Sermons upon Deuteronomy

Now finally, whereas it is said, That there is no judgement of death upon such a man, it serveth to prove the thing better, which I have spoken already: namely that if a man be not guilty by his own purpose, intent, or will; he ought not to be taken for an offender. God acquitteth him, and therefore he ought not to be condemned by men or by any creature. This ought to serve us for a further confirmation of the doctrine which I take in hand to expound. Men can always §30well grant that faults are willing. When the Heathen wrote of that matter, they spake after this manner: the Law punisheth not the events of things, but the intents of them. And when the Philosophers wrote thereof, they could well skill to say, there is neither vice nor virtue which proceedeth not of the will. Yet for all this, we cease not to blear our own eyes, neither do we think our selves to have offended, unless our hands be bloody, or that there appear §40some evident token to the worldward, or (to be short,) that we be convicted of the doing of some wicked deed. But that is against my former saying, that is to wit, that all sins proceed of the will. Therefore when we intend to examine our selves throughly, let us learn to begin at our wills And if we find no evil deed in our selves, that is to say neither malice, nor evil will; then is it no crime. And whereas I say that evil affection is willing, yet for all that I exclude not mens inquiries:§50 for it is not for naught that God hath distinguished sins and misdeeds into two sorts; whereof the one sort are called crimes, and the other sort are called ignorances. Although then that men have no intent or meaning to do amiss, yet is it not to be said that therefore they be righteous. But my meaning now is that there be no wicked affection or desire in us, so as we be not disposed to it of any will, but that the whole §60matter standeth upon mischance that ensueth. And I call it mischance after the custom of common speech. For it behooveth us to refer all things to Gods providence, and not to think that any thing can fall out through fortune. Nevertheless it is a common manner of speech among us, to say that a thing happeneth by chance or fortune, when it cometh to pass on our side.

Now finally, whereas it is sayd, That there is no iudgement of death vppon such a man, it serueth to proue the thing better, which I haue spoken already: namely that if a man be not guiltie by his own purpose, intēt, or wil; he ought not to be taken for an offender. God acquitteth him, and therefore he ought not to bee condemned by men or by any creature. This ought to serue vs for a further confirmation of the doctrine which I take in hand to expound. Men can alwayes