Some general directions for a comfortable walking with God delivered in the lecture at…Some generall directions for a comfortable walking with God deliuered in the lecture at…

And it must needs be so. For it is utterly impossible that any finite cause, created power, or any thing out of Himself, should primarily move and incline the eternal, immutable, increated, omnipotent will of God. The true original and prime motive of all gracious, bountiful expressions and effusions of love upon His Elect, is His [Greek or Hebrew]. His merum beneplacitum: The good pleasure of His will. And therefore to hold, that election to life is made upon foresight of faith, good works, the right use of free-will, or any created motive, is not only ^tfalse, and wicked; but also an ignorant and absurd Tenet. To say no more at this time, it robs God of his All-sufficiency, making Him go out of Himself, looking to this or that in the creature, upon which His will may be determined to elect. The School-men tho otherwise a rotten generation of Divines, yet are right in this.

And it must needs bee so. For it is vtterly impossible that any finite cause, created power, or any thing out of Himselfe, should primarily mooue and incline the eternall, immutable, increated, omnipotent will of God. The true originall and prime motiue of all gracious, bountifull expressions and effusions of loue vpon His Elect, is His 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. His merum beneplacitum: The good pleasure of His will. And therefore to hold, that election to life is made vpon foresight of faith, good workes, the right vse of free-will, or any created motiue, is not only ^tfalse, and wicked; but also an ignorant and absurd Tenent. To say no more at this time, it robs God of his All-sufficiencie, making Him goe out of Himselfe, looking to this or that in the creature, vpon which His will may bee determined to elect. The Schoole-men tho otherwise a rotten generation of Diuines, yet are right in this.

1. tSicut Deo nihil potest esse causa ut incipiat velle: ita & ipsi Deo nihil potest esse causa ut ab aeterno aliquid velit, sicut nihil potest ei esse causa, ut ab aeterno sit, Driedo Tom. 3 lib. de concor lib. Arb. & praedest. divi. cap. 3. Non enim Deus monetur abaliquâ re àd extra, ad aliquid agendum; alioquin ipsius voluntas ab alio in volendo dependeret, quod repugnans est. Rubeus in 1. Sent. dist. 40. Divinae voluntatis non solùm nulla est causa finalis, & moriva per mo obiecti; sed etiam nullum est obiectum creaturae, quod possit Deo esse ratio volendi aliud, sed sola sua bonitas, Vasqz […] 1. p. disp. 91. q. 23. Art. 5. cap. 1.