A25470:1670
The Morning exercise [at] Cri[ppleg]ate, or, Several cases of conscience practically resolved
The Morning exercise [at] Cri[ppleg]ate, or, Several cases of conscience practically resolved by sundry ministers, September 1661.
London: printed for Joshua Kirton and Nathaniel Webb, 1661
Sermon 16: In what things must we use Moderation, and in what not?
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
I am not ignorant all this while, that this word [Greek or Hebrew] is most frequently used in a forinsecal or Law sense, more strictly; the Moralists, Schoolmen, and Civilians borrowing it from Aristotle, and restraining it to that particular Moderation of mitigating strict Justice in the execution of humane Laws, and so is rendered equitas equity. Which is either that of the Magistrate in his public capacity, and is so clementia clemency, and is opposed to cruelty; the Magistrate being obliged as not to write his Laws in blood, like Draco's; so also not to execute them with cruelty, (though where requisite with severity;) but to moderate them by the Law of Nature, other Laws, former precedents, constant customs, which hath the nature of Laws, or the reason and end of the Law, which is more equitable (and more Law say some) than the letter, and amongst Christians by the written Laws of God, that there may be convenientia poenae ad delictum, or a proportioning punishment to the quality of the offence, all circumstances (which the Law cannot possibly foresee or provide for) being duly considered. This includes all Superiors, Political, Ecclesiastical, Domestical, &c. and is frequently joined with Justice and Judgement in Scripture, as executed both by God and man, Psal. 98.9.99.4. Is. 11.4. Prov. 1.3.2.19.17.26. Micah 3.9, &c. Or secondly that of private persons (or public in their private capacity) which is between party and party, when ⟨p. 387⟩according to the rules of equity, we omit what the rigour of the letter of the Law would adjudge us, thereby neither injuring our selves or others, which is usually called probitas or honestas; by us, common honesty that should be 'twixt man and man. And hence some borrow it and restrain it to that carriage the Law takes not cognisance of, in our meekness and gentleness, making it that single Virtue the Moralists call mansuetudo, we meekness. But though it be all these, yet 'tis also more, these not reaching the latitude of the word [Greek or Hebrew] nor the extent of the duty here in joined; the word being not used here in that strict sense the Philosophers use it, (as the learned Grotius well observes upon the place:1