The Institution of Christian Religion

Now remaineth the third point, of knowing the rule of well framing of life, which we do rightly call the knowledge of the works of righteousness wherein mans wit seemeth to be of somewhat more sharp sight, than in the other two before. For the Apostle testifieth,¹ that the Gentiles which have no law, while they do the works of the law, are to themselves in stead of a law, and do show the law written in their hearts, their consciences bearing them witness, and their thoughts accusing them within themselves, or excusing them before the judgement of God. If the Gentiles have righteousness naturally graven in their minds, surely we can not say that we are altogether blind in the order of life. And nothing is more common, than that man by the law natural, of which the Apostle speaketh in that place, is sufficiently instructed to a right rule of life. But let us way to what purpose this knowledge of the law is planted in men: then it shall by and by appear, how far it bringeth them toward the mark of reason and truth. The same is also evident by the words of Paul, if a man do mark the placing of them. He had said a little before, that they which sinned in the law, are judged by the law: they that have sinned without law, do perish without law. Because this might seem unreasonable, that the gentiles should perish without any judgement going before, he by and by addeth, that their conscience is to them in stead of a law, and therefore is sufficient for their just damnation. Therefore the end of the law natural is, that man may be made inexcusable. And it shall be defined not il after this sort that it is a knowledge of conscience, that sufficiently discerneth between just and unjust, to take away from men the pretence of ignorance, while they are proved guilty by their own testimony. Such is the tenderness of man toward him self, that in doing of evils, he alway turneth away his mind so much as he may from the feeling of sin.² By which reason it seemeth that Plato was moved to think that there is no sin done but by ignorance. That in deed were fitly said of him if mens hypocrisy went so far in hiding of vices, that the mind might not know itself guilty before God.

Nowe remaineth the thirde pointe, of knowyng the rule of well framynge of life, whiche we doe rightly call the knoweledge of the workes of righteousnesse wherein mans wit semeth to bee of somewhat more sharpe sight, than in the other two before. For the Apostle testifieth,