A25478:1492
A supplement to The Morning-exercise at Cripple-Gate, or, Several more cases of conscience practically…
A supplement to The Morning-exercise at Cripple-Gate, or, Several more cases of conscience practically resolved by sundry ministers
London: printed for Thomas Cockerill, 1676
Sermon 15 › Question 1 › Argument 2 › Proposition 1: 1. Proposition.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
1. Proposition.
Man being made by God a rational creature, and a voluntary Agent, is obliged to take God for his Governor and Ruler: the actual existence of a Creature doth necessarily and immediately infer his relation to a Creator, as the being of a Son doth the relation of a Father: actual creation is the fundamentum or ground of this relation: and as it is an absurdity in nature, that a Son should be a Son, having his being by his Parents under God, and should not be obliged to be thankful to them, to […] them, love them, and obey them; so it is much more absurd, that man […] a rational being from God, and not be obliged to take him for his Gove••••• by how much God is greater then our Parents, and the first cause of our being. And this man is obliged unto, antecedently to his own consent; yea, though he should never consent unto it; as a Son is bound to obey his Parents, though he should never consent thereto. Though to take God for our Ruler in order to salvation, our own consent is necessary; for God saveth no man against his will, nor without his own consent, but by his powerful Spirit maketh them willingly consent; but as our consent was not necessary (nor possible) to our own creation, so it is not necessary to our obligation and subjection unto God; yet if man doth not consent to take God for his Governor, he is a Rebel against his Maker, and though he do it not, he stands bound to do it; else obedience to God were not man's duty, nor disobedience his sin, and then man might act as he list, and do what he please, and never have any accusation from his own Conscience, nor reason to be ashamed of, nor afraid of any thing he doth, if he can by policy or power escape punishment from men, and if they should come to any harm by what they do, it would be rather for their silliness and unwariness, then for their wickedness; or if they do good, moved thereunto by their own