The Marrow of Sacred Divinity

34. Yet because every of those affections do more ⟨p. 233⟩appear in some virtues then in other, therefore some special virtues do take both their name and definition from them: for because an accurate rectitude doth most appear in the number, measure, weight, and value of those things which are mutually received and given by man, therefore Justice, in a certain special manner is wont to be placed in things of such sort. And because those inconveniences are held most terrible, which are wont to happen in war and such like dangers, therefore the name of fortitude is wont to be restrained to such things. Because the pleasures of the senses are wont most to tickle, therefore temperance is for the most part placed in them only; although those three together with Prudence taken in a general sense, are tied and folded together among themselves, as that Philosopher did observe, who did first almost propound those four heads of virtues.

34. Yet because every of those affections doe more ⟨p. 233⟩appeare in some vertues then in other, therefore some speciall vertues doe take both their name and definition from them: for because an accurate rectitude doth most appeare in the number, measure, weight, and valew of those things which are mutually received and given by man, therefore Iustice, in a certaine speciall manner is wont to be placed in things of such sort. And because those inconveniences are held most terrible, which are wont to happen in warre and such like dangers, therefore the name of fortitude is wont to be restrained to such things. Because the pleasures of the sences are wont most to tickle, therefore temperance is for the most part placed in them only; although those three together with Prudence taken in a generall sence, are tied and folded together among themselves, as that Philosopher did observe, who did first almost propound those foure heads of vertues.

35. Whereas the form of virtue is placed by many in a certain mediocrity between two vices in the extreme, that can be defended by reason. 1. Because privation is not the form of an habit; but mediocrity, is nothing else then a privation of a defect and an excess. 2. Because the form of virtue is to be sought in that conformity which it hath to his rule: But this conformity doth neither only, nor chiefly, nor sometime at all consist in mediocrity. 3. Because virtue in its formal respect cannot be too much intended, & so doth not admit excess, but either in that material thing which it hath common with vices, or in the circumstances of operations, as when some of them are exercised when they ought not, or are not exercised when they ought.