A Christian instruction, containing the law and the Gospel Also a summary of the…A Christian instruction, conteyning the law and the Gospell Also a summarie of the…

D. I do take ⟨p. 471⟩it for a necessary consequent which followeth of causes that are joined together with their effects, which can not be others, but such as are agreeable to the nature of the causes and things which are so joined together, and do depend the one of the other.

D. I do take ⟨p. 471⟩it for a necessarie consequent which followeth of causes that are ioyned togither with their effectes, which can not be others, but such as are agreable to the nature of the causes and things which are so ioyned togither, and do depend the one of the other.

T. Give me an example of this that thou speakest of.

T. Giue me an example of this that thou speakest of.

D. Behold the Sun, his nature is to shine, and by his light to make the day for us, I say then, the sun shineth, it is therefore day of necessity, that is to say, it must needs be day, and it can not be otherwise, for such is his nature, and therefore of necessity he must bring forth such an effect of his own nature, without any constraint or violence at all, because that he hath that cause natural in him self. But there where constraint is, there is some force and unolence that cometh from else where, than from the thing that is enforced and constrained: as if a woman be violated by force, she ought not to be accounted a whore, in such sort as we do account her, who willingly consenteth to the whore master: we do then sin all necessarily and of necessity, in ⟨p. 472⟩so much as it is not possible that of our nature it should do otherwise, it being corrupted as it is, and being not regenerate by the spirit of God: and that by mean of the natural corruption which sin hath engendered in all mankind. And yet for all that, none constraineth us but only our own malice and wicked will, which being wicked, can apply it self to nothing but to evil. Therefore it is not without cause said:¹ thy perdition is of thy self, O Israel, but thy salvation is only by me. It doth then follow that our wicked will doth evil of necessity, for so much as it is of a wicked nature, that can do none otherwise, as we say, that an evil tree doth necessarily bring forth evil fruit, because that his nature is such.² For as it is written: that which is borne of the flesh, is flesh, and that which is borne of the spirit, is spirit. But now the will should not be a will, if it did not willingly,³ and not by constraint, for will and constraint are contraries, wherefore will ceaseth where constraint hath place: yea and it is not possible that will may be constrained: it ⟨p. 473⟩may in deed be corrupted and changed from good into evil, or else from evil to good. Wherefore even as a good will doth necessarily that which is good, because it can not otherwise do, being good, as the good tree of necessity bringeth forth good fruit, and yet doth she it not by constraint, but voluntarily:

D. Behold the Sunne, his nature is to shine, and by his light to make the day for vs, I say then, the sunne shineth, it is therefore day of necessitie, that is to say, it must néedes be day, and it can not be otherwise, for such is his nature, and therfore of necessitie he muste bring foorth suche an effecte of his owne nature, without any constraynt or violence at all, bicause that he hath that cause naturall in him selfe. But there where constraynt is, there is some force and vnolence that commeth from else where, than from the thing that is enforced and constrayned: as if a woman be violated by force, she ought not to be accounted a whore, in suche sorte as we doe accounte hir, who willingly consenteth to the whore master: we doe then sinne all necessarily and of necessitie, in ⟨p. 472⟩so muche as it is not possible that of our nature it shoulde doe otherwyse, it beeing corrupted as it is, and béeing not regenerate by the spirite of God: and that by meane of the naturall corruption which sinne hath engendred in all mankinde. And yet for al that, none constraineth vs but onely our owne malice and wycked will, which béeing wicked, can applie it selfe to nothing but to euill. Therefore it is not without cause saide:¹ thy perdition is of thy selfe, O Israell, but thy saluation is onely by me. It dothe then followe that our wicked will dothe euill of necessitie, for so muche as it is of a wicked nature, that can doe none otherwise, as we say, that an euil trée doth necessarily bring foorth euill fruite, bicause that his nature is suche.² For as it is written: that which is borne of the fleshe, is fleshe, and that whiche is borne of the spirite, is spirite. But nowe the will should not be a will, if it did not willingly,³ and not by constraynt, for will and constraint are contraries, wherfore wil ceaseth where constraint hath place: yea and it is not possible that will may be constrayned: it ⟨p. 473⟩may in déede be corrupted and chaunged from good into euill, or else from euill to good. Wherefore euen as a good will dothe necessarily that which is good, bycause it can not otherwyse doe, béeing good, as the good trée of necessitie bringeth foorthe good fruite, and yet doth she it not by constrainte, but voluntarily:

1. 1Hosea. 13.Osee. 13.
2. 2Matt. 7.12.
3. 3John. 3.Iohn. 3.

Examples and similitudes for declaration of the difference that is put between Necessity and Constraint.

Examples and similitudes for declaration of the difference that is put betweene Necessitie and Constraint.

T. I Can not yet throughly well understand that difference.

T. I Can not yet throughly well vnderstand that difference.

D. I will make the matter more plain unto thee by examples and comparisons. The fire doth necessarily warm and give light, because that it can not otherwise do, in so much as the nature of it is such: and yet is it not constrained so to do. The water on the contrary, abiding in his natural, doth refresh and make moist. By the like reason, a living body hath breathing and respiration, moving and feeling, and can not otherwise be. On the contrary, a dead body is deprived from all these things, and may necessarily engender nothing but corruption: and yet for all that is there no constraint, neither in the one nor in the other, onlesse we do call the nature of any thing constraint.

D. I wil make the matter more playne vnto thée by examples and comparisons. The fire doth necessarily warme and giue light, bicause that it can not otherwise do, in so muche as the nature of it is suche: and yet is it not constrayned so to do. The water on the contrary, abiding in his natural, doth refresh and make moyst. By the like reason, a liuing body hath breathing and respiration, mouing and féeling, and can not otherwise be. On the contrary, a dead body is depriued from all these things, and may necessarily engender nothing but corruption: and yet for all that is there no constraint, neither in the one nor in the other, onlesse we do cal the nature of any thing constraint.

T. For so much as in manner all these similitudes are given of things that have no will, show me some others more meet for our purpose.

T. For so much as in maner all these similitudes are giuen of things that haue no will, shewe me some others more méete for our purpose.

D. I will so do. We may not doubt but that God is necessarily good, just, wise, holy, almighty and perfect, for he can be none other, nor do any thing but that which is godly, justly, wisely and ⟨p. 475⟩holily done, and yet can he in nowise be constrained. In like sort the Angels, for so much as they be Angels, and do continue still in that nature, wherein they were created of God, they can not necessarily do any other thing, but praise God, and serve to his glory: for if they did the contrary, they should be no more Angels, such as they were created by God, but they should be Devils, like unto their fellows, which are fallen from their first state: And further, if they did that which they do by constraint and not willingly, then should they have no praise with God, nor should be any more accepted, than is the Devil, for the good which he is constrained to do, for so much as God doth turn will he nill he, his wicked will, & also his wicked works, making them to serve to his glory: on the other side, the Devil being such as he is now at this present, fallen from the Angelical state, wherein he was created of God, can necessarily do nothing but evil, and dishonour God, for if he should do otherwise, he should be no more a Devil, and yet surely he doth not that which he doth of ⟨p. 476⟩constraint, but voluntarily: For who should constrain him to do evil? should God so do, who hath forbidden & condemned it, & can do nothing but that which is good? it is very true that there is none other constraint, but only of his own wicked will, which hath as great delight in doing evil, as that of the Angels of heaven hath in doing well: But the like is not in the doing of the good that he doth: for in that he doth nothing but by constraint, and that which is always evil, in so much as it proceedeth from him: & can not be good, but so far forth as God through his power & infinite goodness, will he or will he not, doth draw out goodness of it, & maketh it to serve to an other end, than to that whereunto the Devil did pretend.

D. I will so do. We may not doubt but that God is necessarily good, iuste, wise, holy, almightie and perfecte, for he can be none other, nor do any thing but that which is godly, iustly, wisely and ⟨p. 475⟩holily done, and yet can he in nowise be constrained. In like sorte the Angels, for so much as they be Angels, and doe continue still in that nature, wherein they were created of God, they can not necessarily doe any other thing, but prayse God, and serue to his glory: for if they did the contrary, they should be no more Angels, such as they were created by God, but they should be Diuels, like vnto their felowes, which are fallen from their first state: And further, if they did that which they do by constraint and not willingly, thē should they haue no praise with God, nor should be any more accepted, than is the Deuill, for the good which he is constrained to doe, for so much as God dothe turne will he nill he, his wicked will, & also his wicked workes, making them to serue to his glory: on the other side, the Deuill being suche as he is now at this present, fallen from the Angelicall state, wherein he was created of God, can necessarily doe nothing but euill, and dishonour God, for if he should doe otherwise, he should be no more a Deuill, and yet surely he doth not that which he doth of

T. I do now begin already to discern more perfectly in this matter, than I did before.

T. I do now begin already to discerne more perfectly in this matter, than I did before.

Of the free necessity to do well, that was in man before sin: and of the necessity to do evil, unconstrained notwithstanding, into the which he is fallen through the same, and in what meaning this word of necessity ought to be taken, when it hath regard to good things.

Of the free necessitie to do vvell, that vvas in man before sinne: and of the necessitie to doe euill, vnconstrayned notvvithstanding, into the vvhich he is fallen through the same, and in vvhat meaning this vvord of necessitie ought to be taken, vvhen it hath regard to good things.

D. WE may easily understand by these examples, what we may judge of man, concerning this matter whereof we do now entreat. For after that man was created by God, in so much as he was created of God, good, just, & holy, he did necessarily & willingly all that wherefore God had created him: For seeing that God had created him good, as he did all his other creatures, it was natural for him to do well, & continuing in the same, being joined to God: & hearing his voice, he could none otherwise do. For in as much as his will was good, he could not will, nor yet do, following that good will, but that which was good: but when he once gave ear to the counsel of the devil, & changing both his will & nature, by following of him is fallen into an other necessity wholly contrary to the first: For in the stead that before he did necessarily good, & was wholly given to God, for that of his nature he could not then will nor do otherwise, through constraint, having changed both nature & will, he can not but follow his nature: wherefore this necessity of well doing, did not proceed of any want that was in him, as it seemeth unto ⟨p. 478⟩us that the word doth signify, for when we speak of good things, we do not in that behalf take necessity, for need or lacks, but for a disposition of things which can not be other but such as she is her self, according to the declaration that hath been already made: if we speak of evil, we may well then say that the necessity whereof we speak, is joined with lack of goodness, contrary to this evil. For the evil which man doth, is not done but for want of goodness which ought to be in him in the stead of the evil into the which the good was changed: the which evil of his nature engendereth evil, where as the good engendereth good: We see the like again of this in some other thing, as in the darknesses which the night doth bring unto us, & in that which followeth: for what is the cause of the night, but only the shadow of the earth which taketh from us the light of the sun, & bringeth unto us darknesses, contrary to that light? by means whereof we have the day turned into night, and then when we are covered all over with the night, we can not do that which we do in the day, nor go ⟨p. 479⟩forth right but clean contrary:

D. WE may easily vnderstād by these exāples, what we may iudge of mā, cōcerning this matter wherof we doe now intreat. For after yt mā was created by God, in so much as he was created of God, good, iust, & holy, he did necessarily & willingly all yt wherfore God had created him: For seing yt God had created him good, as he did all his other creatures, it was naturall for him to do well, & continuing in the same, being ioined to God: & hearing his voyce, he coulde none otherwise do. For in as much as his will was good, he could not will, nor yet do, folowing that good will, but yt which was good: but when he once gaue eare to the coūsel of ye deuill, & chaūging both his will & nature, by folowing of him is fallen into an other necessitie wholy cōtrary to ye first: For in the stead yt before he did necessarily good, & was wholy giuen to God, for that of his nature he coulde not then will nor do otherwise, through constraint, hauing changed both nature & will, he can not but folow his nature: wherefore this necessitie of wel doing, did not procéede of any wāt yt was in him, as it séemeth vnto

and that, because that we have darkness in the stead of light, without the which we can not walk directly, & yet all this while, is the necessity without constraint: For albeit that the lack which may be in a man (the which we call necessity) be by chance an occasion to make him to steal, yet notwithstanding he cannot justly say that he was constrained to steal, for if he had been an honest man, and not a thief, he would rather have endured all kind of miseries & necessities, than to have stolen: but for so much as he had rather live at his ease, than he would endure pain & misery according to the will of God, he had rather steal than to obey God.

and that, bicause that wée haue darknesse in the steade of light, without the which we can not walke directly, & yet all this while, is the necessitie without constraint: For albeit that the lacke which may be in a mā (the which we cal necessitie) be by chaūce an occasion to make him to steale, yet notwithstāding he cannot iustly say that he was constrained to steale, for if he had bene an honest man, and not a théefe, he would rather haue endured all kinde of miseries & necessities, than to haue stolen: but for so much as he had rather liue at his ease, than he would endure paine & misery according to the will of God, he had rather steale than to obey God.

How that the necessity that is here spoken of, is free and commendable in good things: and how it ought to be otherwise considered in God than in Creatures.

Hovv that the necessitie that is here spoken of, is free and commendable in good things: and hovv it ought to be othervvise considered in God than in Creatures.

T. Then by as much as I can understand of such matters, if this necessity be sound in a good thing, it is commendable ⟨p. 480⟩& joined with great liberty.

T. THen by as much as I can vnderstand of such matters, if this necessitie be sound in a good thing, it is cōmendable ⟨p. 480⟩& ioined with great libertie.

D. We do see it in the nature of God, as it hath been already touched. For that which God can not be necessarily but all mighty, all wise, all just, all good, & all perfect, infinite, eternal & immortal, doth not carry with it a necessity of lack, nor constraint, nor yet doth in any respect diminish the power, the glory, & majesty of him, but on the contrary it doth magnify & declare the great excellency & perfection of his nature. For it is not a true liberty & commendation to be able to sin & to do evil: but it is a token of an excellent nature to be so perfect in goodness, that it doth hold in it continually that goodness which it naturally hath, in such sort that it can not by any accident whatsoever it be, be changed, diminished or abolished, it is as if we should say, that it is impossible that God should not be God, & good, and just. Who would not conclude then by that same, that God is not all mighty, & that there is something impossible to him. Are we more strong than he, because we may be wicked, untrue, unjust, & liars, the which he can not be? For goodness is in him a thing which hath ⟨p. 481⟩subject & substance, & the accidents agreeable to the same, as we do see in the sun & in his light, which doth light all the world: for the evil is nothing else, but a privation, lack & want of the good which ought to be, even as the darknesses are nothing else than privation & lack of light. Or if thou haddest rather to have it spoken in other terms: it is nothing but a corrupted quality & a vicious accident, which are come upon a good substance & creature of God, & have corrupted it: the fault whereof may not be sought in God, albeit that nothing can come to pass without his providence & his eternal counsel: but it must be sought in causes more near unto us, leaving a part the secrete counsels & judgments of God, which is in such sort the cause of causes, that no fault may be imputed unto him, or that he can do any thing other than justly. For he hath in such sort disposed the second causes, that when the evil is a doing, the wicked will either of the Devil or man, cometh between, in such sort that that fault resteth in them, albeit that God doth cause their wicked work and will to serve him, and make the worker good, ⟨p. 482⟩in so much as God is served therewith.

D. We doe sée it in the nature of God, as it hath bene already touched. For yt which God can not bée necessarily but all mighty, all wise, all iust, all good, & al perfect, infinite, eternal & immortall, doth not carrie with it a necessitie of lacke, nor constraint, nor yet doth in any respect diminish ye power, the glory, & maiestie of him, but on the cō trary it doth magnifie & declare the great excellencie & perfection of his nature. For it is not a true libertie & cōmendation to be able to sinne & to doe euill: but it is a token of an excellent nature to be so perfect in goodnesse, that it doth holde in it cō tinually that goodnesse which it naturally hath, in such sorte that it cā not by any accident whatsoeuer it be, be chaunged, diminished or abolished, it is as if we shold say, that it is impossible that God should not be God, & good, and iuste. Who would not cōclude thē by that same, that God is not all mighty, & that there is something impossible to him. Are we more stronge than he, bicause we may be wicked, vntrue, vniust, & liers, ye which he cā not be? For goodnes is in him a thing which hath