A25250:161
Ultima, = the last things in reference to the first and middle things
Ultima, = the last things in reference to the first and middle things: or certain meditations on life, death, judgement, hell, right purgatory, and heaven: delivered by Isaac Ambrose, minister of the Gospel at Preston in Amoundernes in Lancashire.
London: printed for J.A., 1650
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Others again have passed this opinion, and they call it a form: but what? only material, not substantial, and such as are the souls of beasts that dye with their bodies, as being deduced from the matter of some bodies pre-existent. It is not so with the souls of men, which though for a while they are knit and united to this house of clay, yet may they be separated from it, and subsist without it: this is that goodness of God, that as ⟨p. 63⟩our souls are intellectual, so their being is perpetual,1 not but that our souls might dye (seeing every thing that is of nothing may return into the same nothing whence it sprung) but that God so sustains them by his glorious goodness, that as he gave the first being, so he would continue that he gave. What have we, that we have not received? Or to speak of the soul, what are we that God, and God only hath not bestowed upon us? our parents begot our bodies, God only gave our souls: our bodies are buried again in the womb of our common mother, but our souls return to God, as to their chiefest good. So immaterial is the soul, that neither will nor understanding depends on the dying organ. What then is the soul? a nothing, an accident, a body, a form only material: no, but on the contrary, an ens, a substance, a spirit, a form, a substantial being of it self subsisting.
Others again have passed this opinion, and they call it a form: but what? onely materiall, not substantiall, and such as are the souls of beasts that dye with their bodies, as being deduced from the matter of some bodies pre-existent. It is not so with the souls of men, which though for a while they are knit and united to this house of clay, yet may they be separated from it, and subsist without it: this is that goodness of God, that as ⟨p. 63⟩our souls are intellectuall, so their being is perpetuall,1 not but that our souls might dye (seeing every thing that is of nothing may return into the same nothing whence it sprung) but that God so sustains them by his glorious goodness, that as he gave the first being, so he would continue that he gave. What have we, that we have not received? Or to speake of the soul, what are we that God, and God onely hath not bestowed upon us? our parents begot our bodies, God onely gave our souls: our bodies are buried again in the wombe of our common mother, but our souls return to God, as to their chiefest good. So immateriall is the soul, that neither will nor understanding depends on the dying organ. What then is the soul? a nothing, an accident, a body, a form onely materiall: no, but on the contrary, an ens, a substance, a spirit, a form, a substantiall being of it self subsisting.