A25467:2494
A Continuation of morning-exercise questions and cases of conscience practically resolvedA Continuation of morning-exercise questions and cases of conscience practicaly resolved
A Continuation of morning-exercise questions and cases of conscience practically resolved by sundry ministers in October, 1682.A Continuation of morning-exercise questions and cases of conscience practicaly resolved by sundry ministers in October, 1682.
London: printed by J.A. for John Dunton, 1683
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Proposition 2. An evil that is the effect of its proper cause, is imputed to him that gave, or laid the cause, tho he designed not actually the effect. We are responsible to God for all the evil that naturally and necessarily flows from our actions, whatever our designs are, or may be. And the Reason is, because it is supposed that we do know, in as much as we ought to know, all the natural and necessary Moral ⟨p. 618⟩Products of our own actions. And this will condemn some of our filthy Fashions, which of themselves produce these accursed effects. And tho God can bring good out of evil, or restrain the evil, that it follow not from that which otherwise would produce it; yet because we cannot, it is evil in us not to prevent it.
Proposition 3. An evil which we ordinarily know hath followed, and probably will follow any action of ours, will be charged on us, if we yet shall adventure upon it. For what if there be no natural and necessary connection between that evil, and that action? yet if we see the event to be evil, we are bound to prevent it, if it be in our power. He that knows the damning nature of sin, and what it cost to atone and expiate it; the worth and price of souls, and what it cost to redeem them, would not be an accidental instrument of the Devil, to lead into the one, or destroy the other by any action of his which he may well and conveniently refrain.
Proposition 3. An evil which we ordinarily know hath follow'd, and probably will follow any action of ours, will be charged on us, if we yet shall adventure upon it. For what if there be no natural and necessary connexion between that evil, and that action? yet if we see the event to be evil, we are bound to prevent it, if it be in our power. He that knows the damning nature of sin, and what it cost to atone and expiate it; the worth and price of souls, and what it cost to redeem them, would not be an accidental instrument of the Devil, to lead into the one, or destroy the other by any action of his which he may well and conveniently refrain.