Secondly, other inventions of men there are that concern only things that in their own nature are indifferent, neither commanded nor forbidden of God: in these the Magistrate hath power to command, but yet not an absolute power: for, he may offend in commanding; and Subjects may offend in obeying. And therefore I distinguish thus: If the Magistrate command things indifferent in their own nature to be used, and profess, that he requires them with opinion of worship,1 holiness, or merit, or necessity to salvation, then the Magistrate sins in so commanding, and the Subject sins in obeying: but, if the Magistrate command things to be used which in their own nature are indifferent, and profess to disclaim the opinion of holiness, worship, merit, or necessity, then it is lawful to obey his commandments in such cases. So then, traditions brought-in with an opinion of necessity, &c. are unlawful: but traditions brought-in for order and decorum, are lawful, 1. Cor. 14.40. and this is apparent. For, if God have left the ordering of things indifferent, to men, why may not Magistrates appoint that order? And if Christians may take-in or bring up customs in ⟨p. 588⟩the time of God's worship, why may not the Magistrate do it by his authority? If Christians may make an order for what garments women should wear on their heads in the time of God's worship, why may not the Magistrate make an order, what garments Ministers should wear in the time of God's worship? If subjects may of their own heads appoint a feast of their own making, at the time of God's feast, as they did their love-feasts in the Primitive Church, and withal appointed the action or gesture of kissing one another; why may not the Magistrate by his authority bring in an action or gesture, it being such a gesture as God hath neither commanded nor forbidden? Finally, if in things indifferent, a private man may use things indifferent of his own head, why may he not use them which the Magistrate commands, and when he commands him? and if he may refuse to use some things only because of his own will, why may he not refuse them when the Magistrate forbiddeth him?
Secondly, other inuentions of men there are that concern only things that in their owne nature are indifferent, neither commanded nor forbidden of God: in these the Magistrate hath power to command, but yet not an absolute power: for, he may offend in commanding; and Subiects may offend in obeying. And therefore I distinguish thus: If the Magistrate command things indifferent in their owne nature to be vsed, and professe, that hee requires them with opinion of worship,1 holinesse, or merit, or necessity to saluation, then the Magistrate sinnes in so commanding, and the Subiect sinnes in obeying: but, if the Magistrate command things to bee vsed which in their owne nature are indifferent, and professe to disclaim the opinion of holinesse, worship, merit, or necessity, then it is lawfull to obey his commandements in such cases. So then, traditions brought-in with an opinion of necessity, &c. are vnlawfull: but traditions brought-in for order and decorum, are lawfull, 1. Cor. 14.40. and this is apparant. For, if God haue left the ordering of things indifferent, to men, why may not Magistrates appoint that order? And if Christians may take-in or bring vp customes in ⟨p. 588⟩the time of God's worship, why may not the Magistrate doo it by his authority? If Christians may make an order for what garments women should wear on their heads in the time of God's worship, why may not the Magistrate make an order, what garments Ministers should weare in the time of God's worship? If subiects may of their owne heads appoint a feast of their owne making, at the time of God's feast, as they did their loue-feasts in the Primitiue Church, and withall appointed the action or gesture of kissing one another; why may not the Magistrate by his authority bring in an action or gesture, it being such a gesture as God hath neither commanded nor forbidden? Finally, if in things indifferent, a priuat man may vse things indifferent of his owne head, why may hee not vse them which the Magistrate commands, and when hee commands him? and if hee may refuse to vse some things onely because of his owne will, why may hee not refuse them when the Magistrate forbiddeth him?
- 1Gal. 5. Mat. 15. Command. 2.
