A14463:2580
A14463:2580
A Christian instruction, containing the law and the Gospel Also a summary of the principal points of the Christian faith and religion, and of the abuses and errors contrary to the same. Done in certain dialogues in french, by M. Peter Viret, sometime minister of the Word of God at Nymes in Province. Translated by I.S. Seen and allowed according to the Queens Majesties injunctions.A Christian instruction, conteyning the law and the Gospell Also a summarie of the principall poyntes of the Christian fayth and religion, and of the abuses and errors contrary to the same. Done in certayne dialogues in french, by M. Peter Viret, sometime minister of the Word of God at Nymes in Prouince. Translated by I.S. Seene and allowed according to the Queenes Maiesties iniunctions.
London: printed by Henry Bynneman? for Abraham Veale, 1573
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
T. I Think also that this be one of the principal causes why God doth set forth rather the work than any other thing in that law, to the end that we should not be deceived under the cloak of our heart.
T. I Thinke also that this be one of the principall causes why God doth set foorth rather the worke than any other thing in that lawe, to the ende that we should not be deceiued vnder the cloke of our heart.
D. The matter is plain. For as the heart can not be boasted of to be good, except the mouth confess it, and that he do declare by works the faith and charity whereof he will so glory, it can not be excused, but that it is wicked and by consequent displeaseth God, when he doth a wicked work that is forbidden ⟨p. 468⟩by God, for either he doth it through ignorance, or else of a certain knowledge: if he do it through ignorance, it is an assured sign that the heart of his own nature is wicked: For if it were not wicked, it could not bear such fruit by any means, nor also could it by by any means ignorant of the will of God, for the ignorance is a witness of the darkness which sin hath engendered in the understanding of man, and of the contempt of god, and what negligence there is in man in searching to know the will of God, as it hath been already more largely touched in an other place. If he have done it of knowledge, what can he allege? May he allege that he was enforced to do it, and that he did it by compulsion? But by what compulsion? If this reason were sufficient to excuse the sin of man, there should be no sin but should seem worthy of excuse: for so much as it seemeth that there is none but it is committed by constraint, considering that man is so corrupted by the means of sin, and so made subject to the devil through the same, that of his nature he can do nothing but sin. Wherefore saint Paul ⟨p. 469⟩doth say,1 that he can not do the good which he would do, but he doth the evil which he would not do, because he is a sinner, and slave to sin, and sold under the same, which doth engender in his members a law, repugnant to the law of god. For the like also sayeth our Lord Jesus Christ, he that sinneth,2 is servant to sin.
D. The matter is playne. For as the heart can not be boasted of to bée good, excepte the mouth confesse it, and that he do declare by works the faith and charitie whereof he will so glory, it can not be execused, but that it is wicked and by consequent displeaseth God, when he doth a wicked worke that is forbidden ⟨p. 468⟩by God, for either he doth it through ignorance, or else of a certen knowledge: if he do it through ignoraunce, it is an assured signe that the heart of his owne nature is wicked: For if it were not wicked, it could not beare suche fruite by any meanes, nor also could it by by any meanes ignoraunt of the will of God, for the ignorance is a witnesse of the darknesse which sinne hath engendred in the vnderstanding of man, and of the contempt of god, and what negligence there is in man in searching to know the wil of God, as it hath bene alredy more largely touched in an other place. If he haue done it of knowledge, what can he alleage? May he alleage that he was enforced to do it, and that he did it by compulsion? But by what compulsion? If this reason were sufficient to excuse the sinne of man, there should be no sinne but should séeme worthy of excuse: for so muche as it séemeth that there is none but it is cōmitted by constrainte, considering that man is so corrupted by the meanes of sinne, and so made subiecte to the diuell through the same, that of his nature he can do nothing but sinne. Wherefore sainct Paule ⟨p. 469⟩dothe say,1 that he can not do the good whiche he woulde doe, but he dothe the euyll which he woulde not doe, bicause he is a sinner, and slaue to sinne, and solde vnder the same, which doth engēder in his members a lawe, repugnant to the law of god. For the like also sayeth our Lorde Iesus Christe, he that sinneth,2 is seruaunte to sinne.
T. BY this account sin should then be no sin, for it should not then be voluntary. And it is commonly said, that every sin is voluntary, or otherwise it seemeth that it should deserve no punishment.
T. BY this accompte sinne shoulde then be no sinne, for it should not then be voluntarie. And it is commonly saide, that euery sinne is voluntary, or otherwyse it séemeth that it shoulde deserue no punishmente.
D. There are many things to be considered in this matter. The first is, that it behoveth to put difference between necessity and constraint. For by wanting this distinction, many do very filthily err in the matter of free will, and of predestination, and in the consideration of the nature of sin. For to speak properly, ⟨p. 470⟩we may say that we do all sin of necessity and not by constraint.
D. There are many thinges to be considered in this matter. The first is, that it behoueth to put difference betwéene necessitie and constraint. For by wanting this distinction, many doe very filthily erre in the matter of frée will, and of predestination, and in the consideration of the nature of sin. For to speke properly, ⟨p. 470⟩we may say that we do all sinne of necessitie and not by constraynt.
T. What difference puttest thou then between necessity and constraint? for they seem to me to be both one.
T. What difference puttest thou then betwene necessitie and constraynt? for they séeme to me to be both one.
D. Yea, but there is notwithstanding great difference, but it is requisite for the better understanding of it, that we do first well consider in what meaning and in what signification these words ought to be taken. First of all, this word of necessity, is commonly for want of some thing whereof we have need, in such sort that we do oftentimes take it for lack, poverty and misery, but we do not properly take it in that sense, when we do speak of the necessity whereby man is brought to sin by mean of the natural corruption that is in him: but so far forth as we may say that he sinneth by necessity, that is to say through default and lack of goodness, justice, innocency, holiness, and other virtues and gifts and graces of God, whereof he hath ben spoiled through sin, unto whom he was made subject.
D. Yea, but there is notwithstanding great difference, but it is requisite for the better vnderstanding of it, that we doe firste well consider in what meaning and in what signification these words ought to be taken. First of al, this worde of necessitie, is commonly for want of some thing whereof we haue néede, in such sort that we do oftentimes take it for lacke, pouertie and miserie, but we do not properly take it in that sense, when we do speake of the necessitie whereby man is brought to sinne by meane of the naturall corruption that is in him: but so farre foorth as we may say that he sinneth by necessity, that is to say through defaulte and lacke of goodnesse, iustice, innocencie, holinesse, and other vertues and giftes and graces of God, wherof he hath ben spoyled through sin, vnto whom he was made subiect.
T. In what signification dost thou then take this word in this matter?
T. In what signification doste thou then take this worde in this matter?
D. I do take ⟨p. 471⟩it for a necessary consequent which followeth of causes that are joined together with their effects, which can not be others, but such as are agreeable to the nature of the causes and things which are so joined together, and do depend the one of the other.
D. I do take ⟨p. 471⟩it for a necessarie consequent which followeth of causes that are ioyned togither with their effectes, which can not be others, but such as are agreable to the nature of the causes and things which are so ioyned togither, and do depend the one of the other.
T. Give me an example of this that thou speakest of.
T. Giue me an example of this that thou speakest of.
D. Behold the Sun, his nature is to shine, and by his light to make the day for us, I say then, the sun shineth, it is therefore day of necessity, that is to say, it must needs be day, and it can not be otherwise, for such is his nature, and therefore of necessity he must bring forth such an effect of his own nature, without any constraint or violence at all, because that he hath that cause natural in him self. But there where constraint is, there is some force and unolence that cometh from else where, than from the thing that is enforced and constrained: as if a woman be violated by force, she ought not to be accounted a whore, in such sort as we do account her, who willingly consenteth to the whore master: we do then sin all necessarily and of necessity, in ⟨p. 472⟩so much as it is not possible that of our nature it should do otherwise, it being corrupted as it is, and being not regenerate by the spirit of God: and that by mean of the natural corruption which sin hath engendered in all mankind. And yet for all that, none constraineth us but only our own malice and wicked will, which being wicked, can apply it self to nothing but to evil. Therefore it is not without cause said:1 thy perdition is of thy self, O Israel, but thy salvation is only by me. It doth then follow that our wicked will doth evil of necessity, for so much as it is of a wicked nature, that can do none otherwise, as we say, that an evil tree doth necessarily bring forth evil fruit, because that his nature is such.2 For as it is written: that which is borne of the flesh, is flesh, and that which is borne of the spirit, is spirit. But now the will should not be a will, if it did not willingly,3 and not by constraint, for will and constraint are contraries, wherefore will ceaseth where constraint hath place: yea and it is not possible that will may be constrained: it ⟨p. 473⟩may in deed be corrupted and changed from good into evil, or else from evil to good. Wherefore even as a good will doth necessarily that which is good, because it can not otherwise do, being good, as the good tree of necessity bringeth forth good fruit, and yet doth she it not by constraint, but voluntarily:
even so doth the wicked will, for so much as it is wicked, necessarily the evil, because that his nature is such as can not otherwise do, and yet doth it not at all by constraint, but voluntarily, for there is no force nor violence from any where else that doth constrain her against her own disposition or inclination, but only in so much as she hath in her the spring and the cause from the which the evil which she doth, proceedeth.
euen so dothe the wicked will, for so muche as it is wicked, necessarilie the euill, bicause that his nature is suche as can not otherwyse doe, and yet dothe it not at all by constraynt, but voluntarily, for there is no force nor violence from any where else that dothe constrayne hir agaynst hir owne disposition or inclination, but onely in so much as she hath in hir the spring and the cause from the which the euill which she dothe, procéedeth.
D. Behold the Sunne, his nature is to shine, and by his light to make the day for vs, I say then, the sunne shineth, it is therefore day of necessitie, that is to say, it must néedes be day, and it can not be otherwise, for such is his nature, and therfore of necessitie he muste bring foorth suche an effecte of his owne nature, without any constraynt or violence at all, bicause that he hath that cause naturall in him selfe. But there where constraynt is, there is some force and vnolence that commeth from else where, than from the thing that is enforced and constrayned: as if a woman be violated by force, she ought not to be accounted a whore, in suche sorte as we doe accounte hir, who willingly consenteth to the whore master: we doe then sinne all necessarily and of necessitie, in ⟨p. 472⟩so muche as it is not possible that of our nature it shoulde doe otherwyse, it beeing corrupted as it is, and béeing not regenerate by the spirite of God: and that by meane of the naturall corruption which sinne hath engendred in all mankinde. And yet for al that, none constraineth vs but onely our owne malice and wycked will, which béeing wicked, can applie it selfe to nothing but to euill. Therefore it is not without cause saide:1 thy perdition is of thy selfe, O Israell, but thy saluation is onely by me. It dothe then followe that our wicked will dothe euill of necessitie, for so muche as it is of a wicked nature, that can doe none otherwise, as we say, that an euil trée doth necessarily bring foorth euill fruite, bicause that his nature is suche.2 For as it is written: that which is borne of the fleshe, is fleshe, and that whiche is borne of the spirite, is spirite. But nowe the will should not be a will, if it did not willingly,3 and not by constraynt, for will and constraint are contraries, wherfore wil ceaseth where constraint hath place: yea and it is not possible that will may be constrayned: it ⟨p. 473⟩may in déede be corrupted and chaunged from good into euill, or else from euill to good. Wherefore euen as a good will dothe necessarily that which is good, bycause it can not otherwyse doe, béeing good, as the good trée of necessitie bringeth foorthe good fruite, and yet doth she it not by constrainte, but voluntarily: