A20225:55
A platform, made for the proof of Gods providence that is, for examining of…A platforme, made for the proofe of Gods prouidence that is, for examining of…
A platform, made for the proof of Gods providence that is, for examining of the truth of this doctrine, whether God by his providence rule all things generally, and every creature and action particularly / by Arthur Dent.A platforme, made for the proofe of Gods prouidence that is, for examining of the truth of this doctrine, whether God by his prouidence rule all things generally, and euery creature and action particularly / by Arthur Dent.
London: printed by Ed. Allde for Henry Gosson, 1608
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
To this argument drawn thus from the nature of God, I answer, that their first proposition is false, which is that God cannot govern all things generally and particularly without exceeding foil, and grief of mind: but for that I will not only deny it as false, but show the reasons that move me so to do, you must know that there are divers kinds of actions, some are natural, some are violent other some mean: that is neither altogether natural, nor altogether violent: natural actions are they that do flow from the principles of nature it self, without any help elsewhere: such are ⟨p. 25⟩the round motions of the heavens, the flowing and ebbing of the sea, that light things do of their natural lightness mount upward, heavy things fall downward, that we breath and such like: these actions are done without any labour, because they move of themselves without any other help: Other actions there are, which are done by force, and therefore are called violent, as by force to make a stone mount upward, whose nature is to fall downward. And such like violent actions, which cannot long last as Aristotle teacheth, because they are done with •orce. There is another sort of actions which I called mean, whose beginnings are of nature, but yet they cannot be done unless they be helped by some other means, as to eat, to drink, to walk, and such like. But now that, that God doth, he doth without labour, because he doth it naturally, and therefore most freely: again, there is no force that can compel God, and therefore he worketh of himself freely without any compulsion: ⟨p. 26⟩neither is he troubled with griefs, but governeth all things according to the rule of his will: neither is there any thing more agreeable to the nature of God, then to govern, and preserve the whole world, even with the word of his power.
To this argument drawne thus from the nature of God, I answere, that their first proposition is false, which is that God cannot gouerne all things generally and particularly without exceeding foile, and greife of minde: but for that I will not onely denie it as false, but shew the reasons that mooue me so to doe, you must know that there are diuers kindes of actions, some are naturall, some are violent other some meane: that is neither altogether naturall, nor altogether violent: naturall actions are they that doe flowe from the principles of nature it selfe, without any helpe elsewhere: such are