A platform, made for the proof of Gods providence that is, for examining of…A platforme, made for the proofe of Gods prouidence that is, for examining of…

Now come I to that I promised to ⟨p. 24⟩handle in the second place, namely to the unfolding and answering of those arguments which are made against this doctrine. The first argument they make is this: God cannot govern all things generally, and every creature and action without exceeding toil and grief of mind: But if agreeth with the nature of God, that he rest in quiet and be free from all labours: Therefore God doth not govern all and every particular thing.

Now come I to that I promised to ⟨p. 24⟩handle in the second place, namely to the vnfolding and answering of those arguments which are made against this doctrine. The first argument they make is this: God cannot gouerne all things generally, and euery creature and action without exeeding toile and griefe of minde: But if agreeth with the nature of God, that he rest in quiet and be free from all labours: Therefore God doth not gouerne all and euery particular thing.

To this argument drawn thus from the nature of God, I answer, that their first proposition is false, which is that God cannot govern all things generally and particularly without exceeding foil, and grief of mind: but for that I will not only deny it as false, but show the reasons that move me so to do, you must know that there are divers kinds of actions, some are natural, some are violent other some mean: that is neither altogether natural, nor altogether violent: natural actions are they that do flow from the principles of nature it self, without any help elsewhere: such are ⟨p. 25⟩the round motions of the heavens, the flowing and ebbing of the sea, that light things do of their natural lightness mount upward, heavy things fall downward, that we breath and such like: these actions are done without any labour, because they move of themselves without any other help: Other actions there are, which are done by force, and therefore are called violent, as by force to make a stone mount upward, whose nature is to fall downward. And such like violent actions, which cannot long last as Aristotle teacheth, because they are done with orce. There is another sort of actions which I called mean, whose beginnings are of nature, but yet they cannot be done unless they be helped by some other means, as to eat, to drink, to walk, and such like. But now that, that God doth, he doth without labour, because he doth it naturally, and therefore most freely: again, there is no force that can compel God, and therefore he worketh of himself freely without any compulsion: