A14463:2608
A Christian instruction, containing the law and the Gospel Also a summary of the principal points of the Christian faith and religion, and of the abuses and errors contrary to the same. Done in certain dialogues in french, by M. Peter Viret, sometime minister of the Word of God at Nymes in Province. Translated by I.S. Seen and allowed according to the Queens Majesties injunctions.A Christian instruction, conteyning the law and the Gospell Also a summarie of the principall poyntes of the Christian fayth and religion, and of the abuses and errors contrary to the same. Done in certayne dialogues in french, by M. Peter Viret, sometime minister of the Word of God at Nymes in Prouince. Translated by I.S. Seene and allowed according to the Queenes Maiesties iniunctions.
London: printed by Henry Bynneman? for Abraham Veale, 1573
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
D. When he did create the Angels he created them all good: for he could make them none other, for so much as he is in such sort good, that he can do nothing but well: otherwise he should not be God. Wherefore we may not imagine two Gods, with the Manichees, the one good, and the author and Creator of good things, and the other evil, and the author and creator of evil: For the evil can not be God, nor any other than the devil himself, which is a creature, and not a Creator, although he be the author of all evil: who notwithstanding was not created such an one of God, but is become such of his own malice, when he turned away from God, and renounced the goodness that he received of him. Wherein he hath showed the difference that is between the creator and the creature, and between the nature and goodness of the one and the other. For if God had created the Angels of such perfection as he is, and of a goodness so unchangeable of his nature, that it could never have ben changed into malice, no more than his own nature & goodness mought, ⟨p. 484⟩what difference should there be between God & his angels? The creature by this mean should be no more a creature, if his nature were such as is the nature of his creator, but he should be very God, which it can not be. For there is nothing that may be both maker & creature, unless we will attribute the same to our lord Jesus Christ, who being very God & very man in one only person is both maker & creature together:1 Maker, inasmuch as he is God eternal: & creature, in that that he is man, which was conceived in the womb of the virgin, & born in his time ordained by god: but this belongeth unto him by sundry respects, by mean of the two divers natures that are joined together in one person in him. Wherefore, although he be both the one & the other in one very person, yet is he not so in one nature, but creator, by reason of the one: & creature by mean of the other: but the like is not of angels: for as they have but only one nature, so may they be therein but very creatures, greatly different from their creator, as the fall of those that are fallen, hath plainly declared: For in falling from the state wherein they were, they have ⟨p. 485⟩showed in deed that they were not such of themselves, nor Gods unchangeable of their own nature, & that they could not so continue of their own power.
D. WHen he did create the Angells he created them all good: for he could make them none other, for somuch as he is in suche sorte good, that he can do nothing but well: otherwyse he shoulde not be God. Wherfore we may not imagine two Gods, with the Manichees, the one good, and the author and Creator of good things, and the other euill, and the author and creator of euill: For the euill can not bée God, nor any other than the deuill himselfe, which is a creature, and not a Creator, although he be the author of all euill: who notwithstandyng was not created suche an one of God, but is become suche of his owne malice, when he turned away from God, and renounced the goodnesse that he receyued of him. Wherin he hathe shewed the difference that is betwéene the creator and the creature, and betwéene the nature and goodnesse of the one and the other. For if God had created the Angels of such perfection as he is, and of a goodnesse so vnchangeable of his nature, that it coulde neuer haue ben changed into malice, no more thā his own nature & goodnesse mought, ⟨p. 484⟩what difference should there be betwéen God & his angels? The creature by this mean should be no more a creature, if his nature wer such as is ye nature of his creator, but he should be very God, which it can not be. For ther is nothing yt may be both maker & creature, vnles we will attribute ye same to our lord Iesus Chryst, who béeing very God & very man in one only person is both maker & creature togither:1 Maker, inasmuch as he is God eternal: & creature, in that yt he is mā, which was cōceiued in ye wombe of the virgin, & born in his time ordeined by god: but this belōgeth vnto him by sundry respects, by meane of the two diuers natures yt ar ioyned togither in one person in him. Wherfore, although he be both the one & the other in one very person, yet is he not so in one nature, but creator, by reason of the one: & creature by mean of the other: but ye like is not of angels: for as they haue but only one nature, so may they be therein but very creatures, greatly differēt from their creator, as the fall of those yt are fallen, hath plainly declared: For in falling frō the state wherin they wer, they haue ⟨p. 485⟩shewed in déed that they were not such of themselues, nor Gods vnchaungeable of their owne nature, & that they could not so continue of their owne power.
T. IF the men which are so troubled with the doctrine of Predestination, did well consider that which thou sayest, they should not have, in my opinion, occasion so to trouble themselves▪ for these things whereof thou speakest, did not come to pass without the knowledge, counsel, foresight, and ordinance of GOD. What will mans reason say then thereof, will it say, that God hath done wrong to those that are fallen, because that he did not sustain & confirm them as he did the others? but if that had bin done, this whereof thou ⟨p. 486⟩speakest, had not ben so manifestly declared, nor yet the nature and the majesty and the excellency that he hath over all creatures, yea the most noble and most excellent that are, should not have ben so well set forth.
T. IF the men which ar so troubled with the doctrine of Predestination, did well consider that which thou sayst, they should not haue, in my opinion, occasion so to trouble themselues▪ for these things wherof thou speakest, did not come to passe withoute the knowledge, counsell, foresyghte, and ordinaunce of GOD. What wil mans reason say then therof, wil it say, that God hath done wrong to those that are falne, bicause that he did not sustain & confirm thē as he did the others? but if that had bin done, this wherof thou ⟨p. 486⟩speakest, had not ben so manifestly declared, nor yet the nature and the maiestie and the excellencie that he hath ouer all creatures, yea the most noble and moste excellent that are, shoulde not haue ben so well set foorth.
D. It is very true: On the other side, if they had all fallen indifferently, the excellency of the nature wherein god had created them, nor yet the power whereby god did make them, should not have ben so well known, nor yet his grace toward them, as it is known. For in considering the difference that is between the devils & the Angels of heaven, we see how excellent the nature of Angels is, & also that which they have received of God in his creation: we see on the other side in the devils what it is that the creature can do of himself, how excellent soever it be, except it be preserved by god, who hath created it: on the contrary, we see in the other angels, the double grace that God hath bestowed upon them. The first in their creation which they had common with the rest that are fallen, before they did fall. The second is, in the conservation of the nature which was first given ⟨p. 487⟩unto them, & in the confirmation in the same through his grace, which the others wanted: which is the very cause of the diversity that now is between them: which diversity doth not let notwithstā ding but that the devils do continue still angels in the same substance that they were created in: but the difference is great in the quality, that is to say, in that that the one sort are not only angels, but are good angels, persevering in the first goodness that they received of God in the beginning, in their creation: from which notwithstanding, they mought as well have fallen as the others, if that God by his special grace had not sustained them, & had not otherwise disposed & ordained: Wherefore it is not written without cause,1 that all is restored by Jesus Christ, aswell in heaven as in earth, & that all consist by him & in him. The other on the other side are called not only angels, but wicked angels & devils, because that they did not persevere in the first goodness, wherein they were created, but turning from him from whence the same proceeded, they were put from it: & in the stead of the same, malice & wickedness ⟨p. 488⟩is come in place, which is nothing else but lack & privation of goodness, which is changed into an evil quality, which doth corrupt the creature that was created good, & maketh the natures contrary, which were before like.2
that is to say, even from the time that he was first a devil, and not from the time that he was first made an angel, & that when he doth speak lies, he speaketh that which is his own. And therefore he addeth unto it, that he did not abide still in the truth: for he hath nothing of God which is truth, but that which he now hath of evil, is of himself.
that is to say, euē frō the time that he was first a diuel, and not fom the time yt he was first made an angel, & that when he doth speak lies, he speaketh that which is his own. And therfore he addeth vnto it, that he did not abyde still in the truth: for he hath nothing of God which is truth, but that whiche he now hath of euill, is of himselfe.
T. Then is there no fault that proceedeth from God in the fall of the angels, nor any thing thereof which is apparent ⟨p. 489⟩to men, out of his eternal counsel: but that when the devil would turn from him of his own proper motion, God who had not created him unchangeable, did suffer him to change & to follow his will, and permitted him to fall, & did not let him, hold him, nor pluck him back: which thing not withstanding he could well have done, if his good will and pleasure had ben such, and that he had not otherwise determined in his eternal counsel, for good & just causes, for the which he is not bound to give us an account, the which he doth know better than we do: But he hath not thrust him forward, nor constrained him of force so to do, albeit that it is not done without his providence and eternal ordinance. Wherefore he may not attribute the fault of his evil act to any other than to himself, which thing we must seek (as thou haste already said) in the second and nearest causes, leaving the judgement & consideration of the first to the secrete counsel of God, which is to us unknown.
T. THen is there no faulte that procéedeth from God in the fall of the angels, nor any thing therof which is apparant ⟨p. 489⟩to men, out of his eternall coūsel: but that when the diuel wold turne from him of his own proper motion, God who had not created him vnchaungeable, did suffer him to change & to folow his wil, and permitted him to fall, & did not let him, hold him, nor pluck him back: which thing not withstanding he could wel haue done, if his good will and pleasure had ben suche, and that hée had not otherwise determined in his eternall counsel, for good & iust causes, for the which he is not bounde to giue vs an accompte, the which he dothe know better than we doe: But he hathe not thrust him forward, nor constrayned him of force so to do, albeeit that it is not done without his prouidence and eternal ordinaunce. Wherfore he may not attribute the faulte of his euill acte to any other than to himselfe, whiche thyng wée must séeke (as thou haste alreadie sayd) in the seconde and nearest causes, leauing the iudgement & consideration of the first to the secrete counsell of God, whiche is to vs vnknowne.
Dan. It is true. And to come again to our purpose, the Devil bi•ing deprived from this goodness, the ⟨p. 500⟩which he hath lost, can be none other than he is, nor have any other will than wicked: But yet notwithstanding, it is still a will: & that which he doth, is done voluntarily. There is no difference in this matter, but in stead that before his will was good, and did willingly that which was good, by the same: now is it evil, & doth willingly that which is evil, & that which he can not otherwise do, proceedeth not but only of that that he can have of himself none other will but that which is wicked: the fault whereof may be imputed to none other but to him: For if he have bin unthankful toward God, & hath through his unkindness and pride contemned that which he hath received of him, God is not bound to give him that which he thorough his own fault and unkindness hath lost: neither doth he him any wrong to leave him in that state, into the which he hath brought himself: for if he were not bound neither to create the Angels, nor yet to preserve & to confirm them in their estate, but hath done what he hath don, of his mere goodness & liberality, what duty oweth he else to repair & restore those that are fallen, ⟨p. 501⟩unless it please him, and except he think and know it to be agreeable to his glory & majesty, which he declareth in showing himself a just judge, in punishing so grievously such a pride, and such an arrogance and ingratitude: and likewise he doth show his great glory and power, declaring in a creature so excellently by him created, what difference there is between him that is the Creator, and the creature: and between dwelling in him and abandoning or leaving of him. And by the same mean he doth also give us the better to know the great grace that he hath bestowed upon the other Angels the which he conserveth in their first estate. For they may understand by that which happened to their fellows, that which mought also have happened to them, if that God of special grace had not holden them up and conserved them: considering that they were created of one very nature, which is now of an unchangeable goodness, through his grace, without the which it mought be changeable, as well as that of the others. And therefore it is not without cause written in the book ⟨p. 492⟩
For if we should compare God, and the perfection of him with that of his Angels, it should fare as it doth with the stars, which loose their light in the presence of the sun: or as it doth with a candle that is lighted at a fair noon tide. On the other side, we may not properly call true, firm and constant any: but only he that hath his being of himself,1 & may say, I am: to wit God unto whom this same belongeth.
For if we shuld compare God, and ye perfection of him with yt of his Angels, it shuld fare as it doth wyth the starres, whych loose their light in the presence of the sunne: or as it doth with a candle that is lighted at a faire noone tyde. On the other syde, we may not properly call true, firme and constant any: but only he that hath hys being of himselfe,1 & may say, I am: to wit God vnto whom this same belongeth.
T. J Understand well by that which thou hast said, what the nature & will of man should have bin, if he had continued in the first estate in which God did create him. For as concerning his will, it should necessarily have bin ruled by the will of god, as that of the Angels which have remained ⟨p. 493⟩steadfast, is at this present: in such sort that he should have bin no more able to sin than they: and so should not at all have lost the liberty of his will, nor done any thing by constraint. And even so should he have been in a good necessity, which should have proceeded from the riches of the goodness and grace wherewith GOD had endued him and made him a part taker of it. But when he turned from this way, it came to pass with him as it did with the Angels, when they turned from GOD, and hath declared thereby, that he was in such sort created of GOD, good and just, and of a good and holy will, and yet was he notwithstanding not so created that he should or mought be unchangeable of his own nature and force, for the causes which have been already alleged, which in their behalf do as much pertain to man as to the Angels. Wherefore seeing that man through the enticing and counsel of the Devil, which was the first transgressor, is turned away from the will and obedience of GOD his Creator, and did make ⟨p. 504⟩an alliance with the first offender, who made himself enemy to God through his pride and ingratitude, he hath ben part taker of his iniquity, with whom he made an alliance. From whence it followeth, that his good and holy nature & will hath been corrupted and perverted, and made like to the same, of him to whom he hath joined himself, & that he hath taken him not only for his fellow, but for his guide, his leader, his master, & his Lord. Wherefore, even as before, abiding united and joined to God, and having God in him, and being governed by his holy spirit, he could do nothing but good, and that without enforcement or constraint: even so by the contrary being separated from god, & joined with the devil, being lead and governed by him, he can do nothing but evil, and doth it of his own will, without constraint of any but only of him self, only because his nature is such, by reason whereof he taketh as great pleasure in doing of evil, as he did in well doing, when he was in his first state of innocency.
T. J Vnderstand wel by that which thou hast said, what the nature & wyll of man should haue byn, if he had continued in the first estate in which God did create him. For as concerning his wil, it should necessarily haue byn ruled by the will of god, as that of the Angels which haue remained
Now this necessity is greatly different from the first. For in stead that ⟨p. 505⟩the first did proceed from the abundant riches of the grace of god, this other proceedeth from the lack and fault of the same. Wherefore that is as wicked, as the first is blessed. It seemeth to me that I have touched the very same thing that thou wouldest have concluded upon.
Now this necessity is greatly different from the first. For in steade that ⟨p. 505⟩the first did procéede from the aboundant riches of the grace of god, this other procéedeth from the lacke and faulte of the same. Wherefore that is as wicked, as ye firste is blessed. It séemeth to me that I haue touched the very same thing yt thou woldest haue concluded vpō.
D. Yet shalt thou more plainly understand it by the comparison of a whole man, and a sick man. Note well a man that is whole of body and mind, because that he hath his appetite sound, and not corrupted by any naughty humours, he doth covet nor desire to eat & drink any thing but that which is good, and agreeable to his nature and health, and in such quality and quantity as his nature and health doth require, because he is so disposed. Consider again the same being sick, he will do all things contrary to that which he did being hole, because he is wholly otherwise disposed: That will he most covet and desire which is most contrary to him, and can not refrain from the use of it, and the more the thing shall be contrary and hurtful for him, and the more straitly that he shall be forbidden it, the more earnestly ⟨p. 496⟩shall he desire it. And yet may he not complain and say that he was constrained so to do, either by the physician, or others which have forbidden him the same, and that his will was enforced by any other than by himself which perisheth willingly, for that he is so delicate, that he cannot vanquish his affections, & his corrupted nature.
D. Yet shalt thou more plainly vnderstande it by the comparison of a whole man, and a sicke man. Note well a man that is whole of body and minde, bicause that he hath his appetite sound, and not corrupted by any naughty humors, he doth couet nor desire to eate & drinke any thing but that which is good, and agréeable to hys nature and health, and in such qualitie and quantitie as his nature and health doth require, bycause he is so disposed. Consider againe the same being sicke, he will do al things contrary to that which he did being hole, bycause he is wholly otherwise disposed: That will he moste couet and desyre which is most contrary to him, and can not refraine from the vse of it, and the more the thing shalbe contrary and hurtfull for him, and the more straitly that he shall be forbiddē it, the more earnestly ⟨p. 496⟩shal he desire it. And yet may he not complaine and saye that he was constrained so to doe, either by the phisition, or others which haue forbidden him the same, and that his will was inforced by anye other than by himself which perisheth willinglye, for that he is so delicate, that he cannot vanquishe his affections, & his corrupted nature.
D. It is very true: On the other syde, if they had all fallen indifferently, the excellencie of the nature wherin god had created them, nor yet the power wherby god did make them, shold not haue ben so well knowne, nor yet his grace toward them, as it is knowne. For in considering the difference that is betwéen the diuels & the Angels of heauen, we sée how excellent the nature of Angels is, & also that which they haue receiued of God in his creation: we see on the other side in the deuils what it is that the creature can do of himself, how excellent soeuer it be, except it be preserued by god, who hath created it: on the contrary, wée sée in the other angels, the double grace that God hath bestowed vpon them. The first in their creation which they had cō mon with the rest that are fallen, before they did fal. The second is, in the conseruation of the nature whiche was first giuen ⟨p. 487⟩vnto them, & in the confirmation in the same through his grace, which the others wanted: which is the very cause of the diuersitie that now is betwéen them: which diuersitie doth not let notwithstā ding but that the diuels do continue still angels in the same substaunce that they were created in: but the difference is great in the qualitie, that is to say, in that that the one sort are not only angels, but are good angels, perseuering in the firste goodnesse that they receiued of God in the beginning, in their creatiō: frō which notwithstanding, they mought as well haue fallen as ye others, if yt God by his special grace had not sustained them, & had not otherwise disposed & ordeined: Wherfore it is not writtē without cause,1 yt all is restored by Iesus Chryste, aswel in heauē as in earth, & that all consist by him & in him. The other on ye other side are called not only angels, but wicked angels & deuils, bicause that they did not perseuere in ye first goodnes, wherin they were created, but turning from him frō whence ye same proceeded, they were put frō it: & in the stead of the same, malice & wickednes ⟨p. 488⟩is come in place, whiche is nothing else but lack & priuation of goodnes, which is changed into an euil qualitie, which doth corrupt the creature yt was created good, & maketh the natures contrary, which wer before like.2 For ye same cause Iesus christ hath sayd, that the diuel is a lier from the beginning:
Dan. It is true. And to come againe to oure purpose, the Diuell bi•ing depriued from thys goodnesse, the ⟨p. 500⟩which he hath lost, can be none other thā he is, nor haue any other wil thā wicked: But yet notwithstanding, it is stil a wil: & that which he doth, is doon voluntarily. Ther is no difference in this matter, but in stead that before his wil was good, and did willingly that which was good, by the same: now is it euil, & doth willingly that which is euill, & that which he can not otherwise doe, procéedeth not but onely of that that he can haue of himselfe none other wil but that which is wicked: ye fault whereof maye be imputed to none other but to him: For if he haue bin vnthākful toward God, & hath through his vnkindnesse and pride contemned that which he hath receyued of him, God is not bounde to giue him that whiche he thorough his own fault and vnkindnesse hath lost: neither doth he him any wrong to leaue him in yt state, into the which he hath brought himself: for if he were not bound neither to create the Angels, nor yet to preserue & to confirme thē in their estate, but hath done what he hath don, of his méere goodnesse & liberalitie, what dutie oweth hée else to repaire & restore those yt are falne, ⟨p. 501⟩vnlesse it please him, and except he think and know it to be agréeable to his glory & maiestie, which he declareth in shewing himselfe a iust iudge, in punnishing so greuously such a pride, and such an arrogancie and ingratitude: and likewise hée doth shewe his great glorye and power, declaring in a creature so excellently by him created, what difference there is betwene him that is the Creator, and the creature: and betwene dwelling in hym and abandoning or leauing of him. And by the same meane he doth also giue vs the better to knowe the great grace that he hath bestowed vpon the other Angels the which hée conserueth in their fyrste estate. For they may vnderstande by that which happened to their felowes, that which mought also haue happened to thē, if that God of speciall grace had not holden them vp and conserued them: considering that they were created of one very nature, which is now of an vnchangeable goodnesse, through his grace, without the which it mought be chaungeable, as well as that of the others. And therfore it is not without cause writtē in the booke ⟨p. 492⟩of Iob, that God hath founde no prayse nor perfection in his very Angels.