A Christian instruction, containing the law and the Gospel Also a summary of the…A Christian instruction, conteyning the law and the Gospell Also a summarie of the…

Of the free necessity to do well, that was in man before sin: and of the necessity to do evil, unconstrained notwithstanding, into the which he is fallen through the same, and in what meaning this word of necessity ought to be taken, when it hath regard to good things.

Of the free necessitie to do vvell, that vvas in man before sinne: and of the necessitie to doe euill, vnconstrayned notvvithstanding, into the vvhich he is fallen through the same, and in vvhat meaning this vvord of necessitie ought to be taken, vvhen it hath regard to good things.

D. WE may easily understand by these examples, what we may judge of man, concerning this matter whereof we do now entreat. For after that man was created by God, in so much as he was created of God, good, just, & holy, he did necessarily & willingly all that wherefore God had created him: For seeing that God had created him good, as he did all his other creatures, it was natural for him to do well, & continuing in the same, being joined to God: & hearing his voice, he could none otherwise do. For in as much as his will was good, he could not will, nor yet do, following that good will, but that which was good: but when he once gave ear to the counsel of the devil, & changing both his will & nature, by following of him is fallen into an other necessity wholly contrary to the first: For in the stead that before he did necessarily good, & was wholly given to God, for that of his nature he could not then will nor do otherwise, through constraint, having changed both nature & will, he can not but follow his nature: wherefore this necessity of well doing, did not proceed of any want that was in him, as it seemeth unto ⟨p. 478⟩us that the word doth signify, for when we speak of good things, we do not in that behalf take necessity, for need or lacks, but for a disposition of things which can not be other but such as she is her self, according to the declaration that hath been already made: if we speak of evil, we may well then say that the necessity whereof we speak, is joined with lack of goodness, contrary to this evil. For the evil which man doth, is not done but for want of goodness which ought to be in him in the stead of the evil into the which the good was changed: the which evil of his nature engendereth evil, where as the good engendereth good: We see the like again of this in some other thing, as in the darknesses which the night doth bring unto us, & in that which followeth: for what is the cause of the night, but only the shadow of the earth which taketh from us the light of the sun, & bringeth unto us darknesses, contrary to that light? by means whereof we have the day turned into night, and then when we are covered all over with the night, we can not do that which we do in the day, nor go ⟨p. 479⟩forth right but clean contrary:

D. WE may easily vnderstād by these exāples, what we may iudge of mā, cōcerning this matter wherof we doe now intreat. For after yt mā was created by God, in so much as he was created of God, good, iust, & holy, he did necessarily & willingly all yt wherfore God had created him: For seing yt God had created him good, as he did all his other creatures, it was naturall for him to do well, & continuing in the same, being ioined to God: & hearing his voyce, he coulde none otherwise do. For in as much as his will was good, he could not will, nor yet do, folowing that good will, but yt which was good: but when he once gaue eare to the coūsel of ye deuill, & chaūging both his will & nature, by folowing of him is fallen into an other necessitie wholy cōtrary to ye first: For in the stead yt before he did necessarily good, & was wholy giuen to God, for that of his nature he coulde not then will nor do otherwise, through constraint, hauing changed both nature & will, he can not but folow his nature: wherefore this necessitie of wel doing, did not procéede of any wāt yt was in him, as it séemeth vnto ⟨p. 478⟩vs that the woorde doth signifie, for when wée speake of good things, we doe not in that behalfe take necessitie, for néede or lacks, but for a dispositiō of things which cā not be other but such as she is hir self, according to the declaration that hath bene already made: if wée speake of euill, wée may well then say that the necessitie whereof wée speake, is ioyned with lacke of goodnesse, contrarie to this euill. For the euill which man doth, is not done but for wante of goodnesse which ought to be in him in the steade of the euill into the which the good was chaunged: the which euill of his nature engēdreth euill, where as the good engendreth good: Wée sée the like againe of this in some other thing, as in the darkenesses whiche the night doth bring vnto vs, & in that which foloweth: for what is the cause of the night, but only the shadow of the earth whiche taketh from vs the light of the sunne, & bringeth vnto vs darknesses, cōtrary to that light? by meanes whereof we haue the day turned into night, and then when we are couered all ouer with the night, we can not doe that which we doe in the day, nor go ⟨p. 479⟩forth right but clean contrarie:

How that the necessity that is here spoken of, is free and commendable in good things: and how it ought to be otherwise considered in God than in Creatures.

Hovv that the necessitie that is here spoken of, is free and commendable in good things: and hovv it ought to be othervvise considered in God than in Creatures.

T. Then by as much as I can understand of such matters, if this necessity be sound in a good thing, it is commendable ⟨p. 480⟩& joined with great liberty.

T. THen by as much as I can vnderstand of such matters, if this necessitie be sound in a good thing, it is cōmendable ⟨p. 480⟩& ioined with great libertie.

D. We do see it in the nature of God, as it hath been already touched. For that which God can not be necessarily but all mighty, all wise, all just, all good, & all perfect, infinite, eternal & immortal, doth not carry with it a necessity of lack, nor constraint, nor yet doth in any respect diminish the power, the glory, & majesty of him, but on the contrary it doth magnify & declare the great excellency & perfection of his nature. For it is not a true liberty & commendation to be able to sin & to do evil: but it is a token of an excellent nature to be so perfect in goodness, that it doth hold in it continually that goodness which it naturally hath, in such sort that it can not by any accident whatsoever it be, be changed, diminished or abolished, it is as if we should say, that it is impossible that God should not be God, & good, and just. Who would not conclude then by that same, that God is not all mighty, & that there is something impossible to him. Are we more strong than he, because we may be wicked, untrue, unjust, & liars, the which he can not be? For goodness is in him a thing which hath ⟨p. 481⟩subject & substance, & the accidents agreeable to the same, as we do see in the sun & in his light, which doth light all the world: for the evil is nothing else, but a privation, lack & want of the good which ought to be, even as the darknesses are nothing else than privation & lack of light. Or if thou haddest rather to have it spoken in other terms: it is nothing but a corrupted quality & a vicious accident, which are come upon a good substance & creature of God, & have corrupted it: the fault whereof may not be sought in God, albeit that nothing can come to pass without his providence & his eternal counsel: but it must be sought in causes more near unto us, leaving a part the secrete counsels & judgments of God, which is in such sort the cause of causes, that no fault may be imputed unto him, or that he can do any thing other than justly. For he hath in such sort disposed the second causes, that when the evil is a doing, the wicked will either of the Devil or man, cometh between, in such sort that that fault resteth in them, albeit that God doth cause their wicked work and will to serve him, and make the worker good, ⟨p. 482⟩in so much as God is served therewith.

D. We doe sée it in the nature of God, as it hath bene already touched. For yt which God can not bée necessarily but all mighty, all wise, all iust, all good, & al perfect, infinite, eternal & immortall, doth not carrie with it a necessitie of lacke, nor constraint, nor yet doth in any respect diminish ye power, the glory, & maiestie of him, but on the cō trary it doth magnifie & declare the great excellencie & perfection of his nature. For it is not a true libertie & cōmendation to be able to sinne & to doe euill: but it is a token of an excellent nature to be so perfect in goodnesse, that it doth holde in it cō tinually that goodnesse which it naturally hath, in such sorte that it cā not by any accident whatsoeuer it be, be chaunged, diminished or abolished, it is as if we shold say, that it is impossible that God should not be God, & good, and iuste. Who would not cōclude thē by that same, that God is not all mighty, & that there is something impossible to him. Are we more stronge than he, bicause we may be wicked, vntrue, vniust, & liers, ye which he cā not be? For goodnes is in him a thing which hath

As touching the rest, thou oughtest to note, that there is none which of his own nature is of such an unchangeable and infinite goodness, but God only, which is only unchangeable, and the most free of all others, and doth give a law to all creatures, & is above all laws, himself being a law to all creatures. For the same cause our Lord Jesus Christ hath said that none is good,¹ but the only God: because that goodness is to him natural, essential and substantial, and it is inseparable with him, and not accidental and separable, which may be joined unto him, or taken away from him by any manner of means: But the like is not of creatures how excellent so ever they be: as we may see first in the Angels, and afterward in man.

As touching the reste, thou oughtest to note, that there is none which of his own nature is of such an vnchaungeable and infinite goodnesse, but God only, which is onely vnchangeable, and the most frée of all others, and doth giue a law to al creatures, & is aboue all lawes, himselfe being a lawe to all creatures. For the same cause our Lorde Iesus Christe hath saide that none is good,¹ but the onely God: bicause that goodnesse is to him naturall, essentiall and substantiall, and it is inseparable with him, and not accidentall and separable, which may be ioyned vnto him, or taken away from him by any manner of meanes: But the like is not of creatures how excellent so euer they be: as we may sée first in the Angels, and afterwarde in man.

1. 1Matth. 19.

T. I shall also very gladly understand this point.

T. I shall also very gladly vnderstand this point.

Of the creation and fall of the Angels, and how that God in the same hath declared the difference that is between the Creator and the Creature, and how it is only he that is perfect and unchangeable.

Of the creation and fall of the Angels, and hovv that God in the same hath declared the difference that is betvveene the Creator and the Creature, and hovv it is onely he that is perfect and vnchaungeable.

D. When he did create the Angels he created them all good: for he could make them none other, for so much as he is in such sort good, that he can do nothing but well: otherwise he should not be God. Wherefore we may not imagine two Gods, with the Manichees, the one good, and the author and Creator of good things, and the other evil, and the author and creator of evil: For the evil can not be God, nor any other than the devil himself, which is a creature, and not a Creator, although he be the author of all evil: who notwithstanding was not created such an one of God, but is become such of his own malice, when he turned away from God, and renounced the goodness that he received of him. Wherein he hath showed the difference that is between the creator and the creature, and between the nature and goodness of the one and the other. For if God had created the Angels of such perfection as he is, and of a goodness so unchangeable of his nature, that it could never have ben changed into malice, no more than his own nature & goodness mought, ⟨p. 484⟩what difference should there be between God & his angels? The creature by this mean should be no more a creature, if his nature were such as is the nature of his creator, but he should be very God, which it can not be. For there is nothing that may be both maker & creature, unless we will attribute the same to our lord Jesus Christ, who being very God & very man in one only person is both maker & creature together:¹ Maker, inasmuch as he is God eternal: & creature, in that that he is man, which was conceived in the womb of the virgin, & born in his time ordained by god: but this belongeth unto him by sundry respects, by mean of the two divers natures that are joined together in one person in him. Wherefore, although he be both the one & the other in one very person, yet is he not so in one nature, but creator, by reason of the one: & creature by mean of the other: but the like is not of angels: for as they have but only one nature, so may they be therein but very creatures, greatly different from their creator, as the fall of those that are fallen, hath plainly declared: For in falling from the state wherein they were, they have ⟨p. 485⟩showed in deed that they were not such of themselves, nor Gods unchangeable of their own nature, & that they could not so continue of their own power.

Of the marvellous counsel of God which was declared in the fall of the angels, which are fallen from their first estate: and in the preservation of those which did continue firm and steadfast, and how he hath declared the justice of his judgement towards the one sort, & the riches of his grace towards the others.

Of the maruelous counsel of God vvhich was declared in the fal of the angels, which are fallen from their first estate: and in the preseruation of those which did continue firme and stedfast, and how he hath declared the iustice of his iudgement towards the one sort, & the riches of his grace towards the others.

T. IF the men which are so troubled with the doctrine of Predestination, did well consider that which thou sayest, they should not have, in my opinion, occasion so to trouble themselves▪ for these things whereof thou speakest, did not come to pass without the knowledge, counsel, foresight, and ordinance of GOD. What will mans reason say then thereof, will it say, that God hath done wrong to those that are fallen, because that he did not sustain & confirm them as he did the others? but if that had bin done, this whereof thou ⟨p. 486⟩speakest, had not ben so manifestly declared, nor yet the nature and the majesty and the excellency that he hath over all creatures, yea the most noble and most excellent that are, should not have ben so well set forth.

T. IF the men which ar so troubled with the doctrine of Predestination, did well consider that which thou sayst, they should not haue, in my opinion, occasion so to trouble themselues▪ for these things wherof thou speakest, did not come to passe withoute the knowledge, counsell, foresyghte, and ordinaunce of GOD. What wil mans reason say then therof, wil it say, that God hath done wrong to those that are falne, bicause that he did not sustain & confirm thē as he did the others? but if that had bin done, this wherof thou ⟨p. 486⟩speakest, had not ben so manifestly declared, nor yet the nature and the maiestie and the excellencie that he hath ouer all creatures, yea the most noble and moste excellent that are, shoulde not haue ben so well set foorth.

D. It is very true: On the other side, if they had all fallen indifferently, the excellency of the nature wherein god had created them, nor yet the power whereby god did make them, should not have ben so well known, nor yet his grace toward them, as it is known. For in considering the difference that is between the devils & the Angels of heaven, we see how excellent the nature of Angels is, & also that which they have received of God in his creation: we see on the other side in the devils what it is that the creature can do of himself, how excellent soever it be, except it be preserved by god, who hath created it: on the contrary, we see in the other angels, the double grace that God hath bestowed upon them. The first in their creation which they had common with the rest that are fallen, before they did fall. The second is, in the conservation of the nature which was first given ⟨p. 487⟩unto them, & in the confirmation in the same through his grace, which the others wanted: which is the very cause of the diversity that now is between them: which diversity doth not let notwithstā ding but that the devils do continue still angels in the same substance that they were created in: but the difference is great in the quality, that is to say, in that that the one sort are not only angels, but are good angels, persevering in the first goodness that they received of God in the beginning, in their creation: from which notwithstanding, they mought as well have fallen as the others, if that God by his special grace had not sustained them, & had not otherwise disposed & ordained: Wherefore it is not written without cause,¹ that all is restored by Jesus Christ, aswell in heaven as in earth, & that all consist by him & in him. The other on the other side are called not only angels, but wicked angels & devils, because that they did not persevere in the first goodness, wherein they were created, but turning from him from whence the same proceeded, they were put from it: & in the stead of the same, malice & wickedness ⟨p. 488⟩is come in place, which is nothing else but lack & privation of goodness, which is changed into an evil quality, which doth corrupt the creature that was created good, & maketh the natures contrary, which were before like.²

that is to say, even from the time that he was first a devil, and not from the time that he was first made an angel, & that when he doth speak lies, he speaketh that which is his own. And therefore he addeth unto it, that he did not abide still in the truth: for he hath nothing of God which is truth, but that which he now hath of evil, is of himself.

that is to say, euē frō the time that he was first a diuel, and not fom the time yt he was first made an angel, & that when he doth speak lies, he speaketh that which is his own. And therfore he addeth vnto it, that he did not abyde still in the truth: for he hath nothing of God which is truth, but that whiche he now hath of euill, is of himselfe.

Howe that the devil may not impute the fault and fall of his damnation but to him self, and how it is manifest by that fall that there is no unchangeable verity nor constancy but in the nature of God.

Howe that the diuel may not impute the fault and fall of his damnation but to him selfe, and how it is manifest by that fal that ther is no vnchangeable veritie nor constancie but in the nature of God.