The Institution of Christian Religion

Although these things be true, or at least likely to be true, yet because I fear that they shall more entangle us with obscureness than further us, I think it best to overpass them. If any man list otherwise to divide the powers of the soul, and to call the one the power of Appetite, which although it be without reason it self, ⟨image 65⟩yet doeth obey reason, if it be by other mean directed, and to call the other the power of understanding, which is by it self partaker of reason, I am not much against it, neither will I confute this opinion, that there are three beginnings of doing: that is to say, Sense, Understanding, and Appetite. But let us rather choose a division, that is within the capacity of all men, which can not be had of the Philosophers. For they when they mean to speak most plainly, do divide the soul into Appetite and Understanding, but either of these they make of two sorts. Understanding, they say, is sometime Contemplative, which being contented with only knowledge,¹ hath no moving of action, which thing Cicero thinketh to be expressed by this word ingenium, wit. Sometime they say it is practical, which by conceiving of good or evil doeth diversely move the Will. And appetite they do divide into Will, and Lust. Will they call that when Appetite which they call Horme, obeyeth to reason, and Lust they call that when the appetite shaking of the yoke of reason, runneth out• to intemperance. So always they imagine reason to be that in man, whereby man may rightly govern him self.

Although these things be true, or at least likely to be true, yet because I feare that they shall more entangle vs with obscurenesse than further vs, I thynke it beste to ouerpasse them. If any man lyste otherwyse to dyuide the powers of the soule, and to calle the one the power of Appetite, whyche althoughe it be without reason it selfe, ⟨image 65⟩yet doeth obey reason, if it bee by other meane directed, and to call the other the power of vnderstandyng, whyche is by it selfe partaker of reason, I am not muche agaynst it, neither will I confute this opinion, that there are thre beginnyngs of doyng: that is to say, Sense, Understandyng, and Appetite. But let vs rather choose a diuision, that is within the capacitie of all men, which can not be hadde of the Philosophers. For they when they meane to speake moste plainely, doo diuide the soule into Appetite and Understandyng, but eyther of these they make of two sortes. Understandyng, they saye, is sometyme Contemplatiue, which beyng contented with onely knowlege,