A14353:283
Most learned and fruitful commentaries of D. Peter Martyr Vermilius Florentine, professor of divinity…Most learned and fruitfull commentaries of D. Peter Martir Vermilius Florentine, professor of diuinitie…
Most learned and fruitful commentaries of D. Peter Martyr Vermilius Florentine, professor of divinity in the school of Tigure, upon the Epistle of S. Paul to the Romans wherein are diligently [and] most profitably entreated all such matters and chief common places of religion touched in the same Epistle. With a table of all the common places and expositions upon divers places of the scriptures, and also an index to find all the principal matters contained in the same. Lately tra[n]slated out of Latin into English, by H.B.Most learned and fruitfull commentaries of D. Peter Martir Vermilius Florentine, professor of diuinitie in the schole of Tigure, vpon the Epistle of S. Paul to the Romanes wherin are diligently [and] most profitably entreated all such matters and chiefe common places of religion touched in the same Epistle. With a table of all the common places and expositions vpon diuers places of the scriptures, and also an index to finde all the principall matters conteyned in the same. Lately tra[n]slated out of Latine into Englishe, by H.B.
London: printed by John Daye. Cum gratia & privilegio Regiæ Maiestatis per decennium. These books are to be sold, 1568London: printed by Iohn Daye. Cum gratia & priuilegio Regiæ Maiestatis per decennium. These bookes are to be solde, 1568
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Therefore was it needful to urge them on this behalf, that they should understand, that their knowledge was not sufficient for them. Moreover, the intent of the Apostle is, to call them back from the law, and from Philosophy: of which two things, the principallest office is, to teach. Wherefore when he had declared, that knowledge by it self was not sufficient to justify them, he most manifestly inferreth, that justification cannot be obtained, neither by Philosophy nor by the law. And that these men by the light of nature, knew what things were to be done, he proveth manifestly by this token, namely, for that they could judge of them. But there is no man, which can give judgement of those things whereof he1 is utterly ignorant. But how much the wise men of the Ethnics excelled in sharpness of judgement, the goodly laws and excellent books, which they have set forth, do declare, and also the determinations which were decreed at their places of judgement, when matters were decided. Chrysostom supposeth, that these things are therefore written unto the Romans, because at that time they were the chief Lords over all, and the judgements in a manner of all provinces were drawn thither. But undoubtedly those things whereof the Apostle here writeth, pertain unto all men. For there is none, which hath his right wits, which either with himself or else with other men discusseth not of those things, which he either publicly or privately seeth done: and either praiseth or disprayseth the same, as they either disagree from natural justice, or agree therewith. But forasmuch as they can give judgement of other men, they ought in especial to give judgement of themselves: for y• unto them it is most plain, not only what they do, but also with what mind they do it: which they cannot so easily see in other men. But ⟨p. 36⟩they spare themselves, and do the self same things, which they give judgement of. Paul therefore to strike into them a terror saith:2
Therfore was it nedefull to vrge them on this behalfe, that they should vnderstand, that theyr knowledge was not sufficient for them. Moreouer, the entent of the Apostle is, to call them backe from the lawe, and from Philosophye: of whiche two thinges, the principallest office is, to teach. Wherefore when he had declared, that knowlege by it selfe was not sufficient to iustefy them, he moste manifestly inferreth, that iustification cannot be obtayned, neyther by Philosophy nor by the lawe. And that these men by the lighte of nature, knew what thinges were to be doone, he proueth manifestlye by this token, namely, for that they coulde iudge of them. But there is no man, which can geue iudgemente of those thinges whereof he