5. The Definition which he maketh choice of is: Superstition is that whereby undue worship is exhibited to God: •rom hence the Rej. collecteth, and assumeth 1. that superstition properly is in the opinion and mind of the worshipper: •. That a man may imagine himself to honour God in the use •f such things, as God hath not forbidden or condemned, and •hereupon forbear, even for conscience to God, things lawful: •. That the very not doing of things prohibited in the first •able (if it be for conscience to God,) is worship. Now the first of these, is to fetch quidlibet ex quolibet, any thing out of every thing: For there is nothing in the Definition alleged, from whence (by any logic) it can be concluded, that superstition is properly in opinion and mind: 2. The assertion is as false, as untowardly collected, for though inward superstition, be in the mind or soul, and springeth from an erroneous opinion, yet neither it, nor any moral vice or virtue, doth properly consist in opinion, but rather in affection, and disposition of the heart and will, as all that consider of the ⟨p. 100⟩matter, will easily perceive and confess: And as for outward superstition, that consisteth in outward observances. 3. The second collection serveth nothing to the purpose: Neither yet the conclusion drawn from it, that there may be a negative superstition: yet is it so intricately set down, that it containeth a kind of contradiction, for the forbearing of things lawful, is termed the use of such things, in what sense I cannot conjecture: The last would prove something, if it were generally true as it is not: The avoiding of sin or things forbidden by God, is an act of common obedience, belonging as well to things forbidden, in the second table, as to those, that are forbidden in the first: And the termination of this act, upon matters of the first table, doth no more make it properly worship toward God, then the like termination of it, upon the matters of the second table, doth make the same act, properly justice, o• charity towards men: It may, in this or that particular, be imperated or commanded by religion to God, and in others by charity to men, but it is not, in that particular elicited, or naturally flowing from either, as worship doth from religion and bounty from charity.
5. The Definition which he maketh choice of is: Superstition is that wherby undue worship is exhibited to God: •rom hence the Rej. collecteth, and assumeth 1. that supersti•ion properly is in the opinion and mynd of the worshipper: •. That a man may imagine himself to honor God in the use •f such things, as God hath not forbidden or condemned, and •hereupon forbeare, even for conscience to God, things lawfull: •. That the very not doing of things prohibited in the first •able (if it be for conscience to God,) is worship. Now the first of these, is to fetch quidlibet ex quolibet, any thing out of every thing: For ther is nothing in the Defini•ion alledged, from whence (by any logick) it can be concluded, that superstition is properly in opinion and mynd: 2. The assertion is as false, as untowardly col•ected, for though inward superstition, be in the mynd or soule, and springeth from an erronious opinion, yet neither it, nor any morall vice or virtue, doth properly consist in opinion, but rather in affection, and disposition of the heart and will, as all that consider of the ⟨p. 100⟩matter, will easily perceave and confesse: And as for outward superstition, that consisteth in outward observances. 3. The second collection serveth nothing to the purpose: Neither yet the conclusion drawne from it, that there may be a negative superstition: yet is it so intricately sett downe, that it conteyneth a kynd of contradiction, for the forbearing of things lawfull, is termed the use of such things, in what sense I cannot conjecture: The last would prove something, if it were generally true as it is not: The avoyding of synne or things forbidden by God, is an act of common obedience, belonging as well to things forbidden, in the second table, as to those, that are forbidden in the first: And the terminanation of this act, upon matters of the first table, doth no more make it properly worship toward God, then the like termination of it, upon the matters of the second table, doth make the same act, properly justice, o• charity towards men: It may, in this or that particular, be imperated or commaunded by religion to God, and in others by charity to men, but it is not, in that particular elicited, or naturally flowing from either, as worship doth from religion and bounty from charity.
