A14227:575
An answer to a challenge madeAn ansvver to a challenge made
An answer to a challenge made by a Jesuit in Ireland Wherein the judgement of antiquity in the points questioned is truly delivered, and the novelty of the now romish doctrine plainly discovered. By James Usher Bishop of Meath.An ansvver to a challenge made by a Iesuite in Ireland Wherein the iudgement of antiquity in the points questioned is truely delivered, and the noveltie of the now romish doctrine plainly discovered. By Iames Vssher Bishop of Meath.
Dublin: printed by the Society of Stationers and Eliot's Court Press, 1624Dublin: printed by the Societie of Stationers and Eliot's Court Press, 1624
AN ANSWER TO THE FORMER CHALLENGE. › OF MERITS.AN ANSVVER TO THE FORMER CHALLENGE. › OF MERITS.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Neither are the testimonies of the Schoolmen wanting in this cause. For where aGod is affirmed to give ⟨p. 518⟩the kingdom of heaven for good merits or good works: some made here a difference betwixt pro bonis meritis and propter bona merita. The former, they said, did note, a sign, or a way, or some occasion: and in that sense they admitted the proposition. But according to the latter expression, they would not receive it; because propter did note an efficient cause. And yet for the salving of that also, the Cardinal of Cambraye, Petrus de Alliaco delivereth us this distinction: bThis word Propter is sometimes taken by way of consequence; and then it noteth the order of the following of one thing upon another: as when it is said, The reward is given for the merit. For nothing else is signified thereby, but that the reward is given after the merit, and not but after the merit. Sometimes again it is taken causally. And cforasmuch as a cause also is accounted that, upon the being whereof another thing doth follow: a thing may be said to be a cause two manner of ways. One way properly; when upon the presence of the being of the one, by the virtue thereof and out of the nature of the thing there followeth the being of the other: and thus is fire the cause of heat. Another way improperly; when upon the presence of the being of the one there followeth the being of the other, yet not by the virtue thereof nor out of the nature of the thing, but only out of the will of another: and so a meritorious •ot is said to be a cause in respect of the reward; as caussa sine quâ non also is said to be a cause, though it be none properly.
Neither are the testimonies of the Schoolemen wanting in this cause. For where aGod is affirmed to give ⟨p. 518⟩the kingdome of heaven for good merits or good works: some made here a difference betwixt pro bonis meritis and propter bona merita. The former, they said, did note, a signe, or a way, or some occasion: and in that sense they admitted the proposition. But according to the latter expression, they would not receive it; because propter did note an efficient cause. And yet for the salving of that also, the Cardinal of Cambraye, Petrus de Alliaco delivereth us this distinction: