeable truth, there is false vertue even in the best manners. Which he elegantly expresseth in verse, as well in his 81. Epigramme, as in his Poëme against the Pelagians, wherein of naturall wisdome he writeth thus:
hEt licèt eximias studeat pollere per artes,
Ingeniumque bonum generosis moribus ornet:
Coeca tamen finem ad mortis per deuia currit,
Nec vitae aeternae veros acquirere fructus
De falsâ virtute potest; unamque decoris
Occidui speciem mortali perdit in aevo.
Omne etenim probitatis opus, nisi semine verae
Exoritur fidei, peccatum est, inque reatum
Vertitur, & sterilis cumulat sibi gloria poenam.
dSententiam proferamus adversus eos, qui in Christū non credentes, fortes & sapientes, temperantes se putant esse & justos: ut sciant nullum absque Christo vivere, sine quo omnis virtus in vitio est. Hieronym. in Galat. cap. 3.Sententiam proferamus adversus eos, qui in Christū non credentes, fortes & sapientes, temperantes se putant esse & justos: ut sciant nullum absque Christo vivere, sine quo omnis virtus in vitio est. Hieronym. in Galat. cap. 3.
eManifestissimè patet, in impiorum animis nullam habitare virtutem: sed omnia opera eorum immunda esse atque polluta; habentium sapientiam non spiritualem sed animalem, non coelestem sed terrenam, non Christianam sed Diabolicam, non à Patre luminum, sed à Principe tenebrarum; dumb per ea ipsa quae non haberent nisi dante Deo, subduntur ei qu• primus recessit à Deo. Prosper. contra Collator. cap. 13.Manifestissimè patet, in impiorum animis nullam habitare virtutem: sed omnia opera eorum immunda esse atque polluta; habentium sapientiam non spiritualem sed animalem, non coelestem sed terrenam, non Christianam sed Diabolicam, non à Patre luminum, sed à Principe tenebrarum; dum per ea ipsa quae non haberent nisi dante Deo, subduntur ei qu• primus recessit à Deo. Prosper. contra Collator. cap. 13.
fNec ideo existima•e debemus, in naturalibus thesauris principia esse virtutum, quia multa laudanda reperiuntur etiam in ingenijs impiorum: quae ex naturâ quidem prodeunt; sed quoniam ab eo qui naturam condidit recesserunt, virtutes esse non possunt. Quod enim vero illuminatum est lumine, lumē est; & quod eodem lumine caret, nox est: Quia sapientia hujus mundi stultitia est apud Deum. Ac sic vitium est quod putatur esse virtus: quandoquidem stultitia est, quod putatur esse sapientia. Ibid.Nec ideo existima•e debemus, in naturalibus thesauris principia esse virtutum, quia multa laudanda reperiuntur etiam in ingenijs impiorum: quae ex naturâ quidem prodeunt; sed quoniam ab eo qui naturam condidit recesserunt, virtutes esse non possunt. Quod enim vero illuminatum est lumine, lumē est; & quod eodem lumine caret, nox est: Quia sapientia hujus mundi stultitia est apud Deum. Ac sic vitium est quod putatur esse virtus: quandoquidem stultitia est, quod putatur esse sapientia. Ibid.
The Author of the book De Vocatione Gentium (by some wrongly attributed to S. Ambrose, to Prosper by others) delivereth the same doctrine in these words:
The Author of the booke De Vocatione Gentium (by some wrongly attributed to S. Ambrose, to Prosper by others) delivereth the same doctrine in these words:
iAlthough there have been some who by their natural understanding have endeavoured to resist vices; yet have they only barrenly adorned this temporal life, but not profited at all unto true virtues and everlasting bliss. For without the worship of the true God, even that which seemeth to be virtue is sin: neither can any man please God, without God. And he that doth not please God, whom doth he please but himself and the Devil? By whom when man was spoiled, he was deprived not of his will, but of the sanity of his will. kTherefore if God do not work in us, we can be partakers of no virtue. For without this good, there is nothing good; without this light, there is nothing lightsome; without this wisdom, there is nothing sound; without this righteousness, there is nothing right. So Fulgentius, in his book of the Incarnation and Grace of Christ. lIf unto some who did know God, and yet did not glorify him as God, that knowledge did profit nothing unto salvation: how could they be just with God, which do so keep some goodness in their manners and works, that yet they refer it not unto the end of Christian faith and charity? In whom there may be indeed some good things that appertain to the equity of humane society: but because they are not done by the love of God, profit they cannot. And Maxentius in the Confession of his Faith: mWe believe ⟨p. 473⟩that natural Free-will hath ability to nothing else, but to discern and desire carnal or secular things only; which not with God, but with m•n peradventure may seem glorious: but for the things that pertain to everlasting life, that it can neither think, nor will, nor desire, nor effect, but by the infusion and inward operation of the Holy Ghost. and Cassiodorus, in his exposition of the Psalms. nOn the evil part indeed there is an execrable freedom of the will, that the sinner may forsake his Creator, and convert himself to wicked vices: but on the good part, by Adams sinning, we have lost free-will, unto which otherwise than by the grace of Christ we cannot return: according to the saying of the Apostle; It is God which worketh in you, both to will and to do, of his good pleasure. (Philip. 2.13.)
iAlthough there have beene some who by their naturall understanding have endevoured to resist vices; yet have they only barrenly adorned this temporall life, but not profited at all unto true vertues and everlasting blisse. For without the worship of the true God, even that which seemeth to be vertue is sinne: neither can any man please God, without God. And he that doth not please God, whom doth hee please but himselfe and the Devill? By whom when man was spoiled, he was deprived not of his will, but of the sanitie of his will. kTherefore if God doe not worke in us, we can be partakers of no vertue. For without this good, there is nothing good; without this light, there is nothing lightsome; without this wisdome, there is nothing sound; without this righteousnesse, there is nothing right. So Fulgentius, in his booke of the Incarnation and Grace of Christ. lIf unto some who did know God, and yet did not glorifie him as God, that knowledge did profit nothing unto salvation: how could they be just with God, which doe so keepe some goodnesse in their manners and workes, that yet they referre it not unto the end of Christian faith and charitie? In whom there may be indeed some good things that appertaine to the equitie of humane societie: but because they are not done by the love of God, profit they cannot. And Maxentius in the Confessio• of his Faith: mWe beleeve ⟨p. 473⟩that naturall Free-will hath abilitie to nothing else, but to discerne and desire carnall or secular things only; which not with God, but with m•n peradventure may seeme glorious: but for the things that pertaine to everlasting life, that it can neither thinke, nor will, nor desire, nor effect, but by the infusion and inward operation of the Holy Ghost. and Cassiodorus, in his exposition of the Psalmes. nOn the evill part indeed there is an execrable freedome of the will, that the sinner may forsake his Creator, and convert himselfe to wicked vices: but on the good part, by Adams sinning, we have lost free-will, unto which otherwise than by the grace of Christ we cannot returne: according to the saying of the Apostle; It is God which worketh in you, both to will and to doe, of his good pleasure. (
iEtsi fuit qui naturali intellectu conatus sit vitijs reluctari; hujus tantùm temporis vitam steriliter ornavit, ad veras autem virtutes aeternā que beatitudinem non profecit. Sine cultu enim veri Dei, etiā quod virtus videtur esse, peccatū est: nec placere ullus Deo sine Deo potest. Qui verò Deo non placet, cui nisi sibi & Diabolo placet? A quo cùm homo spoliaretur; nō voluntate, sed voluntatis sanitate privatus est. Prosp. de Vocatione Gent. lib. 1. cap. 7.Etsi fuit qui naturali intellectu conatus sit vitijs reluctari; hujus tantùm temporis vitam steriliter ornavit, ad veras autem virtutes aeternā que beatitudinem non profecit. Sine cultu enim veri Dei, etiā quod virtus videtur esse, peccatū est: nec placere ullus Deo sine Deo potest. Qui verò Deo non placet, cui nisi sibi & Diabolo placet? A quo cùm homo spoliaretur; nō voluntate, sed voluntatis sanitate privatus est. Prosp. de Vocatione Gent. lib. 1. cap. 7.
kQui si non operatur in nobis, nullius possumus esse participes virtutis. Si• noe quippe bono, nihil est bonum: sine hâc luce, nihil est lucidum: sine hâc sapientiâ, nihil sanum; fine hac justitiâ, nihil rectum. Ibid. cap. 8.
lQuòd si quibusdam cognoscentibus Deum, nec tamen sicut Deum glorificantibus, cognitio illa nihil profuit ad salutem: quomodo hi potuerunt justi esse apud Deum, qui sic in suis moribus atque operibus bonitatis aliquid servant, ut hoc ad finem Christianae fidei charitatisque non referant? Quibus aliqua quidem bona, quae ad societatis humanae pertinent aequitatem, inesse possunt: sed quia non charitate Dei fiunt, prodesse non possunt. Fulg. de Incarn. & Grat. Christi, c. 26.
mLiberum naturale arbitrium ad nihil aliud valere credimus, nisi ad discernenda tantùm & desideranda carnalia sive secularia; quae non apud Deum, sed apud homines possunt fortassis videri gloriosa. Ad ea verò quae ad vitam aeternam pertinent, nec cogitare, nec velle, nec defiderare, nec perficere posse, nisi per infusionem & inoperationem intrinsecus Spiritus Sancti. Jo. Maxent. in Confessione suae fidei.Liberum naturale arbitrium ad nihil aliud valere credimus, nisi ad discernenda tantùm & desideranda carnalia sive secularia; quae non apud Deum, sed apud homines possunt fortassis videri gloriosa. Ad ea verò quae ad vitam aeternam pertinent, nec cogitare, nec velle, nec defiderare, nec perficere posse, nisi per infusionem & inoperationem intrinsecus Spiritus Sancti. Io. Maxent. in Confessione suae fidei.
The first presumptuous advancer of free-will, contrary to the doctrine anciently received in the Church, is by Vicentius Lirinensis noted to be Pelagius the heretic. For owho ever (saith he) before that profane Pelagius, presumed the virtue of free-will to be so great; that he did not think the grace of God to be necessary for the helping of it in good things at every act? For maintaining of which ungodly opinion, both he and his disciple Celestius were condemned by the censure of the CCXLIII. Bishops assembled in the great Council of Carthage (anno Dom. 418.) puntil they should acknowledge by a most open confession, that by the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord, we are holpen not only to ⟨p. 474⟩know but also to do righteousness at every act: so that without it we can have, think, say, do, nothing that belongeth to true and holy piety. Wherewith Pelagius being pressed, stuck not to make this profession: qAnathema to him, who either thinketh or saith, that the grace of God, whereby Christ came into this world to save sinners, is not necessary, not only at every hour or every moment, but also at every act of ours: and they who go about to take away this, are worthy to suffer everlasting punishment. Four books also did he publish in defence of Freewill; to which he thus referreth his adversaries, for further satisfaction in this matter: rLet them read the late work, which we were forced to set out the other day for Free-will; and they shall perceive how unjustly they go about to defame us with the denial of Grace, who throughout the whole context almost of that work do perfectly and entirely confess both Free-will and Grace. Yet for all this he did but equivocate in the name of Grace: sunder an ambiguous generality hiding what he thought, but by the term of Grace breaking the envy, and declining the offence which might be taken at his doctrine, as S. Augustine well observeth. For, by Grace, he did not understand, as the Church did in this question, the infusion of a new quality of holiness into the soul, whereby it was regenerated, and the will of evil made good: but first, tthe possibility of nature, that is to say, the natural freedom of will which every one hath received from God by virtue of the first creation. Against which S. Augustine thus opposeth himself: ⟨p. 475⟩uWhy is there so much presumed of the possibility of nature?
The first presumptuous advancer of free-will, contrary to the doctrine anciently received in the Church, is by Vicentius Lirinensis noted to be Pelagius the hereticke. For owho ever (saith he) before that profane Pelagius, presumed the vertue of free-will to be so great; that he did not thinke the grace of God to be necessarie for the helping of it in good things at every act? For maintaining of which ungodly opinion, both he and his disciple Celestius were condemned by the censure of the CCXLIII. Bishops assembled in the great Councell of Carthage (anno Dom. 418.) puntill they should acknowledge by a most open confession, that by the grace of God through Iesus Christ our Lord, we are holpen not onely to ⟨p. 474⟩know but also to doe righteousnesse at every act: so that without it we can have, thinke, say, doe, nothing that belongeth to true and holy piety. Wherewith Pelagius being pressed, stucke not to make this profession: qAnathema to him, who either thinketh or saith, that the grace of God, whereby Christ came into this world to save sinners, is not necessarie, not onely at every houre or every moment, but also at every act of ours: and they who goe about to take away this, are worthy to suffer everlasting punishment. Foure bookes also did he publish in defence of Freewill; to which he thus referreth his adversaries, for further satisfaction in this matter: rLet them reade the late worke, which we were forced to set out the other day for Free-will; and they shall perceive how uniustly they goe about to defame us with the deniall of Grace, who thorowout the whole context almost of that worke doe perfectly and entirely confesse both Free-will and Grace. Yet for all this he did but equivocate in the name of Grace: sunder an ambiguous generalitie hiding what he thought, but by the tearme of Grace breaking the envie, and declining the offence which might be taken at his doctrine, as S. Augustine well observeth. For, by Grace, he did not understand, as the Church did in this question, the infusion of a new qualitie of holinesse into the soule, whereby it was regenerated, and the will of evill made good: but first, tthe possibilitie of nature, that is to say, the naturall freedome of will which every one hath received from God by vertue of the first creation. Against which S. Augustine thus opposeth himselfe:
oQuis unquā ante profanum illum Pelagium tantam virtutē liberi praesumpsit arbitrij; ut ad hoc in bonis rebus per actus singulos adjuvandum, necessariam Dei gratiam non putaret? Vincent. Lirinens. Commonitor. 1. advers. haeres. cap. 34.Quis unquā ante profanum illum Pelagium tantam virtutē liberi praesumpsit arbitrij; ut ad hoc in bonis rebus per actus singulos adjuvandum, necessariam Dei gratiam non putaret? Vincent. Lirinens. Commonitor. 1. advers. haeres. cap. 34.
pDonec apertissimâ confessione fateantur, Gratiâ Dei per Jesum Christum Dominum nostrum, non solùm ad cognoscendam verumetiam ad faciendam justitiam, nos per actus singulos adjuvari; ita ut sine eâ nihil verae sanctaeque pietatis habere, cogitare, dicere, agere valeamus. Synod. African. Epist. ad Zosimum Pap. apud Prosperum contra Collator. cap. 5. & Respons. ad object. 8. Gallorum: ubi addit hanc constitutionem contra inimicos gratiae Dei totum mundum amplexum esse.Donec apertissimâ confessione fateantur, Gratiâ Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum, non solùm ad cognoscendam verumetiam ad faciendam justitiam, nos per actus singulos adjuvari; ita ut sine eâ nihil verae sanctaeque pietatis habere, cogitare, dicere, agere valeamus. Synod. African. Epist. ad Zosimum Pap. apud Prosperum contra Collator. cap. 5. & Respons. ad object. 8. Gallorum: ubi addit hanc constitutionem contra inimicos gratiae Dei totum mundum amplexum esse.
qAnathema qui vel sentit vel dicit, gratiam Dei, quâ Christus venit in hunc mundum peccatores s•lvos facere, non solùm per singulas horas aut per singula momenta, sed etiam per singulos actus nostros non esse necessariam: & qui hanc conantur auferre, poenas so•tiuntur aeternas. Pelag. apud Augustin. lib. 1. de gratiâ Christi, con•r. Pelag. & Cellest. cap. 2.Anathema qui vel sentit vel dicit, gratiam Dei, quâ Christus venit in hunc mundum peccatores s•lvos facere, non solùm per singulas horas aut per singula momenta, sed etiam per singulos actus nostros non esse necessariam: & qui hanc conantur auferre, poenas so•tiuntur aeternas. Pelag. apud Augustin. lib. 1. de gratiâ Christi, con•r. Pelag. & Celest. cap. 2.
rLegant etiam recens meum opusculū, quod pro libero nuper arbitrio edere compulsi sumus; & agnoscent quàminiquè nos negatione gratiae infamare gestierint; qui per tutom penè ipsius textum operis perfectè atque integrè & liberum arbitrium confitemur & gratiam. Id. ibid. cap. 41.
It is wounded, it is maimed, it is vexed, it is lost. It hath need of a true confession, not of a false defence. And Prosper, speaking of the state of mans free-will after Adams fall;
— xhinc arbitrium per devia lapsum
Claudicat, & caecis conatibus inque ligatis
Motus inest, non error abest. manet ergo voluntas
Semper amans aliquid quò see ferat; & labyrintho
Fallitur, ambages dubiarum ingressa viarum.
Vana cupit, vanis tumet & timet: omnimodaque
Mobilitate ruens, in vulnera vulnere surgit.
It is wounded, it is maimed, it is vexed, it is lost. It hath need of a true confession, not of a false defence. And Prosper, speaking of the state of mans free-will after Adams fall;
— xhinc arbitrium per devia lapsum
Claudicat, & caecis conatibus inque ligatis
Motus inest, non error abest. manet ergo voluntas
Semper amans aliquid quò se ferat; & labyrintho
Fallitur, ambages dubiarum ingressa viarum.
Vana cupit, vanis tumet & timet: omnimodaque
Mobilitate ruens, in vulnera vulnere surgit.
Secondly, by grace he understood the grace of doctrine and instruction, whereby the mind was informed in the truth out of the word of God. Which by Prosper is thus objected to his followers:
— yaliud non est vobiscum gratia, quàm lex,
Quamque Propheta monens, & quàm doctrina ministri.
Unto whom S. Augustine therefore saith well: zLet them read and understand, let them behold and confess, that not by the law and doctrine sounding outwardly, but by an inward and hidden, by a wonderful and unspeakable power, God doth work in the hearts of men, not only true revelations, but good wills also. And thereupon the African Fathers in the Council of Carthage, enacted this Canon. aWhosoever shall say, that the grace of God by Jesus Christ our Lord, doth for this cause only help us not to sin, because by it the understanding of the commandments ⟨p. 476⟩is revealed and opened unto us, that we may know what we ought to affect, what to shun; & that by it there is not wrought in us, that we may also love and be enabled to do that, which we know should be done; let him be anathema. Thirdly, under this grace he comprehended not only the external revelation by the word, but also the binternal by the illumination of Gods Spirit. Whereupon he thus riseth up against his adversary. cWe confess that this grace is, not (as thou thinkest) in the Law only, but in the help of God also. For God doth help us by his doctrine and revelation, whilst he openeth the eyes of our hearts; whilst he showeth us things to come, that we be not holden with things present; whilst he discovereth the snares of the Devil; whilst he enlighteneth us with the manifold and unspeakable gift of his heavenly grace. He that saith these things, doth he seem unto thee to deny grace? or doth he confess, both the free-will of man, and the grace of God too? And yet in all this (as S. Augustine rightly noteth) dhe doth but confess that grace, whereby God doth show and reveal what we ought to do; not that, whereby he doth grant and help that we may do. And therefore, ein other places of his writings he plainly affirmeth, that our very prayers are to be used for nothing but this, that the doctrine may be opened unto us by divine revelation; not that the mind of man may be holpen, that he may also accomplish by love and action that which he hath learned should be done.
Secondly, by grace he understood the grace of doctrine and instruction, whereby the minde was informed in the truth out of the word of God. Which by Prosper is thus objected to his followers:
— yaliud non est vobiscum gratia, quàm lex,
Quamque Propheta monens, & quàm doctrina ministri.
Unto whom S. Augustine therefore saith well: zLet them reade and understand, let them behold and confesse, that not by the law and doctrine sounding outwardly, but by an inward and hidden, by a wonderfull and unspeakable power, God doth worke in the hearts of men, not only true revelations, but good wills also. And thereupon the African Fathers in the Councell of Carthage, enacted this Canon. aWhosoever shall say, that the grace of God by Iesus Christ our Lord, doth for this cause only helpe us not to sinne, because by it the understanding of the commandements ⟨p. 476⟩is revealed and opened unto us, that we may know what we ought to affect, what to shunne; & that by it there is not wrought in us, that we may also love and be inabled to doe that, which we know should be done; let him be anathema. Thirdly, under this grace he comprehended not only the externall revelation by the word, but also the binternall by the illumination of Gods Spirit. Whereupon he thus riseth up against his adversarie. cWe confesse that this grace is, not (as thou thinkest) in the Law only, but in the helpe of God also. For God doth helpe us by his doctrine and revelation, whilest he openeth the eyes of our hearts; whilest he sheweth us things to come, that we be not holden with things present; whilest he discovereth the snares of the Devill; whilest he enlightneth us with the manifold and unspeakable gift of his heavenly grace. He that saith these things, doth he seeme unto thee to denie grace? or doth he confesse, both the free-will of man, and the grace of God too? And yet in all this (as S. Augustine rightly noteth) dhe doth but confesse that grace, whereby God doth shew and reveale what we ought to doe; not that, whereby he doth grant and helpe that we may doe. And therefore, e
yId. ibid. cap. 20. Vid. eund. in epist. ad Ruffinum, non procul ab initio: & Augustin. de haeres. cap. 88. & lib. 1. de gratiâ Christi contra Pelag. cap. 8, 9, 10.
zLegant ergo & intelligant, intueantur atque fateantur, non lege atque doctrinâ insonante forinsecùs, sed internâ atque occultâ, mirabili ac ineffabili potestate operari Deum in cordibus hominum, non solùm veras revelationes, sed etiam bonas voluntates. Augustin. ibid. cap. 24.
aQuisquis dixerit gratiam Dei per Jesum Christum Dominum nostrum, propter hoc tantum nos adjuvare ad non peccandum, quia per ipsam nobis revelatur & aperitur intelligentia mandatorum, ut sciamus quid appetere, quid vitare debeamus; non autem per illam nobis praestari, ut quod faciendum cognoverimus, etiam facere diligamus atque valeamus: anathema sit. African. Patr. in Synod. Carthagin. can. 4.Quisquis dixerit gratiam Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum, propter hoc tantum nos adjuvare ad non peccandum, quia per ipsam nobis revelatur & aperitur intelligentia mandatorum, ut sciamus quid appetere, quid vitare debeamus; non autem per illam nobis praestari, ut quod faciendum cognoverimus, etiam facere diligamus atque valeamus: anathema sit. African. Patr. in Synod. Carthagin. can. 4.
cQuam (gratiam) nos non, ut tu putas, in lege tantummodo, sed & in Dei esse adjutorio confitemur. Adjuvat enim nos Deus per doctrinam & revelationē suam, dumb cordis nostri oculos aperit; dum nobis, ne praesentibus occupemur, futura demonstrat; dumb Diaboli pandit insidias; dumb nos multiformi & ineffabili dono gratiae coelestis· illuminat. Qui haec dicit, gratiam tibi videtur neg•re? An & liberum hominis arbitrium, & Dei gratiam confitetur? Pelag. ibid. cap. 7.Quam (gratiam) nos non, ut tu putas, in lege tantummodo, sed & in Dei esse adjutorio confitemur. Adjuvat enim nos Deus per doctrinam & revelationē suam, dum cordis nostri oculos aperit; dum nobis, ne praesentibus occupemur, futura demonstrat; dum Diaboli pandit insidias; dum nos multiformi & ineffabili dono gratiae coelestis· illuminat. Qui haec dicit, gratiam tibi videtur neg•re? An & liberum hominis arbitrium, & Dei gratiam confitetur? Pelag. ibid. cap. 7.
dHinc itaque apparet, hanc eum gratiam confiteri, quâ demonstrat & revelat Deus quid agere debeamus; non quâ donat atque adjuvat ut agamus; cùm ad hoc potiùs valeat legis agnitio, si gratiae desit opitulatio, ut fiat mandati praevaricatio. Augustin. ibid. cap. 8.
dead in trespasses and sinnes; and so no more able to lead a holy life acceptable unto God, then a dead man is to performe the actions of him which is alive.
⟨p. 468⟩
must intercurre betwixt both: the morall workes of the unregenerate fayling so fowly both in the beginning, middle and end, are to be accounted breaches rather of the Commandement then observances, depravations of good workes rather then performances. For howsoever these actions be in their owne kinde good and commanded of God, yet are they marred in the carriage, that which is bonum being not done bene:
Si gentili• (inquis) nudum operuerit, nunquid quia non est ex fide, peccatum est? Prorsus in quantum non est ex fide peccatum est: non quia per seipsum factum, quod est nudum operire, peccatum est; sed de tali opere non in •omino gloriari, solus impius negat esse peccatum. Ibid.
aQuod si & ipsa (misericordia) per seipsam naturali compassione opus est bonum; etiam isto bono malé utitur qui infideliter utitur, & hoc bonum malé facit qui infideliter facit: qui autem malé facit aliquid, profectò peccat. Ex quo colligitur, etiam ipsa bona opera quae faciunt infideles, non ipsorum esse, sed illius qui bene utitur malis. Ipso•um autem esse peccata, quibus & bona malé faciunt; quia ea non fideli, sed infideli, hoc est, stultâ & noxiâ faciunt voluntate. qualis voluntas, nullo Christiano dubitante, arbor est mala, quae facere non potest nisi fructus malos, id est, sola peccata. Omne enim, velis nolis, quod non est ex fide, peccatum est. Ibid.
gOmnis infideliū vita peccatum est: & nihil est bonum sine summo bono. Ubi enim deest agnitio aeternae & incommutabilis veritatis, falsa virtus est, etiam in optimis moribus. Id. ex Augustino Sentent. 106. & Epigram. 81.Omnis infideliū vita peccatum est: & nihil est bonum sine summo bono. Vbi enim deest agnitio aeternae & incommutabilis veritatis, falsa virtus est, etiam in optimis moribus. Id. ex Augustino Sentent. 106. & Epigram. 81.
hId. de Ingratis, cap. 16.
Philip. 2.13
.)
Est quidem in malâ part• execrabilis libertas arbitrij, ut praevaricator creatorem deserat, & ad vitia se nefanda convertat: in bonâ verò part arbitrium liberū, Adā peccante, perdidimus; ad quod nisi per Christi gratiam redire non possumus: dicente Apòstolo; Deus est enim qui operatur in vobis, & velle, & perficere, pro bonâ voluntate. Cassiodor. in Psalm. 117.
Est quidem in malâ part• execrabilis libertas arbitrij, ut praevaricator creatorem deserat, & ad vitia se nefanda convertat: in bonâ verò parte arbitrium liberū, Adā peccante, perdidimus; ad quod nisi per Christi gratiam redire non possumus: dicente Apòstolo; Deus est enim qui operatur in vobis, & velle, & perficere, pro bonâ voluntate. Cassiodor. in Psalm. 117.
Why is there so much presumed of the possibilitie of nature?
Legant etiam recens meum opusculū, quod pro libero nuper arbitrio edere compulsi sumus; & agnoscent quàminiquè nos negatione gratiae infamare gestierint; qui per tutom penè ipsius textum operis perfectè atque integrè & liberum arbitrium confitemur & gratiam. Id. ibid. cap. 41.
sSub ambiguâ generalitate quid sentiret abscondens; gratiae tamen vocabulo frangens invidiam, offensionemque declinans. Augustin. ibid. cap. 37.
tPelag. apud Augustin. de gostis contra Pelag. cap. 10. & in epist. 95. Vid. eund. Augustin. de grat. & lib. arbitr. cap. 13. & serm. 11. de verbis Apostoli.
uQuid tantum de naturae possibilitate praesumitur? Vulnerata, sauciata, vexata, perdita est. Verâ confessione, non falsâ defensione opus habet. Augustin. de natur. & grat. cap. 53.
in other places of his writings he plainly affirmeth, that our very prayers are to be used for nothing but this, that the doctrine may be opened unto us by divine revelation; not that the minde of man may be holpen, that he may also accomplish by love and action that which he hath learned should be done.
eIpsas quoque orationes (ut in scriptis suis apertissimè affirmat) ad nihil aliud adhibendas opinatur, nisi ut nobis doctrina etiam divinâ revelatione aperiatur; non ut adjuvetur mens hominis, ut id, quod faciendum esse didicerit, etiam dilectione & actione perficiat. Id. ibid. cap. 41.
