We see three kinds of Grace here commended unto us by Pelagius. the first, a natural grace (as he fondly termed it) bringing with it a bare possibility only to will and do good: which he said was not given according to merits, because he held it to be given at the very ⟨p. 481⟩beginning of mans being, before which he could not possibly merit any thing. the second, an ex•iting or persuading grace, imparted unto such as were given to earthly lusts, and like brute beasts affected only present things; who being in that case, were far from meriting any good thing at Gods hands: and in that regard he affirmed, that this grace likewise was given without any respect to precedent merits. the third, an assisting grace, by which God doth guide and incline the heart of the converted sinner, to the doing of all good: and this he maintained to be given as a reward to that act of the free-will, whereby it yielded to the persuasions of the former exciting grace, and so did actually convert it self to God. Now this is sthe presumption which S. Augustine condemneth so much in these men; that they durst say: We work to merit that God may work with us. that they twould first give to God, that it might be recompensed to them again: namely, they first give somewhat out of their free-will, that grace might be rendered to them again for a reward. that they were of opinion; uthat our merit consisted in this, that we were with God, and that his grace was given according to this merit, that he should also be with us: that our merit should be in this, that we do seek him; and according to this merit his grace was given that we should find him. For they that followed Pelagius, (refining herein a little the doctrine of their Master, and delivering it in somewhat a more plausible manner) declared that xthe merits which they held to go before grace and to procure ⟨p. 482⟩grace, were, asking, seeking, and knocking: and that ygrace was given, not according to the merit of our good works, (which they did acknowledge to be an effect, and not a cause of this grace) but of our good will only. because (said they) the good will of man praying went before, and the will of man believing went before that: that according to these merits the grace of God hearing might follow after. And all this they did under colour of maintaining free-will against the Manichees:
We see three kindes of Grace here commended unto us by Pelagius. the first, a naturall grace (as he fondly tearmed it) bringing with it a bare possibilitie only to will and doe good: which he said was not given according to merits, because he held it to be given at the very ⟨p. 481⟩beginning of mans being, before which he could not possibly merit any thing. the second, an ex•iting or perswading grace, imparted unto such as were given to earthly lusts, and like bruit beasts affected only present things; who being in that case, were far from meriting any good thing at Gods hands: and in that regard he affirmed, that this grace likewise was given without any respect to precedent merits. the third, an assisting grace, by which God doth guide and incline the heart of the converted sinner, to the doing of all good: and this he maintained to be given as a reward to that act of the free-will, whereby it yeelded to the perswasions of the former exciting grace, and so did actually convert it selfe to God. Now this is sthe presumption which S. Augustine condemneth so much in these men; that they durst say: We worke to merit that God may worke with us. that they twould first give to God, that it might be recompensed to them againe: namely, they first give somewhat out of their free-will, that grace might be rendred to them againe for a reward. that they were of opinion; uthat our merit consisted in this, that we were with God, and that his grace was given according to this merit, that he should also be with us: that our merit should be in this, that we doe seeke him; and according to this merit his grace was given that we should finde him. For they that followed Pelagius, (refining herein a little the doctrine of their Master, and delivering it in somewhat a more plausible manner) declared that xthe merits which they held to goe before grace and to procure ⟨p. 482⟩grace, were, asking, seeking, and knocking: and that ygrace was given, not according to the merit of our good workes, (which they did acknowledge to be an effect, and not a cause of this grace) but of our good will only. because (said they) the good will of man praying went before, and the will of man beleeving went before that: that according to these merits the grace of God hearing might follow after. And all this they did under colour of maintaining free-will against the Manichees:
- sN•hil sic evertit hominum praesumptionem dicentium; Nos facimus, ut mereamur cum quibus faciat Deus. Augustin. c•ntra duas epist. Pel•gian. lib. 4. cap. 6.
- tPriors volunt dare Deo, ut retribuatur eis: priors utique dare quodlibet ex libero arbitrio, ut sit gratia retrib•enda pro praemio. Ibid.Priores volunt dare Deo, ut retribuatur eis: priores utique dare quodlibet ex libero arbitrio, ut sit gratia retrib•enda pro praemio. Ibid.
- uMeritum nostrum in eo esse, quòd sumus cum Deo: ejus autem gratiam secundùm hoc meritum da•i, ut sit & ipse nobiscum. Item meritum nostrum in eo esse, quòd quaerimus: & secundùm hoc meritum dari ejus gratiam, ut inveniamus eum. Id. de grat. & libero arbitr. cap. 5.
- xIbi enim vos ut video, ponere jam coepistis merita gratiam praecedentia, quod est petere, quaerere, pulsare; ut his meritis debita illa reddatur, ac sic gratia inaniter nuncupetur. Id. contra Julian. Pelagian. lib. 4. cap. 8.Ibi enim vos ut video, ponere jam coepistis merita gratiam praecedentia, quod est petere, quaerere, pulsare; ut his meritis debita illa reddatur, ac sic gratia inaniter nuncupetur. Id. contra Iulian. Pelagian. lib. 4. cap. 8.
- yDicunt enim, etsi non datur gratia secundùm me•ita bonorum ope•um, quia per ipsam bene operamur, tamen secundùm meritum bonae voluntatis datur. quia bona voluntas (inquiunt) praecedit orantis, quam praecessit voluntas credentis; ut secundùm haec merita gratia sequatur exaudientis Dei. Id. de grat. & lib. arbitr. cap. 14.