The Morning exercise [at] Cri[ppleg]ate, or, Several cases of conscience practically resolved

8. In matters of freedom and liberty; Which are not determined by any natural or positive Law, we must permit as much to others, as we assume to our selves; and this is a sign of an equal, and temperate person and one that justly values his own understanding and power. But there is nothing wherein men usually deal more unequally with one another, than in indifferent opinions and practices of Religion; I account that an indifferent opinion which good men differ about, not that such an opinion is indifferent as to truth or error, but as to salvation or damnation, it is not of necessary belief; By an indifferent practice in Religion, I mean that which is in its own nature, neither a duty, nor a sin to do or omit. Where I am left free, I would not have any m•n to rob me of my liberty, or intrench upon my freedom, and because he is satisfied, such a thing is lawful, and fit to be done, expect I should do it, who think it otherwise, or because he is confident such an opinion is true, be angry with me, because I cannot believe as fast as he. Now if another do ill, in doing thus to me, I cannot do well in doing so to another. And do not say that thou art sure thou art in the right, and he that differs from thee in the wrong, and therefore thou mayest impose upon him, though he may not upon thee; hath not every man this confidence of his own opinion and practice, and usually the weakest cause bears up with the greatest confidence; now if thou wouldest not have another that is confident ⟨p. 259⟩he is in the right, to impose upon thee, do not thou impose upon another for all thy confidence. We should rather be modest, and say every one to our selves; How came I to be so much wiser then other men, which way came the spirit of the Lord, from so many Wise and Pious men, to speak unto me? Is it a peculiar privilege granted to me, that I cannot be mistaken, or are not they most of all mistaken, who think they cannot mistake? If then I be but like other men, why should I take so much upon me, as if my understanding were to be a rule, and my apprehensions a standard to the whole World? As if when another man differs from me, I did not differ as much from him; why may not another man understand the thing better than I do, or what crime is it if he understand it not so well? Were all mens understandings cast in the same Mould?

8. In matters of freedome and liberty; Which are not determined by any natural or positive Law, wee must permit as much to others, as wee assume to our selves; and this is a sign of an equal, and temperate person and one that justly values his own understanding and power. But there is nothing wherein men usually deal more unequally with one another, than in indifferent opinions and practices of Religion; I account that an indifferent opinion which good men differ about, not that such an opinion is indifferent as to truth or errour, but as to salvation or damnation, it is not of necessary beleef; By an indifferent practice in Religion, I mean that which is in its own nature, neither a duty, nor a sin to do or omit. Where I am left free, I would not have any mn to rob mee of my liberty, or intrench upon my freedome, and because hee is satisfied, such a thing is lawful, and fit to be done, expect I should do it, who think it otherwise, or because hee is confident such an opinion is true, be angry with mee, because I cannot beleeve as fast as hee. Now if another do ill, in doing thus to mee, I cannot do well in doing so to another. And do not say that thou art sure thou art in the right, and he that differs from thee in the wrong, and therefore thou mayest impose upon him, though hee may not upon thee; hath not every man this confidence of his own opinion and practice, and usually the weakest cause bears up with the greatest confidence; now if thou wouldest not have another that is confident