The Institution of Christian Religion

IT might seem that we have said enough, already, concerning the bondage of mans will, if they that with false opinion of liberty, labour to throw it down headlong, did not on the contrary part pretend certain reasons to assail our meaning. First they heap up together diverse absurdities, whereby they may bring it in hatred as a thing abhorring from common reason: afterward they set upon it with testimonies of scripture. Both these engines we shall beat back in order. If (say they) Sin be of necessity, then ceaseth it to be sin: if it be voluntary, then may it be avoided. These were also the weapons of Pelagius to assail Augustine, with whose name we will not yet have them oppressed, till we have satisfied them, concerning the matter it self. I deny therefore that sin ought the less to be imputed, because it is necessary. I deny again that this doth follow which they conclude, that it may be avoided, because it is voluntary. For if any man will dispute with God, and seek to escape from his judgement by this pretence, because he could none otherwise do: God hath that answer ready which we in an other place have spoken of, that it is not of creation, but of the corruption of nature that men being made bondslaves to sin, can will nothing but evil. For whence cometh this want of power which the wicked would gladly pretend, but upon this, that Adam of his own accord made him self subject to the tyranny of the Devil? Hereupon therefore grew the corruption, with the bonds whereof we are holden fast tied, for that the first man fell from his creator. If all men be justly holden guilty of this falling away, let them not think them selves excused by necessity, in which it self they have a most evident cause of their damnation. And this I have above plainly set fourth, and I have given an example in the Devil him self, whereby it might appear, that he which necessarily sinneth, doth nevertheless willingly sin: as again in the elect angels, where as their will can not be decline from good, yet it ceaseth not to be a will.¹ Which same thing Bernard also aptly teacheth: that we are therefore the more miserable, because our necessity is voluntary: which yet holdeth us so subject unto it, that we be the bond slaves of sin, as we have before rehearsed.

YT myght seme that we haue saide enough, already, concerning the bondage of mans wyll, if they that with false opinion of libertie, labour to throwe it downe hedlong, did not on the contrary part pretende certayne reasons to assaile our meanyng. First they heape vp together diuerse absurdities, whereby they may bryng it in hatred as a thing abhorring from common reason: afterward they set vpon it with testimonies of scripture. Bothe these enginse we shall beate back in order. If (say they) Synne be of necessitie, then cesseth it to be synne: if it be voluntarie, then may it be auoyded. These were also the weapons of Pelagius to assaile Augustine, with whose name we wyl not yet haue them oppressed, till we haue satisfied them, concerning the matter it selfe. I denie therfore that sinne ought the lesse to be imputed, because it is necessary. I denie agayne that this dothe followe whiche they conclude, that it may be auoyded, because it is voluntarie. For if any man will dispute with God, and seeke to escape from his iudgement by this pretense, because he coulde none otherwyse do: God hath that aunswere ready whiche we in an other place haue spoken of, that it is not of creation, but of the corruption of nature that men being made bondeslaues to synne, can wyll nothing but euell. For whence cometh this want of power whiche the wycked would gladly pretende, but vpon this, that Adam of his owne accorde made hym selfe subiect to the tyrannie of the Deuell? Hereupon therfore grewe the corruption, with the bondes wherof we are holden fast tyed, for that the fyrst man fell from his creatour. If all men be iustly holden gylty of this fallynge away, let them not thinke them selues excused by necessitie, in whiche it selfe they haue a moste euident cause of their dampnation. And this I haue aboue plainely set fourth, and I haue geuē an example in the Deuel hym selfe, wherby it might appeare, that he whiche necessarely synneth, dothe neuerthelesse wyllyngly sinne: as agayne in the electe aungels, where as their wyll can not be declyne from good, yet it cesseth not to be a will.