A19142:943
A fresh suit against human ceremonies in God's worship. Or a triplication unto. D. Burgess his rejoinder for D. Morton The first partA fresh suit against human ceremonies in God's vvorship. Or a triplication unto. D. Burgesse his rejoinder for D. Morton The first part
Amsterdam: printed by the successors of Giles Thorp, 1633
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
The Rejoinder here first, observeth a contradiction to that which was formerly said sect. 6. worship doeth not vary, according to mens opinion. But if he understand the matter well, he shall find both sayings well to agree. For though the want of some opinion doeth not vary the nature of worship, so as that the absence of this or that opinion, doeth make any external worship, not essential: and yet it doeth so vary the nature of worship, as that the presence of some opinion, doeth (as an efficient, not as a formal cause) make some external ⟨p. 175⟩act essential worship. The Rejoinder his second observation is, that our Ceremonies are hereby discharged from will worship, and superstition, except it can be proved, the imposers, or users of them, do hold, that God is better pleased with them, then without them, in themselves, or that they are as pleasing to him, as if he had commanded them.
The Rejoynder here first, observeth a contradiction to that which was formerly sayd sect. 6. worship doeth not varie, according to mens opinion. But if he understand the matter well, he shall finde both sayings well to agree. For though the want of some opinion doeth not varie the nature of worship, so as that the absence of this or that opinion, doeth make any externall worship, not essentiall: and yet it doeth so varie the nature of worship, as that the presence of some opinion, doeth (as an efficient, not as a formall cause) make some externall ⟨p. 175⟩act essentiall worship. The Rejoynder his second observation is, that our Ceremonies are hereby discharged from will worship, and superstition, except it can be proved, the imposers, or users of them, doe holde, that God is better pleased with them, then without them, in themselves, or that they are as pleasing to him, as if he had commanded them.
The consequence of which hereby conclusion, no logician in the world can make good. Yet (taking out in themselves, as an intrusion) all the consequent part may be maintained. For if there be any more good h•lde in the imposing and observing of them, then in the omitting of them, then God is better pleased with them, then without them. And that which is lawfully and justly commanded by men authorized thereto, is as pleasing to God as if he had commanded it. Nay •t must be received, as commanded of God himself.
The consequence of which heerby conclusion, no logician in the world can make good. Yet (taking out in themselves, as an intrusion) all the consequent part may be mainteyned. For if ther be any more good h•lde in the imposing and observing of them, then in the omitting of them, then God is better pleased with them, then without them. And that which is lawfully and justly commanded by men authorized therto, is as pleasing to God as if he had commanded it. Nay •t must be receyved, as commanded of God himself.
7. It was also by the Repl. brought into the Def. his remembrance, that matter, and form do usually make up the essence of things, and that to instituted means, a proper end is also required, but a right efficient cause not so. About this, the Rejoinder showeth himself perplexed. For 1. he answereth, that this notwithstanding, actions have as it were matter, form and essence of accidental, though not of essential worship.
7. It was also by the Repl. brought into the Def. his remembrance, that matter, and forme doe usually make up the essence of thinges, and that to instituted meanes, a proper ende is also required, but a right efficient cause not so. About this, the Rejoynder sheweth himself perplexed. For 1. he answereth, that this notwithstanding, actions have as it were matter, forme and essence of accidentall, though not of essentiall worship.
Where he manifestly separateth the essence of worship, from essential worship, as if the essence of a man could exist without an essential man, 2. He gathereth ⟨p. 176⟩from that which was said of respect to the end, in institutions, that thereby their assertion, is cleared: viz. that Cer. respecting the honour of God mediately, are not properly parts of Divine worship. As if here had been any mention or question, of mediately, or immediately, proper, or improper, and not only of essential. But for so much as the Rejoinder would needs here cite D. Abbot, for his term immediately, I would desire him to consider of the whole sentence in that place pronounced by him, viz. Def. of Mr. Perk. pag. 844. Order and comeliness (saith the popish Bishop) is some part of Gods worship. But (saith D. Abbot.) Who taught him this deep point of Philosophy, that an accident is a part of the subject, that the beauty, or comeliness of the body is a part of the body? Order and comeliness properly and immediately respect men, and therefore can be no parts of the worship of God. If this be not a plain refuting of the Def. and the Rejoinder their assertion, then none is attempted in all the Reply.
Where he manifestly separateth the essence of worship, from essentiall worship, as if the essence of a man could exist without an essentiall man, 2. He gathereth ⟨p. 176⟩from that which was sayd of respect to the ende, in institutiōs, that therby their assertiō, is cleared: viz. that Cer. respecting the honour of God mediatly, are not properly parts of Divine worship. As if here had been any mention or questiō, of mediatly, or immediatly, proper, or improper, and not onely of essentiall. But for so muche as the Rejoynder would needs heer cite D. Abbot, for his terme immediatly, I would desire him to cōsider of the wholle sentence in that place pronounced by him, viz. Def. of Mr. Perk. pag. 844. Order and comlinesse (sayth the popish Bishop) is some part of Gods worship. But (sayth D. Abbot.) Who taught him this deep point of Philosophie, that an accident is a part of the subject, that the beautie, or comelinesse of the body is a part of the body? Order and comelinesse properly and immediatly respect men, and therfore can be no parts of the woship of God. If this be not a plaine refuting of the Def. and the Rejoynder their assertion, then none is attempted in all the Replie.
3. He in like manner concludeth, that every respect of the honour of God, doeth not make a thing to be properly religious worship. As if the Repl. had ever spoken, or dreamt of such a fantasy, except it were in the Rejoinder his name! His words are: beside the respect of the end, is also required institution of means to an end. What Paracelsian can draw so wild an assertion, from such a ground as this?
3. He in like manner concludeth, that every respect of the honor of God, doeth not make a thinge to be properly religious worship. As if the Repl. had ever spoken, or dreamt of suche a phantasie, except it were in the Rejoynder his name! His wordes are: beside the respect of the ende, is also required institution of means to an ende. What Paracelsian can draw so wilde an assertion, from suche a grounde as this?
8. It was (in the last place) demanded, whether, if the Temple of Jerusalem had been built, with institution of all the appurtenances, sacrifices, and observances, there used, without any Commandment of ⟨p. 177⟩God, according as they were by his appointment, whether (saith the Repl.) they had not been essential false worship, erected to God? The Rejoinder answereth: Yes no doubt, if we may call (as the manner is) essential disworship, essential false worship: either in respect of the things themselves, or in the opinion conceived in their use. Now mark (all readers that have sense) how this Rejoinder (here in the conclusion of all) is constrained to confess, that to be true, which he hath hitherto striven against as false. 1. The Repl. his assertion was, that Gods institution doeth make that worship, which being used in the same manner and to the same end, were otherwise no worship, or (as it pleaseth the Def. and Rejoinder to speak) no essential worship? The Rejoin-hitherto hath contended against this, as against a great error.
8. It was (in the last place) demanded, whether, if the Temple of Ierusalem had been built, with institution of all the appurtenances, sacrifices, and observances, there used, without any Commandement of ⟨p. 177⟩God, according as they were by his appointment, whether (sayth the Repl.) they had not been essentiall false worship, erected to God? The Rejoynder answereth: Yes no doubt, if we may call (as the manner is) essentiall disworship, essentiall false worship: eyther in respect of the thinges themselves, or in the opinion conceyved in their use. Now marke (all readers that have sense) how this Rejoynder (here in the conclusion of all) is constreyned to confesse, that to be true, which he hath hitherto striven against as false. 1. The Repl. his assertion was, that Gods institution doeth make that worship, which being used in the same manner and to the same ende, were otherwise no worship, or (as it pleaseth the Def. and Rejoynder to speake) no essentiall worship? The Rejoyn-hitherto hath contended against this, as against a great errour.
Now in the winding up of the whole Argument, he confesseth, that some essential worship may be, without any institution of God. Certainly, if this be so, then the institution of God, is not required to essential worship, neither is it of the essence of essential worship, that it be instituted of God. 2. He affirmed before, pag, 125. that proper immediate, (or essential) worship are only such things as God hath to that end ordained Yet here he confesseth, that essential worship may be without any command of God. 3. The Rejoinder before, made essential and accidental worship to be a subdivision of true worship. Now he confesseth, that there is an essential worship under the head of false worship. 4. He acknowledgeth, that in all the former senseless ⟨p. 178⟩assertions, he did not speak, as the manner of speech is.
Now in the winding up of the wholle Argument, he confesseth, that some essentiall worship may be, without any institution of God. Certaynly, if this be so, then the institution of God, is not required to essentiall worship, neyther is it of the essence of essentiall worship, that it be instituted of God. 2. He affirmed before, pag, 125. that proper immediat, (or essentiall) worship are onely suche thinges as God hath to that ende ordeyned Yet here he confesseth, that essentiall worship may be without any commande of God. 3. The Rejoynder before, made essentiall and accidentall worship to be a subdivision of true worship. Now he confesseth, that ther is an essentiall worship under the head of false worship. 4. He acknowlegeth, that in all the former senselesse ⟨p. 178⟩assertions, he did not speake, as the manner of speache is.
That was therefore against the manner of speech, which the Def. & he used before. 5. He granteth some worship to be essential, in respect of the things themselves, separated from mens opinion. Yet hitherto, he would have made us believe, that opinion did vary the nature of worship, as sect. 6. If this be not a plain yielding, and granting of the whole Argument, there can be none, save only in plain terms, to say, I yield.
That was therfore against the manner of speache, which the Def. & he used before. 5. He graunteth some worship to be essentiall, in respect of the thinges themselves, separated from mens opinion. Yet hitherto, he would have made us beleive, that opinion did varie the nature of worship, as sect. 6. If this be not a plaine yeilding, and granting of the wholle Argument, ther can be none, save onely in plaine termes, to say, I yeeld.
The former argument being (though demonstrative) yet to the Def. his apprehension new, was derided as new learning: these following are excused from that censure, as being more popular, and seeming more fathomable. Of which it is to be observed, that most of them are fetched out of incertain papers, under the name of Mr. Hy. and others, upon the Def. his credit: wherein, what equal dealing hath been used, it is very suspicious to any judicious reader, and some of those others, (for Mr. Hy. is past writing to) being asked, have testified, that in diverse passages they are much abused. Yet even these relics of Arguments are defensible.
THe former argument being (though demonstrative) yet to the Def. his apprehension new, was derided as new learning: these following are excused from that censure, as being more popular, and seeming more fadomable. Of which it is to be observed, that moste of them are fetched out of incertaine papiers, under the name of Mr. Hy. and others, upon the Def. his credit: wherin, what aequall dealing hath been used, it is very suspicious to any judicious reader, and some of those others, (for Mr. Hy. is past writing to) being asked, have testified, that in diverse passages they are muche abused. Yet even these reliques of Arguments are defensible.
1. The first is: because they are imposed to breed an opinion of holiness, by Mr. Hookers doctrine and therefore, as ⟨p. 179⟩parts of Gods worship. To which the Def. answereth, that it is no meant of operative holiness, either by infusion, or inhesion, but only significative. Whence he concludeth, a perverse purpose of calumniation: and the Rejoinder (adding another distinction, betwixt holiness in them, and in the users of them) maketh mention also of dotage. But 1. the Def. his distinction is vain: because even significative holiness is also a part of Gods worship. Otherwise some holiness must be feigned, which having no other immediate end but that which directly and immediately tend to the honouring of God, is no part of his honour. The Rejoinder also is vain in limiting the matter to holiness in them.
1. The first is: because they are imposed to breed an opinion of holinesse, by Mr. Hookers doctrine and therfore, as ⟨p. 179⟩parts of Gods worship. To which the Def. answereth, that it is no meant of operative holinesse, eyther by infusion, or inhaesion, but onely significative. Whence he concludeth, a perverse purpose of calumniation: and the Rejoynder (adding another distinction, betwixt holinesse in them, and in the users of them) maketh mention also of dotage. But 1. the Def. his distinction is vaine: because even significative holinesse is also a part of Gods worship. Otherwise some holinesse must be fained, which having no other immediat ende but that which directly and immediatly tende to the honoring of God, is no part of his honor. The Rejoynder also is vaine in limiting the matter to holinesse in them.
For those things which are instituted to that immediate end only, that they may breed an opinion of holiness, and so holiness, in others, do (in all reason) deserve the opinion of holiness some way causal, or operative in themselves: because all breeding is causing, or working, 1. e. operative.
For those thinges which are instituted to that immediat ende onely, that they may breed an opinion of holinesse, and so holinesse, in others, doe (in all reason) deserve the opinion of holinesse some way causall, or operative in themselves: because all breeding is causing, or working, 1. e. operative.
It was also observed by the Repl. (only in a parenthesis, by the way) that holiness either by infusion or inhesion, were unreasonably by the Defend. disjoined.
It was also observed by the Repl. (onely in a parenthesis, by the way) that holinesse eyther by infusion or inhaesion, were unreasonablie by the Defend. disjoyned.
This the Rejoinder excepteth against, and saith, in those terms there is no more disjunction, then in these love or charity, Magistrates, or Governors.
This the Rejoynder excepteth against, and sayth, in those termes ther is no more disjunction, then in these love or charitie, Magistrates, or Governours.
But he forgot the proper English note of disjunction, either, or.
But he forgotte the proper English note of disjunction, eyther, or.
Where did he ever read such a phrase: either love, or charity, either Magistrates, or Governors?
Where did he ever read suche a phraze: eyther love, or charitie, eyther Magistrates, or Governours?