A25478:2113
A supplement to The Morning-exercise at Cripple-Gate, or, Several more cases of conscience practically…
A supplement to The Morning-exercise at Cripple-Gate, or, Several more cases of conscience practically resolved by sundry ministers
London: printed for Thomas Cockerill, 1676
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
1. First motions; Those unfleched thoughts, and single threads, before a multitude of them come to be twisted and woven into a discourse: such as skip up from our natural corruption, and sink down again as fish in a river. These are sins though we consent not to them; because, though they are without our will, they are not against our nature; but spring from an inordinate frame, of a different hue from what God implanted in us. How can the first sprouts be good, if the root be evil? Not only the thought formed, but the very formation, or first imagination is evil. Voluntariness is not necessary to the essence of a sin, though it be to the aggravation of it. 'Tis not my Will or Knowledge,1 which doth make an act sinful, but God's prohibition. Lot's incest was not ushered by any deliberate consent of his Will; yet who will deny it to be a sin, since he should have exercised a severer command over himself, than to be overtaken with drunkenness, which was the occasion of it? Original sin is not effectivè voluntary in infants; because no act of the will is exerted in an infant about it: Yet it is voluntary subjectivè; because it doth inhaerere voluntati. These motions may be said to be voluntary negatively, because the Will doth not set bounds to them, and exercise that sovereign dominion over the operations of the soul, which it ought to do, and wherewith it was at it's first creation invested. Besides though the Will doth not immediately consent to them, yet it consents to the occasions, which administer such motions; and therefore, according to the rule, that causa causae est causa causati, may be justly charged upon our score.
1. First motions; Those unfleched thoughts, and single threads, before a multitude of them come to be twisted and woven into a discourse: such as skip up from our natural corruption, and sink down again as fish in a river. These are sins though we consent not to them; because, though they are without our will, they are not against our nature; but spring from an inordinate frame, of a different hue from what God implanted in us. How can the first sprouts be good, if the root be evil? Not only the thought formed, but the very formation, or first imagination is evil. Voluntariness is not necessary to the essence of a sin, though it be to the aggravation of it. 'Tis not my Will or Knowledg,1 which doth make an act sinful, but God's prohibition. Lot's incest was not ushered by any deliberate consent of his Will; yet who will deny it to be a sin, since he should have exercised a severer command over himself, than to be overtaken with drunkenness, which was the occasion of it? Original sin is not effectivè voluntary in infants; because no act of the will is exerted in an infant about it: Yet it is voluntary subjectivè; because it doth inhaerere voluntati. These motions may be said to be voluntary negatively, because the Will doth not set bounds to them, and exercise that soveraign dominion over the operations of the soul, which it ought to do, and wherewith it was at it's first creation invested. Besides though the Will doth not immediately consent to them, yet it consents to the occasions, which administer such motions; and therefore, according to the rule, that causa causae est causa causati, may be justly charged upon our score.