1And is accordingly rendered by former Interpreters modestia; not as opposed to pride or haughtiness, in it's strict Philosophic acception, (which some not attending to, have therefore quarrelled with) but that which doth moderate our actions, in which sense the Masters of that Language frequently use it; and by later, for avoiding that ambiguity, Moderatio, from whence is formed our English word Moderation. Which (in it's latitude) is not any particular Grace or Virtue, but that fit and proper temper we ought to observe in the governing of our hearts and lives: that equal Judgment which should command our wills and affections, and all our humane actions, which are capable of excess or defect, by proportioning them according to the quality of the object, and the end for which, and whom they are employed, for the preserving of peace within our selves and with others; that there may be no contumacy or rebellion in our affections to disquiet our selves, or in our actions to disquiet others. So that moderation according to it's Subject, is either that of the mind, which is as the cause, or of the will and affections in their actings, which is as the effect, from all which the whole man is denominated Moderate. The former, or that of the mind, is that part of Christian prudence, which proportions our actions to the Object which the will chooseth, and it's end, according to the variety of circumstances the agent is in, by applying the general rules of Scripture for our walking, to our particular actions, and is accordingly well rendered here, by one of the Ancients rationabilis conversatio, 2your reasonable or equitable conversation. The latter, of the will, pertains to the several and particular virtues therein, especially those that serve for the restraining our most strong and impetuous passions, which offer the greatest violence to the equality of our minds. And therefore although it most properly be of the judgement, yet being most conspicuous and discernible in the exercise of such Virtues, it doth according to the quality of the Object about which they are conversant, assume their several notions and names.
1And is accordingly rendred by former Interpreters modestia; not as opposed to pride or haughtinesse, in it's strict Philosophick acception, (which some not attending to, have therefore quarrelled with) but that which doth moderate our actions, in which sense the Masters of that Language frequen•ly use it; and by later, for avoiding that ambiguity, Moderatio, from whence is formed our English word Moderation. Which (in it's latitude) is not any particular Grace or Virtue, but that fit and proper temper we ought to observe in the governing of our hearts and lives: that equal Judgment which should command our wills and affections, and all our humane actions, which are capable of excesse or defect, by proportioning them according to the quality of the object, and the end for which, and whom they are imployed, for the preserving of peace within our selves and with others; that there may be no contumacy or rebellion in our affections to disquiet our selves, or in our actions to disquiet others. So that moderation according to it's Subject, is either that of the mind, which is as the cause, or of the will and affections in their actings, which is as the effect, from all which the whole man is denomin•ted Modorate. The former, or that of the mind, is that part of Christian prudence, which proportions our actions to the Object which the will chooseth, and it's end, according to the variety of circumstances the agent is in, by applying the general rules of Scripture for our walking, to our particular actions, and is accordingly well rendred here, by one of the Antients rationabilis conversatio, 2your reasonable or equitable conversation. The latter, of the will, pertains to the several and particular vertues therein, especially those that serve for the restraining our most strong and impetuous passions, which offer the greatest violence to the equality of our minds. And therefore although it most properly be of the judgement, yet being most conspicuous and discernable in the exercise of such Vertues, it doth according to the quality of the Object about which they are conversant, assume their several notions and names.
- 1[Greek or Hebrew]. Hesych. [Greek or Hebrew]. Etymol. Modestia dicta est a modo, ubi autem modus nec plus est quicquam nee minus Cicer; est autem modestia in animo continens moderationem cupiditatum. Idem 3. Rhet.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Hesych. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Etymol. Modestia dicta est a modo, ubi autem modus nec plus est quicquam nee minus Cicer; est autem modestia in animo continens moderationem cupiditatum. Idem 3. Rhet.
- 2Ambros, in loc.