The Institution of Christian Religion

And I weigh not the discussions and fightings that afterward arise▪ while some desire to pervert law and right, the loose absolute governments of kings, that lust strayeth abroad in stead of right, as the eves & robbers, some (which is a fault more than common) think that to be unjust, which other have stablished for just: and on the other side stiffly say, that to be laudable, which other have forbidden. For these men do not therefore hate laws, because they do not know that laws are good and holly, but for that they raging with heady lust, do fight against manifest reason, and for their fancy do abhor that, which in understanding of mind they allow. The latter sort of striving is such, that it taketh not away that first conceiving of equity. For when men do strive among them selves, concerning the points of laws, they agree together in a certain sum of equity. Wherein is proved the weakness of mans wit, which even then when it seemeth to follow the right way, yet halteth and staggereth, but still this remaineth true, that there is sown in all men a certain seed of politic order. And that is a large proof, that in the ordering of this life, no man is void of the light of reason.

And I weye not the disscusions and fyghtynges that afterwarde arise▪ whyle some desyre to peruerte lawe and ryghte, the loose absolute gouernementes of kynges, that luste strayeth abroade in steede of ryghte, as the eues & robbers, some (whiche ys a faulte more than common) thynke that to bee vniuste, whyche other haue stablyshed for iuste: and on the other syde styffely saye, that to be laudable, whiche other haue forbydden. For these menne do not therefore hate lawes, bycause they dooe not knowe that lawes are good and holly, but for that they ragynge wyth heddye luste, doe fyghte agaynste manyfeste reason, and for theyr fansi• dooe abhorre that, whych in vnderstandyng of minde thei allowe. The latter sorte of stryuyng is suche, that yt taketh not awaye that fyrste conceiuing of equitie. For when menne dooe stryue amonge them selues, concerninge the poyntes of lawes, they agree together in a certaine summe of equitie. Wherein is proued the weakenesse of manns witte, which euen then when it seemeth to folowe the righte waye, yet halteth and staggereth, but styll thys remayneth true, that there is sowen in all menne a certayne seede of polytyke ordre. And that ys a large proofe, that in the orderynge of thys lyfe, no manne ys voyde of the lyghte of reason.