The Institution of Christian Religion

They are commonly wont to make subject to the free determination §5of man, things mean, that is which belong not to the kingdom of God: but they do refer true righteousness to the special grace of God & spiritual regeneration Which thing while the author of the book Of the calling of the Gentiles meaneth to show,¹ he reckoneth up three sorts of Wills, the first Sensitive, the second Natural, the third Spiritual, of which he saith, that man hath the first two at his own liberty, the last is the work of the holly ghost in man. Which whether it be true or no shall be entreated in place fit for it, for now my purpose is but shortly to rehearse the opinions of other, and not to confute them. Hereby it cometh to pass, that when writers speak of free will, they principally seek not what it is able to do to civil or outward doings, but what it can do to the obedience of the law of God. Which latter point I think so to be the principal, that yet I think the other is not to be neglected. Of which meaning I trust, I shall show a good reason. There hath been a distinction received in Schools, that reckoneth up three sorts of freedoms, the first from necessity, the second from sin, the third from misery. Of which the first so naturally sticketh fast in man, that it can by no mean be taken away: the other two are lost by sin. This distinction I willingly receive, saving that there necessity is wrongfully confounded with compulsion: between which two how much difference there is, and how necessary that difference is to be considered, shall appear in an other place.

They are commonly wonte to make subiecte to the free determination §5of man, thynges meane, that is whyche belonge not to the kingedome of God: but they do referre true ryghteousnesse to the speciall grace of God & spiritual regeneration Whiche thinge while ye author of the booke Of the callynge of the Gentyles meaneth to shewe,¹ hee reckeneth vp three sortes of Wylles, the fyrste Sensitiue, the seconde Naturall, ye thyrde Spyrytuall, of whiche he saith, that man hath the fyrste twoo at hys owne lybertye, the laste is the woorke of the holly ghoste in man. Whyche whether it be true or no shall be entreated in place fytte for it, for nowe my purpose is but shortely to reherse the opynyons of other, and not to confute them. Hereby it commeth to passe, that when wryters speake of free wil, thei pryncipally seke not what yt is able to doe to ciuile or outewarde doinges, but what it can do to the obedience of ye lawe of God. Whiche latter poynt I thinke so to be the pryncipall, that yet I thynke the other is not to bee neglected. Of whyche meanynge I truste, I shall shewe a good reason. There hathe been a distinction receyued in Schooles, that reckeneth vp three sortes of freedomes, the fyrste from necessytye, the seconde from synne, the thyrde from mysery. Of whiche the fyrste so naturally stycketh faste in man, that yt can by no meane be taken awaye: the other twoo are loste by synne. Thys dystinction I wyllingly receyue, sauynge that there necessytye is wrongefully confounded with compulsion: betwene whyche twoo howe muche dyfference there ys, and howe necessary that dyfference is to be considered, shal appeare in an other place.