A fresh suit against human ceremonies in God's worship. Or a triplication unto. D.…

Of binding the Conscience, enough hath been said in the head of Difference betwixt our Ceremonies and Popish.

Of binding the Conscience, enough hath been sayd in the head of Difference betwixt our Ceremonies and Popish.

4. Junius n. 12. answering to Bellarmines his saying, that God (in the N.T.) gave only the common laws of faith and Sacram. leaving the specials to the Church etc. affirmeth Gods laws to be perfect re, ratione & modo, and those of the Church to be but Canons and disposings of convenience, for better observing of divine laws.

4. Iunius n. 12. answering to Bellarmines his saying, that God (in the N.T.) gave onely the common laws of faith and Sacram. leaving the specialls to the Churche etc. affirmeth Gods laws to be perfect re, ratione & modo, and those of the Churche to be but Canons and disposings of conveniencie, for better observing of divine lawes.

Where note 1. an example of an etc. for a blind, or blinding, which the Rejoinder formerly told of. For in that eat. is contained, pro locorum & temporum diversitate: quia non possunt diversissimi populi conuenire in ijsdem legibus & ritibus. 1▪ e. for this cause, special laws of ritual things, are left to the Churches liberty, because of variety, which falleth out now by occasion of times and places: Which is the very thing that the Rejoinder pawned his credit, Bell. never said, pag. 15.16. Note also 2. that Junius doeth not in this place mention Canons, as the Rej. pleaseth to alter his words in reciting of them. But Cautions, and dispositions. Now a Caution about the performance of any thing, is not an institution of a new thing. 3. Junius is found to say as much as he was alleged for, and to the contrary we have from the Rejoynder a nihil dicit.

Where note 1. an example of an etc. for a blinde, or blindinge, which the Rejoynder formerly tould of. For in that ete. is conteyned, pro locorum & temporum diversitate: quia non possunt diversissimi populi conuenire in ijsdem legibus & ritibus. 1▪ e. for this cause, speciall laws of rituall thinges, are left to the Churches libertie, because of varietie, which falleth out now by occasion of times and places: Which is the very thinge that the Rejoynder pawned his credite, Bell. never sayde, pag. 15.16. Note also 2. that Iunius doeth not in this place mētion Canons, as the Rej. pleaseth to alter his words in reciting of them. But Cautions, and dispositions. Now a Caution about the performance of any thing, is not an institution of a new thing. 3. Iunius is found to say as muche as he was alledged for, and to the contrarie we have from the Rejoynder a nihil dicit.

1. 1Christus solute•• legislator crima•us, qui potest suâ propriâ authoritate judicare & leges far.Christus solute•• legislator crima•us, qui potest suâ propriâ authoritate judicare & leges ferre.

Now out of all these allegations, the Rejoinder maketh his interrogatories. 1. Where be these words all that is requisite, as spoken of Rites and Ceremonies? Answer the sense of these words as spoken of all Ceremonies above mere order and decency, is cap. 16.86.2. Where find you in Junius that the Church may constitute no new thing? Ans. cap. 17. n. 9. this in things Divine is to turn aside, ¹for the Rejoinder his interpretation of those words, that they mean points of faith, and necessary rules of sanctimony, is confuted, by conference of Bellarmines words there opposed, who in that place instanceth in Ceremonial and Judicial laws, and speaketh not at all of faith and necessary sanctimony. 3. Where are those words, ordering in seemly manner? Ans. cap. 16. n. 86. those only humane laws are necessary in the Church, which make that all things be done decently and in order. 1. Cor. 14.40, 4. If the Church may appoint no new thing, but only see to decency and order, then saith the Rej. what patent hath she to make particular ordinances for time, and place? unless these be no new things. I Ans. 1. Time and place considered as mere occasional circumstances, are no more new things in Gods service, then concreated time and place, were new things in Creation, distinct from the created world. And Calvin inst. l. 4. cap. 10. sect. 22. severely censureth those, that call such kind of determinations new laws: Quis nisi calumniator, sic novam ferri•b ijs legem dicat, quos constant duntaxat ⟨p. 66⟩scandalis occu•rere, quae sunt a Domino satis diserte prohibita? If procuring that scandals be avoided, be no new thing, then neither is procuring that disorder, and undecencie, for time, place, etc. be avoided, any new thing.

Now out of all these allegations, the Rejoynder maketh his interrogatories. 1. Where be these words all that is requisite, as spoken of Rites and Ceremonies? Answer the sense of these words as spoken of all Ceremonies above mere order and decencie, is cap. 16.86.2. Where finde you in Iuníus that the Churche may constitute no new thinge? Ans. cap. 17. n. 9. this in things Divine is to turne aside, ¹

As for a patent to appoint double, treble, sacred Ceremonies, it is a vain thing for them to plead it, that cannot show it under the great Seal. I do not think, that any earthly King would have his subjects submit them selves to that power, which is fetched out of a Patent, invisible, and only avouched by conjectures.

As for a patent to appoint double, treble, sacred Ceremonies, it is a vayn thing for them to plead it, that cannot shew it under the great Seal. I doe not thinke, that any earthly Kinge would have his subjects submit thē selves to that power, which is fetched out of a Patent, invisible, and onely avouched by conjectures.

7. A reason was given of the foresaid proposition, out of Jun. de Transl. Imp. l. 1. c. 2. n. 26.27.31. viz. that the Church hath only a Ministry, to observe such things as Christ hath appointed, not authority of appointing new things. Here the Rejoinder 1. observeth, that those words, (new things) have no foot steps in Junius. As if new things could be appointed lawfully without authority of appointing. Surely, he that denieth all authority of appointing, and leaveth only ministerial performance of things appointed, he denieth appointing of new things. 2. He argueth thus: If the Church have a ministry to appoint and do such things as Christ hath commanded, then must she needs have a Commission legative to appoint and use rites serving to order and decency. Add to this only, and then it is not only that, but all that which we require. 3. He crieth out of miserable perversion, either by gross negligence, or mistaking.

7. A reason was given of the foresaid proposition, out of Iun. de Transl. Imp. l. 1. c. 2. n. 26.27.31. viz. that the Churche hath onely a Ministerie, to observe suche thinges as Christ hath appointed, not authoritie of appointing new thinges. Here the Rejoynder 1. observeth, that those words, (new things) have no foot steps in Iunius. As if new things could be appointed lawfully without authoritie of appointing. Surely, he that denieth all authoritie of appointing, and leaveth onely ministeriall performance of things appointed, he denieth appointing of new thinges. 2. He argueth thus: If the Churche have a ministerie to appoint and doe suche thinges as Christ hath commanded, then must she needs have a Commission legative to appoint and use rites serving to order and decencie. Adde to this onely, and then it is not onely that, but all that which we require. 3. He crieth out of miserable perversion, eyther by grosse negligence, or mistaking.

And why so I pray? Because (forsooth) all that Junius saith is good to prove, that no Ecclesiastical person hath any power by his calling over temporal Princes. But this is nothing against their delegated dependant power, by Commission. But 1. these are very strange distinctions: they have not any power by their calling, but some by commission. They have not any power over temporal Princes (though they be members of the Church) but over the Church they have. 2. The Rejoinder maketh Junius only to deny that which Bellarmine never affirmed, viz. absolute independent power of Ecclesiastical persons, as supreme Lords. Nay Bellarmin answereth to Calvin in the very same manner that the Rejoinder doeth: The Pope is not the chief lawgiver but the vicar of Christ, ¹& by Christs authority maketh laws. 3. He addeth that Junius disp. de trad. distinguisheth betwixt decency, and the seemliness of order alone.

And why so I pray? Because (forsooth) all that Iunius sayth is good to prove, that no Ecclesiasticall person hath any power by his calling over temporall Princes. But this is nothing against their delegated dependant power, by Commission. But 1. these are very strange distinctions: they have not any power by their calling, but some by commission. They have not any power over temporall Princes (though they be members of the Churche) but over the Churche they have. 2. The Rejoynder maketh Iunius onely to denie that which Bellarmine never affirmed, viz. absolute independent power of Ecclesiasticall persons, as supreme Lords. Nay Bellarmin answereth to Calvin in the very same manner that the Rejoynder doeth: The Pope is not the cheife lawgiver but the vicar of Christ, ¹& by Christes authority maketh lawes. 3. He addeth that Iunius disp. de trad. distinguisheth betwixt decencie, and the seemlinesse of order alone.

1. 1Pontisex non est legislator primarius •ed Vicarius Christi, & Christi authoritate leges condit De Pontif. l. 4. cap. 17.

As if this were the main question? Or any part of the Proposition! or denied by the Repl. at all. The Rejoinder having little to say that was to the purpose, cacheth hold of one word in the end of the Assumption used by the Repl. seemliness of order (which yet is immediately there differenc•d from other decency, as well commanded as this) and that he maketh the main matter of the proposition: whereas the meaning is, that nothing is left unto liberty in Gods worship, above decency and order, for which these testimonies are brought, and not for the other.

As if this were the maine question? Or any part of the Proposition! or denied by the Repl. at all. The Rejoynder having litle to say that was to the purpose, cacheth hould of one word in the ende of the Assumtion used by the Repl. seemlinesse of order (which yet is immediatly there differēc•d frō other decencie, as well commanded as this) and that he maketh the maine matter of the proposition: whereas the meaning is, that nothing is left unto libertie in Gods worship, above decencie and order, for which these testimonies are brought, and not for the other.

8. For more full support of the foresaid Proposition, a reason is added, from the fullness of a perfect law, which leaveth no more unto Ministerial judges, then needs must.

8. For more full support of the foresaid Proposition, a reason is added, from the fullnesse of a perfect law, which leaveth no more unto Ministeriall judges, then needs must.

For answer, the Rejoinder 1. observeth, that some cases are •f necessity variable, and so left. So the occasions of different Rites and Ceremonies a•e so various, that if our Lord had fixed any one certain fashion, he should have made rather snares then l•ws for his Church. As, if he had appointed sitting at a table in t•e Communion: or kneeling in prayer. This is strange stuff. 1. So much is granted, as is desired, viz. that God hath left nothing (about his worship) undetermined in his word. 1. e. uncommanded, and unforbidden particularly, save only that which he could not command or forbid. Now let any man think▪ and judge, whether it had not been possible for God in his word, either to have commanded, or forbidden the signing of those that are Baptised with the sign of the cross all so well, as Baptizing of them with water? 2, How can that too too bold and inconsiderate assertion be excused: if our Lord had fixed (or commanded) any one certain fashion of Ceremonies, he had made rather snares, then laws for his Church. If it had pleased God to command or forbid the sign of the Cross in particular, what snare had it been? When God appointed all the Ceremonies of the old Testament, he did not (I hope) make snares for his Church, though he did lay a burden upon it. 3. Whereas the Rejoinder maketh sitting at a table, in the Lords Supper, and kneeling at prayer, to be such things as the Lord could not ⟨p. 69⟩command, but as snares, because sometime a table may be wanting, or something to sit on, or ability to sit, and so of kneeling, this is as poor a snare to cache any man of understanding in, as one sh•l lightly see made. For 1. Many affirmative commandments of God there are, which in extraordinary cases cannot be fulfilled, and cease to bind: as praying unto and praising of God, with our voice: which is no snare, to him that cannot speak.

For answer, the Rejoynder 1. observeth, that some cases are •f necessitie variable, and so left. So the occasions of different Rites and Cerem•nies a•e so various, that if our Lord had fixed any one certayn fashon, he should have made rather snares then lws for his Churche. As, if he had appointed sitting at a table in te Communion: or kneeling in prayer. This is strange stuffe. 1. So much is granted, as is desired, viz. that God hath left nothing (about his worship) undertermined in his word. 1. e. uncommanded, and unforbidden particulaly, save onely that which he could not commande or forbid. Now let any man think and judge, whether it had not been possible for God in his word, eyther to have commanded, or forbidden the signing of those that are Baptised with the signe of the crosse all so well, as Baptizing of them with water? 2, How can that too too bolde and inconsiderate assertion be excused: if our Lord had fixed (or commanded) any one certain fashion of Ceremonies, he had made rather snares, then laws for his Churche. If it had pleased God to commande or forbid the signe of the Crosse in particular, what snare had it been? When God appointed all the Ceremonies of the olde Testament, he did not (I hope) make snares for his Churche, though he did lay a burthen upon it. 3. Wheras the Rejoynder maketh sitting at a table, in the Lords Supper, and kneeling at prayer, to be suche thinges as the Lord could not

The appointing of wine for the Supper, is no snare, though some Countries have it not, and some men cannot well drink it. See Beza ep. 2. Pareus and Symb. Sacram. l. 1. cap. 9.2. I would know, whether it had been a snare, if God had appointed sitting at the Table, with exception of such extra ordinary cases? if yea, then m•che more when men appoint kneeling, sirplicing, and crossing, if no, then our Argument may proceed.

The appointing of wine for the Supper, is no snare, though some Countries have it not, and some mē cannot wel drinke it. See Beza ep. 2. Pareus and Symb. Sacram. l. 1. cap. 9.2. I would know, whether it had beē a snare, if God had appointed sitting at the Table, with exception of suche extra ordinarie cases? if yea, then m•che more when men appoint kneeling, sirplicing, and crossing, if no, then our Argument may proceed.

Kneeling in public prayer, might have been appointed without snaring, as appearing before the Lord thrice in the year, was appointed to every Male in Israel. Deut: 16.16. For (without doubt) many men in Israel, were, by accident, more unable to travel up to Jerusalem, then any Christian that hath knees, is to kneel.

Kneeling in publicke prayer, might have been appointed without snaring, as appearing before the Lord thrise in the yeer, was appointed to every Male in Israel. Deut: 16.16. For (without doubt) many men in Israel, were, by accident, more unable to travel up to Ierusalem, then any Christian that hath knees, is to kneel.

After this observation, of which the Rejoinder saith it may be as we will, he answereth, that our Lord hath left nothing absolute to the will of his Officers: but hath left even ambulatory Rites, under general rules, which will try them as perfectly, as if every one had been named, and with less cumber. But 1. this is nothing to the purpose: because so the imperfectest law that is in any nation upon the earth, if it be worthy the name of Law, leaveth nothing ⟨p. 70⟩so absolute to the will of inferior Officers, as that it should be without the general rules of justice, common good, etc. Nay not without the rules of order & decency. 2. Concerning the comparison of perfection, betwixt general and particular rules, though enough hath been said before, upon like occasion, yet this I will add.

After this observation, of which the Rejoynder sayth it may be as we will, he answereth, that our Lord hath left nothing absolute to the will of his Officers: but hath left even ambulatorie Rites, under generall rules, which will trie them as perfectly, as if every one had been named, and with lesse cumber. But 1. this is nothing to the purpose: because so the imperfectest law that is in any nation upon the earth, if it be worthy the name of Law, leaveth nothing ⟨p. 70⟩so absolute to the will of inferior Officers, as that it should be without the generall rules of justice, common good, etc. Nay not without the rules of order & decencie. 2. Concerning the comparison of perfection, betwixt generall and particular rules, though enough hath been sayd before, upon like occasion, yet this I will adde.

If he meaneth, that a general rule if it be perfectly understood and applied, doeth as perfectly try as particulars. I grant it to be a trueth. And so was the old Testament as perfect a rule of Christian faith as the New, thou shalt love thy neighbour, as perfect as the six Commandments of the second Table. But if he mean that a general rule is as fit and full for our direction of us imperfect men, as particulars are, then I think no man conscious of humane frailty, will believe him.

If he meaneth, that a generall rule if it be perfectly understood and applied, doeth as perfectly trie as particulars. I grant it to be a trueth. And so was the olde Testament as perfect a rule of Christian faith as the New, thou shalt love thy neighbour, as perfect as the six Commandements of the second Table. But if he mean that a generall rule is as fit and full for our direction of us imperfect men, as particulars are, then I think no man conscious of humane frailtie, will beleiv him.

Neither do I believe, that he himself is so fully persuaded in Crossing the Baptized, by any rule which he hath out of Gods word, for that, as he is for Baptizing, by the rule of that.

Neyther doe I beleiv, that he himself is so fully perswaded in Crossing the Baptized, by any rule which he hath out of Gods word, for that, as he is for Baptizing, by the rule of that.