A14463:2591
A14463:2591
A Christian instruction, containing the law and the Gospel Also a summary of the principal points of the Christian faith and religion, and of the abuses and errors contrary to the same. Done in certain dialogues in french, by M. Peter Viret, sometime minister of the Word of God at Nymes in Province. Translated by I.S. Seen and allowed according to the Queens Majesties injunctions.A Christian instruction, conteyning the law and the Gospell Also a summarie of the principall poyntes of the Christian fayth and religion, and of the abuses and errors contrary to the same. Done in certayne dialogues in french, by M. Peter Viret, sometime minister of the Word of God at Nymes in Prouince. Translated by I.S. Seene and allowed according to the Queenes Maiesties iniunctions.
London: printed by Henry Bynneman? for Abraham Veale, 1573
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
T. In what signification dost thou then take this word in this matter?
T. In what signification doste thou then take this worde in this matter?
D. I do take ⟨p. 471⟩it for a necessary consequent which followeth of causes that are joined together with their effects, which can not be others, but such as are agreeable to the nature of the causes and things which are so joined together, and do depend the one of the other.
D. I do take ⟨p. 471⟩it for a necessarie consequent which followeth of causes that are ioyned togither with their effectes, which can not be others, but such as are agreable to the nature of the causes and things which are so ioyned togither, and do depend the one of the other.
T. Give me an example of this that thou speakest of.
T. Giue me an example of this that thou speakest of.
D. Behold the Sun, his nature is to shine, and by his light to make the day for us, I say then, the sun shineth, it is therefore day of necessity, that is to say, it must needs be day, and it can not be otherwise, for such is his nature, and therefore of necessity he must bring forth such an effect of his own nature, without any constraint or violence at all, because that he hath that cause natural in him self. But there where constraint is, there is some force and unolence that cometh from else where, than from the thing that is enforced and constrained: as if a woman be violated by force, she ought not to be accounted a whore, in such sort as we do account her, who willingly consenteth to the whore master: we do then sin all necessarily and of necessity, in ⟨p. 472⟩so much as it is not possible that of our nature it should do otherwise, it being corrupted as it is, and being not regenerate by the spirit of God: and that by mean of the natural corruption which sin hath engendered in all mankind. And yet for all that, none constraineth us but only our own malice and wicked will, which being wicked, can apply it self to nothing but to evil. Therefore it is not without cause said:1 thy perdition is of thy self, O Israel, but thy salvation is only by me. It doth then follow that our wicked will doth evil of necessity, for so much as it is of a wicked nature, that can do none otherwise, as we say, that an evil tree doth necessarily bring forth evil fruit, because that his nature is such.2 For as it is written: that which is borne of the flesh, is flesh, and that which is borne of the spirit, is spirit. But now the will should not be a will, if it did not willingly,3 and not by constraint, for will and constraint are contraries, wherefore will ceaseth where constraint hath place: yea and it is not possible that will may be constrained: it ⟨p. 473⟩may in deed be corrupted and changed from good into evil, or else from evil to good. Wherefore even as a good will doth necessarily that which is good, because it can not otherwise do, being good, as the good tree of necessity bringeth forth good fruit, and yet doth she it not by constraint, but voluntarily:
even so doth the wicked will, for so much as it is wicked, necessarily the evil, because that his nature is such as can not otherwise do, and yet doth it not at all by constraint, but voluntarily, for there is no force nor violence from any where else that doth constrain her against her own disposition or inclination, but only in so much as she hath in her the spring and the cause from the which the evil which she doth, proceedeth.
euen so dothe the wicked will, for so muche as it is wicked, necessarilie the euill, bicause that his nature is suche as can not otherwyse doe, and yet dothe it not at all by constraynt, but voluntarily, for there is no force nor violence from any where else that dothe constrayne hir agaynst hir owne disposition or inclination, but onely in so much as she hath in hir the spring and the cause from the which the euill which she dothe, procéedeth.
T. I Can not yet throughly well understand that difference.
T. I Can not yet throughly well vnderstand that difference.
D. I will make the matter more plain unto thee by examples and comparisons. The fire doth necessarily warm and give light, because that it can not otherwise do, in so much as the nature of it is such: and yet is it not constrained so to do. The water on the contrary, abiding in his natural, doth refresh and make moist. By the like reason, a living body hath breathing and respiration, moving and feeling, and can not otherwise be. On the contrary, a dead body is deprived from all these things, and may necessarily engender nothing but corruption: and yet for all that is there no constraint, neither in the one nor in the other, onlesse we do call the nature of any thing constraint.
D. I wil make the matter more playne vnto thée by examples and comparisons. The fire doth necessarily warme and giue light, bicause that it can not otherwise do, in so muche as the nature of it is suche: and yet is it not constrayned so to do. The water on the contrary, abiding in his natural, doth refresh and make moyst. By the like reason, a liuing body hath breathing and respiration, mouing and féeling, and can not otherwise be. On the contrary, a dead body is depriued from all these things, and may necessarily engender nothing but corruption: and yet for all that is there no constraint, neither in the one nor in the other, onlesse we do cal the nature of any thing constraint.
T. For so much as in manner all these similitudes are given of things that have no will, show me some others more meet for our purpose.
T. For so much as in maner all these similitudes are giuen of things that haue no will, shewe me some others more méete for our purpose.
D. I will so do. We may not doubt but that God is necessarily good, just, wise, holy, almighty and perfect, for he can be none other, nor do any thing but that which is godly, justly, wisely and ⟨p. 475⟩holily done, and yet can he in nowise be constrained. In like sort the Angels, for so much as they be Angels, and do continue still in that nature, wherein they were created of God, they can not necessarily do any other thing, but praise God, and serve to his glory: for if they did the contrary, they should be no more Angels, such as they were created by God, but they should be Devils, like unto their fellows, which are fallen from their first state: And further, if they did that which they do by constraint and not willingly, then should they have no praise with God, nor should be any more accepted, than is the Devil, for the good which he is constrained to do, for so much as God doth turn will he nill he, his wicked will, & also his wicked works, making them to serve to his glory: on the other side, the Devil being such as he is now at this present, fallen from the Angelical state, wherein he was created of God, can necessarily do nothing but evil, and dishonour God, for if he should do otherwise, he should be no more a Devil, and yet surely he doth not that which he doth of ⟨p. 476⟩constraint, but voluntarily: For who should constrain him to do evil? should God so do, who hath forbidden & condemned it, & can do nothing but that which is good? it is very true that there is none other constraint, but only of his own wicked will, which hath as great delight in doing evil, as that of the Angels of heaven hath in doing well: But the like is not in the doing of the good that he doth: for in that he doth nothing but by constraint, and that which is always evil, in so much as it proceedeth from him: & can not be good, but so far forth as God through his power & infinite goodness, will he or will he not, doth draw out goodness of it, & maketh it to serve to an other end, than to that whereunto the Devil did pretend.
D. I will so do. We may not doubt but that God is necessarily good, iuste, wise, holy, almightie and perfecte, for he can be none other, nor do any thing but that which is godly, iustly, wisely and ⟨p. 475⟩holily done, and yet can he in nowise be constrained. In like sorte the Angels, for so much as they be Angels, and doe continue still in that nature, wherein they were created of God, they can not necessarily doe any other thing, but prayse God, and serue to his glory: for if they did the contrary, they should be no more Angels, such as they were created by God, but they should be Diuels, like vnto their felowes, which are fallen from their first state: And further, if they did that which they do by constraint and not willingly, thē should they haue no praise with God, nor should be any more accepted, than is the Deuill, for the good which he is constrained to doe, for so much as God dothe turne will he nill he, his wicked will, & also his wicked workes, making them to serue to his glory: on the other side, the Deuill being suche as he is now at this present, fallen from the Angelicall state, wherein he was created of God, can necessarily doe nothing but euill, and dishonour God, for if he should doe otherwise, he should be no more a Deuill, and yet surely he doth not that which he doth of
T. I do now begin already to discern more perfectly in this matter, than I did before.
T. I do now begin already to discerne more perfectly in this matter, than I did before.
D. WE may easily understand by these examples, what we may judge of man, concerning this matter whereof we do now entreat. For after that man was created by God, in so much as he was created of God, good, just, & holy, he did necessarily & willingly all that wherefore God had created him: For seeing that God had created him good, as he did all his other creatures, it was natural for him to do well, & continuing in the same, being joined to God: & hearing his voice, he could none otherwise do. For in as much as his will was good, he could not will, nor yet do, following that good will, but that which was good: but when he once gave ear to the counsel of the devil, & changing both his will & nature, by following of him is fallen into an other necessity wholly contrary to the first: For in the stead that before he did necessarily good, & was wholly given to God, for that of his nature he could not then will nor do otherwise, through constraint, having changed both nature & will, he can not but follow his nature: wherefore this necessity of well doing, did not proceed of any want that was in him, as it seemeth unto ⟨p. 478⟩us that the word doth signify, for when we speak of good things, we do not in that behalf take necessity, for need or lacks, but for a disposition of things which can not be other but such as she is her self, according to the declaration that hath been already made: if we speak of evil, we may well then say that the necessity whereof we speak, is joined with lack of goodness, contrary to this evil. For the evil which man doth, is not done but for want of goodness which ought to be in him in the stead of the evil into the which the good was changed: the which evil of his nature engendereth evil, where as the good engendereth good: We see the like again of this in some other thing, as in the darknesses which the night doth bring unto us, & in that which followeth: for what is the cause of the night, but only the shadow of the earth which taketh from us the light of the sun, & bringeth unto us darknesses, contrary to that light? by means whereof we have the day turned into night, and then when we are covered all over with the night, we can not do that which we do in the day, nor go ⟨p. 479⟩forth right but clean contrary:
D. WE may easily vnderstād by these exāples, what we may iudge of mā, cōcerning this matter wherof we doe now intreat. For after yt mā was created by God, in so much as he was created of God, good, iust, & holy, he did necessarily & willingly all yt wherfore God had created him: For seing yt God had created him good, as he did all his other creatures, it was naturall for him to do well, & continuing in the same, being ioined to God: & hearing his voyce, he coulde none otherwise do. For in as much as his will was good, he could not will, nor yet do, folowing that good will, but yt which was good: but when he once gaue eare to the coūsel of ye deuill, & chaūging both his will & nature, by folowing of him is fallen into an other necessitie wholy cōtrary to ye first: For in the stead yt before he did necessarily good, & was wholy giuen to God, for that of his nature he coulde not then will nor do otherwise, through constraint, hauing changed both nature & will, he can not but folow his nature: wherefore this necessitie of wel doing, did not procéede of any wāt yt was in him, as it séemeth vnto
and that, because that we have darkness in the stead of light, without the which we can not walk directly, & yet all this while, is the necessity without constraint: For albeit that the lack which may be in a man (the which we call necessity) be by chance an occasion to make him to steal, yet notwithstanding he cannot justly say that he was constrained to steal, for if he had been an honest man, and not a thief, he would rather have endured all kind of miseries & necessities, than to have stolen: but for so much as he had rather live at his ease, than he would endure pain & misery according to the will of God, he had rather steal than to obey God.
and that, bicause that wée haue darknesse in the steade of light, without the which we can not walke directly, & yet all this while, is the necessitie without constraint: For albeit that the lacke which may be in a mā (the which we cal necessitie) be by chaūce an occasion to make him to steale, yet notwithstāding he cannot iustly say that he was constrained to steale, for if he had bene an honest man, and not a théefe, he would rather haue endured all kinde of miseries & necessities, than to haue stolen: but for so much as he had rather liue at his ease, than he would endure paine & misery according to the will of God, he had rather steale than to obey God.
T. Then by as much as I can understand of such matters, if this necessity be sound in a good thing, it is commendable ⟨p. 480⟩& joined with great liberty.
T. THen by as much as I can vnderstand of such matters, if this necessitie be sound in a good thing, it is cōmendable ⟨p. 480⟩& ioined with great libertie.