A16317:257
A discourse about the state of true happiness delivered in certain sermons in Oxford,…A discourse about the state of true happinesse deliuered in certaine sermons in Oxford,…
A discourse about the state of true happiness delivered in certain sermons in Oxford, and at Pauls Cross: by Robert Bolton.A discourse about the state of true happinesse deliuered in certaine sermons in Oxford, and at Pauls Crosse: by Robert Bolton.
London: printed by Felix Kyngston for Edmund Weaver, 1611London: printed by Felix Kyngston for Edmund Weauer, 1611
A DISCOURSE ABOUT THE STATE OF TRUE HAPPINESS.A DISCOVRSE ABOVT THE STATE OF TRVE HAPPINESSE.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
I now proceed to tell you, that the word of God is not rooted in the conscience of the formal hypocrite, which is the hearer resembled unto the stony ground.
I now proceed to tell you, that the word of God is not rooted in the conscience of the formall hypocrite, which is the hearer resembled vnto the stony ground.
The whole and entire work of conscience, as you well know, out of the Schools, consisteth in a practical syllogism: The proposition ariseth out of the [Greek or Hebrew], an habit of practical principles, and general fountains of our actions. The assumption is properly [Greek or Hebrew], conscientia, an actual application of our knowledge to this, or that particular act or object. Whence follows the immediate, and necessary issue and office of conscience: to testify, in respect of things simply done, or not done: In respect of things to be done, either to excite and encourage, or to restrain and bridle: In respect of things done well, o• wickedly, to excuse and comfort, or accuse and terrific. For example: The [Greek or Hebrew], which is as it were a treasury of rules and lessons for direction in our actions, proposeth the iniquity of a lie even out of nature. Aristotle condemns it, Eth. 4.7. [Greek or Hebrew]: A lie is stark naught ⟨p. 111⟩and discommendable. The sounder Schoolmen demonstrate every lie, though it be officious, & for a greater good, to be against nature, and indispensable. Natures purpose is frustrated, and her law transgressed when speech and words, which she intends to be ever the true messengers of the conceits and apprehensions of the mind, are abused to falsehood and equivocation. But this practical principle of not lying, howsoever it be clear in nature, yet it receives further illustration from the book of God. Therefore the proposition may be thus framed:
The whole and entire worke of conscience, as you well know, out of the Schooles, consisteth in a practicall syllogisine: The proposition ariseth out of the , an habit of practicall principles, and generall fountaines of our actions. The assumption is properlie , conscientia, an actuall application of our knowledge to this, or that particular act or obiect. Whence followes the immediate, and necessarie issue and office of conscience: to testifie, in respect of things simplie done, or not done: In respect of things to bee done, either to excite and encourage, or to restraine and bridle: In respect of things done well, o wickedly, to excuse and comfort, or accuse and terrific. For example: The , which is as it were a treasurie of rules and lessons for direction in our actions, proposeth the iniquitie of a lie euen out of nature. Aristotle condemnes it, Eth. 4.7. : A lie is starke naught