A25467:2124
A Continuation of morning-exercise questions and cases of conscience practically resolvedA Continuation of morning-exercise questions and cases of conscience practicaly resolved
A Continuation of morning-exercise questions and cases of conscience practically resolved by sundry ministers in October, 1682.A Continuation of morning-exercise questions and cases of conscience practicaly resolved by sundry ministers in October, 1682.
London: printed by J.A. for John Dunton, 1683
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Sermon 18 › Improvement 1 › Consideration 1: CONSIDERATION I.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
We may know that this or the other thing is, and what it is, but how 'tis so, or so, we know not. This is true of things In the Natural World, we know that this is, and what it is, but cannot distinctly show how it is what it is, or how it possibly should be what it is. We know we see, and what we mean when we say we see; but yet if we will not believe that we do see until an Hypothesis be laid down, on which, without any scruple all the many Phenomena, or difficult Appearances that arise from the consideration how we see, be solved, we shall never believe we do see. 'Tis true, we know that we see by the Eye, but how by the Eye, is the difficulty. The Eye and the Object are at a distance, they must be so, if we will see by the Eye; but how, by what Medium are they brought together? Is there an emission of somewhat from the Eye, or an interception of any thing that may be supposed to pass from the Object to the Organ? Whether the one or the other, is it Corporeal, or Incorporeal, Material, or Immaterial? Not the latter, for what is Incorporeal, Immaterial, cannot convey the Species to the Eye; nor what is Corporeal for many other Reasons. Whoever will consult the Old, and (especially) the New Philosophers, may see how much is discoursed on this Subject, and how little to satisfaction. The like of Hearing, of Motion, &c.
We may know that this or the other thing is, and what it is, but how 'tis so, or so, we know not. This is true of things In the Natural World, we know that this is, and what it is, but cannot distinctly shew how it is what it is, or how it possibly should be what it is. We know we see, and what we mean when we say we see; but yet if we will not believe that we do see until an Hypothesis be laid down, on which, without any scruple all the many Phaenomena, or difficult Appearances that arise from the consideration how we see, be solv'd, we shall never believe we do see. 'Tis true, we know that we see by the Eye, but how by the Eye, is the difficulty. The Eye and the Object are at a distance, they must be so, if we will see by the Eye; but how, by what Medium are they brought together? Is there an emission of somewhat from the Eye, or an interception of any thing that may be supposed to pass from the Object to the Organ? Whether the one or the other, is it Corporeal, or Incorporeal, Material, or Immaterial? Not the latter, for what is Incorporeal, Immaterial, cannot convey the Species to the Eye; nor what is Corporeal for many other Reasons. Whoever will consult the Old, and (especially) the New Philophers, may see how much is discoursed on this Subject, and how little to satisfaction. The like of Hearing, ef Motion, &c.