The Institution of Christian Religion

As for them that would have divers souls in man, that is, a feeling soul, and a reasonable soul, although they seem to say somewhat by reason provable, yet because there is no steadfast certainty in their reasons, we must reject them, unless we listed to encumber our selves in things trifling and unprofitable. A great disagreement say they, there is between the instrumental motions and the part of the soul endued with reason. As though reason it self did not also dissent from it self, and some devises of it do strive with other some, as they were armies of enemies. But forasmuch as that troublesomeness proceedeth of the corruption of Nature, it were amiss to gather thereby, that there are two souls, because the powers of the soul do not agree together, in such well framed order as they ought. But as for more subtle disputation of the Powers them selves, I leave that to the Philosophers. A simple definition shall suffice us for edification of godliness. I grant that the things that they teach are true, and not only pleasant but also profitable to be known, and well gathered of them, and I forbid not such as are desirous to learn to study them. First therefore I admit that there are five Senses, which Plato better liked to call Instruments, whereby all Objects,¹ are poured into Common sense, as into a place of receipt: then followeth Fantasy, which judgeth those things one from other that Common sense hath conceived, next is Reason, to which belongeth the universal judgement of things: last, is the Understanding mind, which with earnestly bent and quiet viewing beholdeth all those things, that Reason is wont to discourse upon,² and consider. And to the Understanding mind, Reason, and Phansy, which are the three powers of the soul, that rest in knowledge, there do answer three other that do rest in Appetite, that is to say, Will, the parts whereof are to covet those things that the Understanding mind and Reason do lay before it: the Power of Anger, which catcheth those things that Reason and Phansy do minister unto it, The power of Desiring, which taketh hold of those things that Fantasy and Sense, presenteth it.

As for them that woulde haue diuers soules in man, that is, a felyng soule, and a reasonable soule, although they seme to say somwhat by reason proueable, yet because there is no stedfast certaintie in their reasons, we muste reiecte theim, vnlesse we listed to accombre our selues in thynges triflyng and vnprofitable. A great disagreement say they, there is betwene the instrumentall motions and the part of the soule endued with reason. As thoughe reason it selfe did not also dissent from it selfe, and some deuises of it doo striue with other some, as they were armies of enemies. But forasmuche as that troublesomnesse procedeth of the corruption of Nature, it were amysse to gather therby, that there are two soules, because the powers of the soule doe not agree together, in suche well framed order as they ought. But as for more suttle disputation of the Powers them selues, I leaue that to the Philosophers. A symple definition shall suffise vs for edification of godlynesse. I graunt that the things that they teache are true, and not onelye pleasaunte but also profytable to bee knowen, and well gathered of theym, and I forbydde not suche as are desyrous to learne to studye theim. Fyrste therefore I admitte that there are fyue Senses, whyche Plato better lyked to calle Instrumentes, whereby all Obiectes,