All these, and sundry others beside them, hold that the dignity of the good works done by Gods children doth not proceed from the value of the works themselves, but only from the gracious promise and ⟨p. 521⟩acceptation of God. Yea Gregorius Ariminensis, uthat most able and careful defender of S. Augustine (as Vega stileth him) concludeth peremptorily, xthat no act of man, though issuing from never so great charity, meriteth of condignitie from God, either eternal life, or yet any other reward whether eternal or temporal. The same conclusion is by Durand the most resolute Doctor (as yGerson termeth him) thus confirmed: zThat which is conferred rather out of the liberality of the giver than out of the due of the work, doth not fall within the compass of the merit of condignitie, strictly and properly taken. But whatsoever we receive of God, whether it be grace or whether it be glory, whether temporal or spiritual good, whatsoever good work we have before done for it, yet we receive the same rather and more principally out of Gods liberality, than out of the due of the work. Therefore nothing at all falleth within the compass of the merit of condignitie, so taken. And athe cause hereof is, (saith he) because both that which we are and that which we have, whether they be good acts or good habits, or the use of them, is wholly in us by Gods liberality freely giving and preserving the same. Now because none is bound by his own free gift to give more, but the receiver rather is more bound to him that giveth: therefore by the good habits, and ⟨p. 522⟩by the good acts or uses which God hath given us, God is not bound to us by any debt of justice to give any thing more, so as if he did not give it he should be unjust; but we are rather bound to God. And to think or say the contrary, is rashness or blasphemy.
All these, and sundry others beside them, hold that the dignitie of the good workes done by Gods children doth not proceed from the value of the workes themselves, but only from the gratious promise and ⟨p. 521⟩acceptation of God. Yea Gregorius Ariminensis, uthat most able and carefull defender of S. Augustine (as Vega stileth him) concludeth peremptorily, xthat no act of man, though issuing from never so great charitie, meriteth of condignitie from God, either eternall life, or yet any other reward whether eternall or temporall. The same conclusion is by Durand the most resolate Doctor (as yGerson tearmeth him) thus confirmed: zThat which is conferred rather out of the liberalitie of the giver than out of the due of the worke, doth not fall within the compasse of the merit of condignitie, strictly and properly taken. But whatsoever we receive of God, whether it be grace or whether it be glory, whether temporall or spirituall good, whatsoever good worke we have before done for it, yet we receive the same rather and more principally out of Gods liberalitie, than out of the due of the worke. Therefore nothing at all falleth within the compasse of the merit of condignitie, so taken. And athe cause hereof is, (saith he) because both that which we are and that which we have, whether they be good acts or good habits, or the use of them, is wholly in us by Gods liberalitie freely giving and preserving the same. Now because none is bound by his owne free gift to give more, but the receiver rather is more bound to him that giveth: therefore by the good habits, and ⟨p. 522⟩by the good acts or uses which God hath given us, God is not bound to us by any debt of justice to give any thing more, so as if he did not give it he should be unjust; but we are rather bound to God. And to thinke or say the contrary, is rashnesse or blasphemie.
- uValens ille Gregorius Ariminensis, maximus & studiosissimus Divi Augustini propugnator. Id. ibid. quaest. 6.
- xEx hoc ulteriùs infero; quòd nedum vitae aeternae, sed nec alicujus alterius praemij aeterni vel temporalis, aliquis actus hominis ex quacunque charitate elicitus, est de condigno meritorius apud Deum. Gregor. in 1. dist. 17. quaest. 1. art. 2.
- yDurandus utique resolutissimus. Jo. Gerson. epist. ad studentes Collegij Navarrae.
- zQuod redditur potiùs ex liberalitate dantis quàm ex debito operis; non cadit sub merito de condigno stricté & proprie accepto, ut expositum est. Sed quicquid á Deo accipimus, sive sit gratia, sive sit gloria, sive bonum temporale vel spirituale, praecedente in nobis propter hoc quocunque bono opere; potiùs & principaliùs accipimus ex liberalitate Dei, quàm reddatur ex debito operis. Ergo nihil penitùs cadit sub merito de condigno sic accepto. Durand. in 2. distinct. 27. quaest. 2. sect. 12.
- aCaussa autem hujus est, quia & illud quod sumus, & quod habemus, sive sunt boni actus, sive boni habitus seu usus; totum est in nobis ex liberalitate divinâ gratis dante & conservante. Et quia ex dono gratuito nullus obligatur ad dandum amplius, sed potiùs recipiens magis obligatur danti: ideò ex bonis habitibus, & ex bonis actibus sive usibus nobis á Deo datis, Deus non obligatur nobis ex aliquo debito justitiae ad aliquid amplius dandum, ita quòd si non dederit sit injustus; sed potiùs nos sumus Deo obligati. Et sentire, seu dicere oppositum, est temerarium seu blasphemum. Ibid. sect. 13.14.