The Institution of Christian Religion

This necessity, whereas Augustine e•che where speaketh of it,¹ even then also when he was enviously pressed with the cavillation of Celestius, he sticked not to affirm in these words, up liberty it came to pass that man was with sin, but now the corruption which stowed for punishment, hath of, liberty made necessity. And so oft as he falleth into mention thereof, he bo•bteth not to speak in this manner of the necessary bondage of sin.² Therefore let this sum of that distinction be kept, that man since he is corrupted, sinneth in deed willingly and not against his will nor compelled, by a most bent affection of mind, and not by violent compulsion, by motion of his own lust, and not by foreign constraint: but yet of such perverseness of nature as he is, he can not but be moved and driven to evil. If this be true, then surely it is plainly expressed that he is subject to necessity of •yn•ynge.³ Bernard agreeing to Augustine writeth thus, only man among all living creatures is free: and yet by mean of sin, he also suffereth a certain violence, but of will and not of nature, that even thereby also he should not be deprived of freedom, for that which is willing is free. And a little after, will being changed in it self into worse, by I wot not what corrupt and marvellous manner so maketh necessity, that very necessity for as much as it is willing, can not excuse will, and will forasmuch as it is drawn by allurement, can not exclude necessity, for this necessity is after a certain manner willing. Afterward he saith, that we are pressed down with a yoke, but yet none other but of a certain willing bondage, therefore by reason of our bondage we are miserable, by reason of our will we are inexcusable, because will when it was free, made it self the bond servant of sin. At length he concludeth, that the soul is so after a certain marvellous and evil manner holden both a bond servant and free, under this certain willing and ill free necessity: a bond servant by reason of necessity, free by reason of will, and that which is more marvellous and more miserable, therein guilty wherein it is free, therein bond wherein it is guilty, and so therein bond wherein it is free.